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ABSTRACT

Papers, Places, and Familias: Tracing the Social Mobility of
Mexicans in New York
by
Guillermo Yrizar Barbosa

Advisor: Robert C. Smith

Why and how do some undocumented immigrants, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
recipients, and their families in the United States do better than others in terms of family
household income and educational planning? Immigrant “illegality” can limit specific possibilities
and opportunities for most immigrants and their family members. But important variations have
been identified in ethnographic fieldwork for this dissertation and through a dataset of
contemporary immigrants interviewed in New York. The objective of this dissertation is to
analyze how immigration status, place or local ecosystem, human capital, social networks, and
intra-family dynamics affect the socioeconomic mobility of individuals, born in Mexico, who
have resided in the United States for over a decade. In general, they are the heads of family
households in the Bronx and Queens, both in immigrant-friendly New York City, and Suffolk
County in less welcoming Eastern Long Island. This dissertation seeks to understand
socioeconomic and educational outcomes by examining the effects of immigration status, local
ecosystems, and intra-family dynamics among Mexican-born heads of 53 family households.
Chapter 2 explains key concepts under the current deportation and immigration-enforcement
regime, offering also a theoretical model based on the principle of social mobility as one aspect of
immigrant integration in U.S. society. Chapter 3 examines the contexts of social mobility among
iv

Mexicans in New York using sociodemographic and migration-related variables. Chapter 4 is
about outliers, because it focuses on extreme cases of families who have experienced exceptional
upward mobility based on the theoretical model I suggest and despite their being long-term
unauthorized immigrants. Chapter 5 explains how certain collective practices and common
interactions with institutions in local ecosystems offer community support for undocumented
Mexicans living in family households. Chapter 6 deals with deferred mobility, a type of precarious
immobility for family households with DACA relatives. In conclusion, legal immigration status is
not the only factor influencing upward mobility for Mexicans living in New York. Some
individuals and their families are able to achieve notable socioeconomic successes, even as
undocumented migrants, largely because of their higher human capital, stronger social networks,
and positive intra-family dynamics. One central aim of this dissertation was to demonstrate that
the Mexican immigrant community, far from being homogeneous, hidden or utterly powerless, is
actually diverse, active, and increasing their strength in New York, despite structural barriers and
their fairly recent arrival in this part of the country. The social mobility and integration of
international migrants from Mexico, including their children and families, is inextricably linked to
regularization policies, from granting legal status to enabling access to valuable social goods
established by U.S. society.
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CHAPTER 1. HOW DO PAPERS, PLACES, AND FAMILIES MATTER FOR
SOCIAL MOBILITY?
In recent years, the role of legal status has increasingly been seen as a central determinant
of immigrant integration and social mobility (Alba & Foner, 2015; Bean et al., 2015;
Donato & Armenta, 2011; Gonzales, 2015; Kasinitz, 2012; Massey, 2007; Menjívar &
Kanstroom, 2015; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2015;
Portes, 2012; Ruszczyk & Yrizar Barbosa, 2016; Smith, 2008; Yoshikawa, 2012). Clearly,
undocumented status can play an enormous role in determining the different possibilities
for international migrants in the United States and elsewhere, with a great deal of variation
between migrant communities and even within families (Abrego, 2014; Dreby, 2015; Fix &
Zimmermann, 2001; López, 2015; Mummert, 2012; Schramm, 2018; Sousa-Rodriguez,
2016; Vasquez, 2011; Yrizar Barbosa & Alarcón, 2015; Yrizar Barbosa & Bermúdez
Tapia, 2019; Dreby & Schmalzbauer, 2013; Foner, 2009; Reed & Yrizar Barbosa, 2017).
Not all undocumented immigrants experience their irregular or liminal status the same way.
For many, it seems an insurmountable barrier. Some others manage to achieve substantial
goals, if always with limited mobility, despite being sin papeles pero en familias.
Why and how do some undocumented immigrants, DACA recipients, and their
families in the United States do better than others in terms of family household income and
educational planning? Immigrant “illegality” can limit specific possibilities and
opportunities for most immigrants and their family members. But important variations have
been identified in ethnographic fieldwork for this dissertation and through a dataset of
contemporary immigrants interviewed through the Mexican Initiative for Deferred Action
Project (MIDA). Informants for this research represent only a few of the eleven million
people born abroad and living in U.S. society today without regular or lawful immigration
1

status, mainly from Latin American countries. They are de facto residents and de jure
unauthorized “aliens” under an economic and political system that restricts their socioeconomic mobility. The objective of this dissertation is to analyze how immigration status,
place or local ecosystem, human capital, social networks and intra-family dynamics affect
the socioeconomic mobility of individuals born in Mexico those who have resided in the
United States for over a decade, generally the heads of family households in the Bronx and
Queens (both in immigrant-friendly New York City), and Suffolk County in lesswelcoming Eastern Long Island.
Immigrant social mobility, as the key dependent variable, denotes two aspects of
socio-economic mobility: family household income and educational planning (for adults
and minors). Social mobility for immigrants in this project will be assessed by their total
family household income resulting from their jobs or occupations –allowing them to have
economic stability, avoid overcrowding or extremely poor housing conditions, and
allowing them to acquire valuable educational opportunities for themselves and their
children. 1 Educational planning is defined as a process of preparation, application or
exercising of verbal plans and actions to advance the education of adults and children
within the immigrant family household beyond high school and college graduation. I will
discuss two outcomes in this dissertation: immigrant upward mobility for those with higher
household income and educational attainment, English proficiency, and strong social
networks –displayed for example by the Arias family in Queens and the Iñiguez family in
Long Island– and immigrant “precarious immobility” with support from local organizations

This specific definition of social mobility for immigrants was made considering recent theoretical and
empirical work on the challenges of integration for immigrants in North Atlantic societies in general (see
Alba & Foner, 2015) and for the Mexican population in the United States in particular (see Alarcón et al.,
2016).

1
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–identified initially in the Bronxite Barrios family and in most of the 92 individual cases
and 53 family households I studied across the three sites. Precarious immobility is defined
as a socioeconomic situation in which these individuals living in immigrant family
households are neither upwardly nor downwardly mobile in terms of occupations, income,
and educational prospects.
Immigration status is the main independent variable in this study, and I divide status
into three categories: (1) the documented, integrated by U.S. citizenship, U.S. Legal
Permanent Residence, or other legal status; (2) the “DACA-mented”; and (3) the
undocumented. 2 The main focus is on the last two groups, the DACA-mented and longterm undocumented immigrants (or LTUs, that is, people living ten or more years in the
United States). For these groups, I found important variations in the experience of lacking
papers or authorization by the federal government, including the direction and degree of
mobility. Furthermore, very little is known about social mobility –the object of analysis in
this dissertation– for these last two groups in contemporary U.S. society, and even less
about how upward or downward mobility among DACA-mented and undocumented
immigrants is related to other factors developed within family households, such as human
capital, social networks, or partnering and parenting decisions.
Local ecosystems, at some points also called local institutional contexts (or place),
refers here to the social infrastructure available to (and used by) any person, in the form of
community-based organizations (CBOs) and policies to promote the well-being of

The term DACA-mented has been used by other authors such as Gonzales, Terriquez, & Ruszczyk (2014).
Unauthorized, irregular and undocumented are used interchangeably for the same group of people: foreignborn individuals who overstayed their visa, lost their status, or crossed the U.S. border clandestinely, not
being able to get lawful presence and lawful status (see Gonzales, 2015; Bloch et al., 2014; Spener, 2009).
2
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immigrants and their families. 3 The availability of such infrastructure helps immigrants
most directly by supporting the educational growth of their children –a key element of
social mobility here– but can also help by referring people to other kinds of support
networks, such as providing legal advice and other services in the case of disputes with
landlords or abuses by employers.
Below, I illustrate analytical points using cases from fieldwork for this dissertation
conducted since the summer of 2015. 4 In these cases, the heads of the family households
are LTUs from Mexico. Despite living in a racially diverse neighborhood in Queens, and
scoring as above average in various well-being measures (made up of health, education,
and income indicators), familia Arias does not regularly participate in any local CBOs
(although there are many available to them). The lack of interactions with CBOs has
constrained their upward mobility and educational opportunities for Claudio, Marcela and
their two U.S.-born children. (e.g. finding affordable and good quality options for college).
Claudio and Marcela Arias (married in New York) reported a family-household income of
$70,000 in 2015. It is important to note that since the mid 2000’s the percentage of
undocumented immigrants that are “long-term” has gone up substantially, so they cannot be
thought of as a transient population (see Krogstad et al., 2019; Massey et al., 2014; Passel
et al., 2014; Warren & Warren, 2013).
In contrast, Anastacia Barrios (separated, ex-partner also Mexican) and her two
U.S.-born children reside in a neighborhood with higher poverty, less ethnic diversity (70%

CBO is the broad category that includes other non-governmental organizations or ‘non for profits’ such as
faith-based organizations or FBOs. Here I treat them equally, without any significant organizational
difference.
4
All names are pseudonyms. IRB approval was obtained in November 2014 (and timely renewed), and after
that, progress was made in gaining trust and access to over 100 potential participants (most of them
undocumented; half non- original-MIDA participants) and to a dozen family households in the three locations.
3
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Latino/a), and generally at the bottom of one composite factors. 5 However, familia Barrios
has been actively involved in getting services and participating in more than one local CBO
in New York. This is how they get information about schools and educational programs in
their area and beyond. Anastacia reported a family household income of $25,000 in 2016.
These two families live in New York City, which is more immigrant friendly. Familia
Iñiguez, a third case, resides in the East End of Long Island, which is less immigrantfriendly –more likely hostile– and has fewer resources available, including CBOs, to
support immigrant-family mobility. Yet a faith-based organization (FBO) provided very
low-cost support to them when their youngest child applied for DACA.
Why and how NYC is more welcoming than Long Island could be explained by
looking at local policies and attitudes towards immigrants. For example, IDNYC provides
free identification cards to all city residents regardless of legal status. In opposition,
landlords in Suffolk might ask for SSN to rent a room; police regularly stop Latino drivers;
and other forms of “antagonism” towards Latinos (see Foner, 2008; and D. R. Gordon,
2015) emerge when labor immigrants start settling too close to native-born residents.
Rodrigo and María Fernanda Iñiguez (married in Puebla) reported a family
household income of $75,000 in 2016. They tell their two children to plan and work
towards a graduate degree in spite of financial obstacles. Familias Arias and Iñiguez are
extreme and unusual cases of immigrant upward mobility, while Familia Barrios and most
of the other cases I looked at for this research project displayed what I call immigrant
precarious immobility.

To clarify about this list or composite, I compared neighborhoods between 2015 and 2017 using Measure of
America by the Social Science Research Council, DATA2GO.NYC, available at: http://www.data2go.nyc.

5
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The Iñiguez family, like familia Cortés, resides in a less supportive ecosystem
compared to familias Arias and Barrios. As mentioned earlier, Rodrigo and María Fernanda
Iñiguez got important support from a local FBO in order to achieve DACA status for their
children. In contrast, Socorro Cortés (never married, juntada) and her latest partner in New
York (also from Puebla) are long-term undocumented immigrants from Mexico with a
reported family household income around $20,000 in 2017 and with very little support
from any organization. The Cortés family does not have members who are DACA eligible
and has been receiving very limited community support in Long Island. The FBO’s support
for the Iñiguez family was exceptional, because only a few are eligible for DACA among
the long-term undocumented population. In the case of this family, once their children
achieved DACA status, new educational and work opportunities opened for them, including
access to a driver’s license and credit for a new car.
Socorro Cortés has three U.S.-born children with two different men (not her latest
partner) who were extremely abusive and unsupportive. Two of Socorro’s children are
minors –under 16 years of age in 2018– and U.S.-citizens by birth, now stuck in Mexico
with expired American passports. These two kids live with their grandmother, Socorro’s
mother, and the older child occasionally visits New York during the summer for vacation.
Unlike familias Iñiguez and Barrios, Socorro Cortés and her children have had very limited
organizational support by CBOs or FBOs along their migration trajectory and have recently
resided in Long Island. One of the organizations she did contact referred the case of her
children's passports to me once they got tired of not being able to understand her situation,
demonstrating the limited amount of support the Cortés family has received. Like familia
Barrios, the Cortés family is a case of precarious immobility in immigrant family
households headed by undocumented parents, but with considerably less organizational
6

support in a less welcoming local ecosystem. I argue that Socorro and her family
experienced higher immigrant vulnerability than Anastacia because of living in a less
immigrant-friendly place.
The Arias, Barrios, Iñiguez and Cortés families are examples of distinct forms or
combinations of human capital, social networks, and intra-family dynamics within the
household. These are essential independent variables with the following elements: human
capital, defined as the level of formal schooling or educational attainment, English
proficiency, and pre-emigration work skills, or labor experience; social networks, defined
as those local and transnational or cross-border ties developed by individuals in which
information circulates; and intra-family dynamics, also understood as parenting and
partnering decisions, which includes those actions taken by the heads of the household
(usually as married or cohabiting couples 6) to raise their children and to develop a strong
intimate relationship with an adult peer. These elements have proven essential for familia
Arias to achieve higher quality housing and to find stable, well-paid jobs as a mixed
immigration status family (see Capps et al., 2016; Fix & Zimmermann, 2001; Gomez
Cervantes, 2018; Yrizar Barbosa & Alarcón, 2015). This is also the case of Familia Iñiguez
in Suffolk: A married couple from Mexico (both undocumented) with two children who
received DACA status and a network of relatives who are Legal Permanent Residents or
U.S. citizens. One of the Iñiguez parents has a university education from Mexico, selfidentifies as an autodidact adult, speaks fluent English, and makes key family decisions
with her/his partner's support and approval. 7 This is not the case of informants identified in
Anastacia’s neighborhood in the Bronx and other parents living or working in Queens or in

6
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This qualifier was included to point out the fact that I am referring to adults making family decisions.
To protect the identity of informants and their children, I do not openly disclose their gender.
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the case of familia Cortés in Long Island. 8 With very low formal education, almost no
English, an unstable job (e.g. cleaning homes or as dishwashers and cooks in restaurants),
and very little support from friends or family, Anastacia Barrios and Socorro Cortés
struggle to fulfill their role as breadwinners. However, Anastacia and her kids can rely on
the organizational support available to them from more than one CBO they trust in their
neighborhood.
1.1 UNAUTHORIZED, UNRECOGNIZED, UNAPPRECIATED
Lacking papeles, official documentation, or legal immigration status is a major
disadvantage for the foreign-born and their immediate relatives in the United States,
including “sanctuary” or immigrant-welcoming places such as New York City.
Unauthorized immigration status is without a doubt a hefty obstacle to finding fair housing
opportunities and good schools, formal jobs with benefits, and accessing health or financial
services. Most of the unauthorized immigrants I met and interviewed also expressed a
constant mental burden: the worry and stress of experiencing family separation because of a
sudden deportation on any given day.
Immigrant families with undocumented members fear deportation, but not
uniformly. At least since the late 1990s, scholars have been moving forward the concept of
“immigrant illegality” to examine how states and governments develop different legal and
administrative systems that dehumanize international migrants, often marking them as lawbreakers or intruders (see Ruszczyk & Yrizar Barbosa, 2016). This condition of illegality is
nearly inescapable, and in many instances violates basic human rights by increasing the
social vulnerability of U.S. citizens and non-citizens alike. Immigrant illegality is pervasive
in contemporary U.S. society, but does not necessarily condemn unauthorized immigrants
8

I am not arguing this is the case for all immigrant families in the Bronx and Queens.

8

in all sections of their lives. There are at least two dominant images of these migrants
today: one is the political image of criminals or “bad hombres,” and the other is the socioeconomic idea of individuals who are unskilled, exploited, and stuck, painting immigrants
as a uniform category of persons. My research shows that while these immigrants are
vulnerable to deportation, they are mainly good hombres and mujeres, and some are
upwardly mobile.
Negative images of undocumented people abound in public opinion and
contemporary political discourse in the United States. Unauthorized immigrants have been
identified as lawbreakers or security risks. National and local media outlets still use the
pejorative label of “illegal immigrants” (see Brown, 2019), despite organized efforts to
humanize this group, such as the “Drop the I-Word” campaign (see Race Forward, 2017).
In the United States, irregular migrants have historically been perceived as “undesired” and
“unassimilable” (see Ngai, 2004), and as “a threat” (Chavez, 2008) to the nation and its
formal citizens: as invaders and intruders. Furthermore, at least since the late 1990s,
Mexican scholars have characterized the undocumented population as “vulnerable” or
“low-skilled” (see Bustamante, 2002; Escobar‐Latapí, 1999). This kind of language, I
contend, leaves little room to distinguish the heterogeneity beyond national origins, age or
gender, for a group of over ten million people with limited civil and political rights living
the American way of life, in the shadows but also in broad daylight.
Another portrayal of contemporary undocumented immigrants usually describes
them as individual workers with little to no value, uneducated, unable to learn, low-skilled,
unskilled or “low status” (see Alba & Foner, 2015). Perhaps because of the fact that most of
the unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. labor market receive low or very low salaries,
there is a widespread perception that they lack work-related skills and can hardly improve
9

their skills to move up in their sectors or industries. This could also be associated with the
idea that because most of these irregular migrants report little to no formal education in
their countries of origin, they have a more limited capacity to learn or improve new or
different ideas, skills or abilities in their occupations in a new country.
Unauthorized immigrants in the United States, about half of them born in Mexico,
are also generally imagined as vulnerable and mostly or only downwardly mobile in
socioeconomic terms. Because of their clandestine situation and “unskilled” profile,
undocumented immigrants can sometimes be described by segments of public opinion as
poor, an economic burden to societies and governments, free riders, or a public charge, not
contributing in any way to the communities where they live, under the intensification of the
“crimmigration system” (see Golash-Boza, 2015; Menjívar et al., 2018), ignoring that many
pay taxes. Along these lines, the undocumented population could be considered as faceless,
only living in the shadows, as isolated and lonely people constantly hiding and running
away from the public eye. In addition, it could be argued that migrants without papers live
mainly in cities that offer them some protection from deportation as well as multiple
services for themselves and their children, rather than in suburbs where they can be easily
targeted: places lacking institutional or organizational support, and where the cost of living
is more expensive.
I argue that the existence as well as the social and economic contributions of
undocumented migrants and their families have been largely unrecognized and
underappreciated at least over the past three decades. By looking at the cases of
contemporary immigrants born in Mexico and living in family households in New York, I
focus on the following variables: (i) immigration status within the family household, (ii)
participation in community-based organizations, (iii) interactions with police or law
10

enforcement agencies in the places they inhabit, (iv) formal educational attainment or
credentials acquired, (v) labor skills developed across time and markets, (vi) immediate
social networks, and (vii) intra-family dynamics within the household. By looking at these
seven variables and how they affect immigrant social mobility, defined in terms of family
household income and educational planning, I encountered a heterogenous group of people
challenging the negative images and preconceptions outlined above. This framework
allowed me to recognize that the undocumented Mexican immigrants I found in New York
were honest, hard workers in a land that offered them opportunities to live and raise their
families that they did not have in Mexico. I found undocumented people contributing
socially, culturally, and economically to the well-being of their communities and
institutions around them in the United States.
My analytical framework intends to trace the socioeconomic mobility of
undocumented immigrants living in family households while going beyond the stereotypes
narrowly defined by their legal immigration status. This approach considers more complex
and positive portrayals of undocumented people beyond the condition of ‘immigrant
illegality,’ such as individuals who are part of families with multiple statuses, workers with
numerous jobs, occupations or extended labor trajectories across two different countries
and markets. Further, unauthorized immigrants analyzed under this framework can be
considered as part of binational or transnational families; students and workers eager to
learn; a workforce not only indispensable but dexterous and specialized; as cooperative and
law-abiding residents, with plans transcending national borders despite their limited
geographic mobility caused by fears of being jailed, deported, and excluded.
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1.2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
The central analytical framework I developed in this research in order to explain the
different degrees of social mobility is presented in the chart below (Table 1.1). This chart
includes the five key factors and the two main outcomes, explained previously, that I
developed in my fieldwork throughout a three-year period. Here, these were applied to four
immigrant families out of the 53 family households headed by undocumented parents that I
interviewed. The chart on the social mobility factors for Mexican immigrants in New York
Table 1.1 Chart on social mobility factors for Mexican immigrants in New York
(i) Papers, or
immigration
status effect?
(parent & child)

(ii)
Org.

(iii)
Police

(iv)
Educ.

Arias,
in Queens

––

––

++

Íñiguez,
in Suffolk

––

++

––

––

Factors →
↓ Familias

Barrios,
in the
Bronx

Cortés, in
Suffolk

(v)
Skill?

(vi) Social
networks:
strongreliable?

(vii) Intra-family:
Partneringparenting
decisions?

++

++

++

++

Upward
mobility

––

++

++

++

++

Upward
mobility

++

++

+–

––

––

––

Precarious
immobility

+–

––

––

––

––

––

Precarious
immobility

Places or
ecosystems

Human
Capital

Acronyms:
Org.: Organizational activity in CBOs or FBOs.
Police refers to interactions with police or law enforcement agents.
Educ.: Educational attainment.

Outcome

Note: Symbols in cells should be interpreted as follows:
– – negative or mostly negative
+ – moderate or mixed
+ + positive or mostly positive.
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includes the four families with undocumented parents presented up to this point in two
different local ecosystems: familias Arias and Barrios in New York City (which is
considerably more inclusionary or welcoming to immigrant populations) and familias
Cortés and Iñiguez in the East End of Long Island, Suffolk County, (a more exclusionary
and less welcoming place or local ecosystem). For these four families the effect of
immigration status is negative or mostly negative because they are long-term
undocumented (LTU) adults with minor children.
Place, or the local ecosystem effect, is positive or mostly positive for those
immigrant families living in places such as Queens and the Bronx (New York City) and
negative or mostly negative for those who reside in Eastern Long Island (Suffolk County).
The combination of elements under the other three factors are only positive or mostly
positive for the Arias and Iñiguez families while those same ones are only negative or
mostly negative for the Cortés family, leading in the first two cases to upward mobility and
to precarious immobility in the last one. In the case of the Barrios family, the combination
of elements under human capital, social networks and intra-family dynamics vary from
negative to moderate or mixed but also lead to a precarious immobility outcome. However,
as I will explain in more detail in Chapter 5, the condition of precarious immobility and
levels of immigrant vulnerability in two opposing local ecosystems are different for
Anastacia Barrios and Socorro Cortés, in part explained by the different levels of
organizational support available to them in each place.
An analytical framework such as the one presented here allows us to highlight the
heterogeneity within the undocumented population. This framework is also useful for
examining the undocumented population as a collective of individuals increasingly living in
family households, or as people struggling with their unauthorized immigration status, but
13

with a collective potential to be more or less upwardly mobile. This collective potential, I
argue, is related to their local institutional contexts (meaning places or immediate socioecological resources); a combination of elements embedded in their family households –
human capital, social networks, plus partnering and parenting decisions– and access to
organizational support in the form of CBOs, FBOs, or more informally such as with a street
vendor.
The overall hypotheses can be stated to explain positive and negative outcomes. I
expected to find immigrant upward mobility among those with more human capital and
stronger social networks (i.e. kinship or inter-ethnic), and where there is a local ecosystem
–or institutional context– with more social and infrastructural support (e.g. mainly among
parents linked to a soccer group in Queens or highly educated heads of family households
in Long Island). I also expected to find immigrant precarious immobility among people
who have less human capital, weaker family, local or transnational networks, and less
institutional support (e.g. those with limited and very weak access to CBOs, FBOs or any
organization in NYC, or who are isolated in Long Island).
How these general outcomes are achieved can be explained through three posited
mechanisms described in the following sub-hypotheses. First, I argue that human capital
and social networks have been extensively documented, but we still know relatively little
about family dynamics, particularly in association with immigration status and dissimilar
settlement areas. Therefore, I hypothesized that human capital, social networks, and
especially intra-family processes of immigrant families –their struggles, strategies,
bargains, and collective dynamics– can help us understand the social integration and
mobility of contemporary international migrants in the United States, or in North and
Central America. Taking the immigrant family household as a unit of social reproduction
14

makes sense because members share the costs and benefits of settling in a foreign land, and
nurture and share their aspirations, beliefs, values, attitudes, and actions that could help
them become upwardly mobile. This dissertation examines these issues through in-depth
interviews and ethnographic work with Mexicans living in family households in New York
for more than a decade.
I also hypothesize that having legal immigration status will foster more upward
mobility as well as stronger strategies and better family bargains under any local
institutional context. In Long Island, for instance, interactions with the town police can
have different consequences depending on legal status. Such was the case for Familia
Jaramillo, in which the heads of the family household are legal permanent residents with a
nearby strong kinship network of U.S. citizens around them, compared to Familia Moreno,
in which both parents are long-term undocumented immigrants with a weaker and more
distant family and inter-ethnic network despite limited support by a local FBO. Legal
immigration status allows people to get formal jobs with a certain degree of benefits, and
also to seek additional educational opportunities for themselves and their children. Legal
immigration status allows immigrants to make more use of multiple public and private
institutions, from schools to colleges, hospitals to banks, political parties, and courts or lawenforcement agencies. Legal immigration status could allow greater flexibility and
geographic mobility for immigrants to invest in and develop individual and collective
projects across borders, building more bridges than walls across communities.
Undocumented persons can still be upwardly mobile if they have more human
capital, reliable networks, and positive family dynamics with their immediate relatives.
More formal education, easier or greater access to occupations licensed or certified by
states, and improved conditions in their workplaces all could be converted into better
15

mobility strategies. 9 In addition, more human and social capital can be used to start new
business opportunities via self-employment and greater degrees of entrepreneurship.
My final hypothesis contends that the impact of unauthorized status on the social
mobility of immigrants will be amplified or mitigated based on the supportive sociocommunitarian infrastructure available in different local ecosystems, that is, based on the
services and opportunities available to them and their relatives. If they have better access to
CBOs, the worst impacts of irregular status can be mitigated, otherwise their status would
affect their mobility to a greater degree.
1.3 IMMIGRATION STATUS AND SOCIAL MOBILITY ACROSS PLACES
The labor trajectories and family life of Mexican immigrants, in tandem with legal
immigration status, education, and location, have increasingly come under study by
contemporary scholars. Despite the decline in the number of undocumented immigrants
since 2007 (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2015; Passel et
al., 2012), there is a growing interest in research documenting how unauthorized status not
only represents a challenge for the first generation of immigrants but also for their children,
particularly in the case of the contemporary Mexican population in the U.S. (Bean et al.,
2015). 10 The present and future of Mexican migrants and their children seems to be

9
According to Calvo (2017) New York State made it easier for undocumented immigrants to obtain licenses
for certain professions in 2016. According to this author: “New York chose to allow licensing to a broad
category of non-citizens not lawfully present, including those permanently residing in the state under color of
law (‘PRUCOL’) and those with DACA” (p.38). While California “removed all non-citizens category
restrictions”, New York “allowed licensing and teacher certification to those who can demonstrate that their
presence had federal knowledge and acquiescence or permission” (p.96).
10
The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that approximately 4.5 million US citizen children have at least one
undocumented parent (Passel et al., 2014). According to other estimates by the Migration Policy Institute,
there were 5.1 million children under age 18 living with at least one unauthorized immigrant parent during the
2009-2013 period; in New York State approximately 293,000 people were children of unauthorized
immigrants (Capps et al., 2016).
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threatened by low educational attainment, limited English proficiency, and immigration
status or legal categorization (see Chavez, 1992; Menjívar & Kanstroom, 2015).
New York City could be perceived as a sanctuary for the undocumented population
because it is “America’s quintessential immigrant city” (Foner & Waldinger, 2013, p. 349),
a space where immigrant identities have altered the meaning of being American across
generations (Kasinitz et al., 2008). However, outside the city a more complex picture
emerges. Migration scholars are very aware of the relevance of analyzing origins, stability
and settlement patterns of labor migrants, or “modes of incorporation” (Portes & Böröcz,
1989). Places in Long Island are often more hostile destinations for immigrants (Southern
Poverty Law Center, 2009), and often fail to provide social infrastructure favoring
immigrant integration, with towns falling under the “suburban free riding” phenomenon, by
which local officials decide to rely on central cities to serve immigrant communities (see de
Graauw, Gleeson, and Bloemraad 2013). Communities in Suffolk County could be less
friendly than those in New York City, although they are emerging immigrant destinations
for Latino/as (see Foner, 2008; D. R. Gordon, 2015). It is important to consider that even in
a ‘sanctuary city’ like New York City and in ‘suburban free riding towns’ such as the East
End of Long Island, people from Mexico who lack legal immigration status in family
households have expressed many fears and recurrent concerns, both under previous
governmental actions (i.e. deportations during 2nd term of the Obama Administration) and
through more recent xenophobic anti-immigrant rhetoric from the federal government (i.e.
Trump Presidential campaign and 1st term). Regardless, the majority of unauthorized
immigrants interviewed for this research did not plan to return to their country of origin. 11

11

MIDA data also showed that most of the participants did not plan to go back to their country of birth.
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Family matters for immigrants, not only due to the importance of keeping certain
social or cultural traits, or as an emotional retreat from considerably stressful lives, but also
to balance socioeconomic disadvantage. For instance, because the family constitutes a form
of social capital, it could facilitate economic gains through entrepreneurship (see Sanders &
Nee, 1996). Human capital and social networks have been widely studied by migration
scholars, but that has not been the case for family dynamics and legal immigration status.
Exceptions are projects focused on immigrant generations across groups and locations, in
many instances paying attention to gender, by Dreby (2010, 2015), Abrego (2014),
Schmalzbauer (2014), Foner & Dreby (2011), Menjívar (2006), and Foner (2009), plus
recent work on mothers by Souza-Rodriguez (2016) or Pratt (2012). Another important
work on the upward occupational mobility of immigrant women in Spain by Parella,
Petroff, and Solé, (2013) is worthy of mention because they also look at socio-structural
elements that condition labor trajectories for international migrants.
The aim in this dissertation is to analyze how three factors –immigration status,
local ecosystems, and intra-family processes within immigrant household units (combining
human capital, social networks as well as parenting and partnering decisions) affect
immigrant social mobility. This research engages key themes in the literature on immigrant
integration and bargains. However, few studies have examined how exactly legal status
affects the social mobility of immigrants (Powers & Seltzer, 1998; Zhou et al., 2008), and
even fewer have recognized how some subgroups within the undocumented population
could be achieving immigrant upward social mobility (Eisema et al., 2014). The immigrant
bargain could be defined as an intergenerational expectation in which the efforts of the
parents will be converted into future educational success for their children (Louie, 2012;
Smith, 2006). This study is unique, as it traces how undocumented immigrants, DACA
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recipients and their immediate family members within the same households could be
developing forms of progressive social mobility in the United States.
Unauthorized immigrants in American society experience social vulnerability (see
Bustamante, 1997) and marginalization, however there is significant variation in how those
conditions affect people who have been living for over a decade without legal immigration
status, located across different cities, towns and suburbs. By focusing on the social mobility
of undocumented immigrants, this project acknowledges the complexity of these processes.
My intention is to participate in the development of alternative approaches to the study of
social mobility using case studies of families and communities as suggested by Bertaux &
Thompson (1997). Furthermore, this research was heavily influenced by academic work
stressing the centrality of binational experience and transferability of skills in labor markets
for those apparently “unskilled” (Hagan et al., 2015), the role of transnational social
practices (Pries, 2017) and new perspectives in cross-border mobility for migrants and their
relatives even after someone in the kinship networks dies (see Lestage, 2012). 12 A
fundamental concept and analysis that inspired one of the two main outcomes for the
families included in this research is concerning the production of “precarious immigration
status” (see Goldring, Berinstein, & Bernhard, 2009; Goldring & Landolt, 2013). In sum,
this is a study designed to add to the developing linkages in contemporary transatlantic
research between social mobilities, family relations and non-binary migratory status (i.e.
beyond ‘documented vs. undocumented’, see Bautista León, 2018; Gomez Cervantes, 2018;
Jarrín Morán, 2018; Schramm, 2018; Smith & Yrizar Barbosa, 2018).

Up to late July 2020 about 2,000 Mexicans died in the United States due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
almost 800 in the New York-New Jersey-Connecticut area, and the ashes of 105 people were sent to Puebla.
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1.4 DATA, METHODS, AND APPROACH
This dissertation seeks to understand socioeconomic and educational outcomes by
examining the effects of immigration status, local ecosystems, and intra-family household
dynamics among Mexican-born heads of 53 family households in three different places in
New York. The research design involves 92 cases (from over 70 in-depth recorded
interviews and 22 non-recorded interviews, but written and registered cases) with young
and middle-aged adults born in Mexico –half male, half female, mostly between 25 and 49
years old, who arrived in the U.S. after IRCA, mainly undocumented and DACA eligible–,
identified through four points of access to the Mexican community: three access points are
within NYC neighborhoods and one is a region of small suburban towns in the East End of
Long Island (Suffolk County). 13 The MIDA study allowed me to expand my fieldwork in
New York State.
The logic of selection for the study was to analytically discuss how various
contextual and institutional features in each place were relevant for the immigrant life of
Mexicans in New York, a majority of them identified as long-term undocumented
immigrants living in family households. The participants were selected from four settings:
(1) a food/taco-truck, (2) a non-professional soccer group (both in Queens), (3) a
community-based organization focused on educational issues in the Bronx; and (4) local
faith-based organizations in Long Island. Based on reported social mobility and on access
to their family household life, 12 families (that is, three to four families in each site of
interest) were selected for fuller ethnographic study, involving additional participant
The 70 participants for the interviews were selected from the two sources: (1) the MIDA database (which
already includes sociodemographic and migratory variables for +1,700 individuals in NY State) and (2) from
significant and continuous interactions with individuals not affiliated to any CBO who mainly reside or work
in Queens. The age span of the interviewees corresponds to a key demographic of Mexican labor immigrants.
The fact that they might be at different stages of life was considered fundamental when developing their
cases. Individuals with more than 15 years in the US were ideal targets for the interviews.
13
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observation and more detailed notes. I recorded detailed data concerning individuals’ first
job or occupation, their trajectory, most recent job, income, and working hours over time. I
also asked how undocumented parents make decisions about education for themselves and
their children. By August 2017, I had developed 92 ethnographic cases and about 70
interviews for this dissertation and the Mexican Initiative for Deferred Action (MIDA)
project. 14
MIDA was a research and intervention project to promote Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) applications led by Robert C. Smith from Baruch College.
Over 1,700 intakes were conducted between 2015 and 2016 with the collaboration of a
dozen community-based organizations and legal service providers all over New York State.
This dissertation was one piece of the larger MIDA project. I focused my fieldwork on New
York City and the East End of Long Island, but I have simultaneously been data manager
and research assistant for MIDA and interrelated projects that emerged since 2017, with full
access to databases and team meetings.
Two approaches were considered using Robert Smith’s (2014) ethnographic and
case-based analysis for this research. The first one is a narrative approach and the second
one, still under development with the MIDA team as part of a longitudinal project, consists
of coding cases and causal processes. I analyzed all the cases looking at key variables such
as income, legal status, or educational attainment, but also did partial coding across cases
for emergent processes, such as the importance of police targeting of ‘some dark-skinned’
In some instances, I did multiple interviews and followed up with the 70 participants who accepted to do at
least one formal and recorded interview. With the rest of the ethnographic cases I developed, about two dozen
included in this dissertation (but I started with more than that, close to 30), I was not able to do a formal
recorded interview because they felt uncomfortable. However, all of those who did not want me to record an
interview did accept to talk with me on several occasions about themes and subjects of interests for this
dissertation, at different places and times between 2015 and 2017 in New York and by phone or text messages
after that. These same individuals also allowed me to take notes of our conversations and to spend several
hours around them while they worked, relaxed, or were running errands.
14
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drivers as Mexicans, and other forms of immigrant discrimination when accessing public
services. These issues emerged in various interviews and collective fieldwork in NYC,
Long Island, and other three local ecosystems in MIDA. Anti-immigrant sentiment was
reflected both in the actions of different local governments, and by informants’ accounts.
This enables me and the MIDA team led by Smith to both tell the stories documenting the
processes we are analyzing, and know how widespread the processes are, and with which
other variables they vary. For example, if a U.S. citizen relative who drives still gets pulled
over and ticketed for ‘looking Mexican’, then the impact is due to ‘simple racism.’ If they
do not get ticketed when they have papers, but still get pulled over, then there is racial
profiling, but legal immigration status insulates them from harsher effects.
For the narrative approach, I relied on the concept of “personal myths” (McAdams,
1993), especially when reconstructing the life stories of long-term undocumented mothers
and fathers living with their minor children in New York. I argue that when paying close
attention to their stories, reflecting migratory and labor trajectories in both countries, as
individuals and as a family unit, trying to identify personal myths is important to elucidate
limitations imposed by immigration status and to discern ways in which these individuals,
usually mothers and fathers, overcome barriers and seek opportunities despite a lack of
papers. As a concept anchored in the theory of human identity and linked to developmental
changes in personality, the elements of the personal myth I seek in each of their narratives
as migrant workers heading families are crucial to my work.
In terms of my positionality while doing fieldwork, it is important to add a few
reflections and clarifications. I was very transparent and honest with all the participants in
this research about my intentions, in terms of the dissertation project, specifically telling
them about my personal background as a privileged ‘light skinned mestizo and graduate
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student from a small-urban town in San Luis Potosí (Matehuala, Mexico). Due to my
education I had the chance to live in different cities they knew, particularly across the U.S.Mexico border. I also knew all the states and some of the cities and towns were my
participants were born, grew up or worked before going to New York.
Working with CUNY, and particularly with research projects ran by Rob Smith (my
advisor), allowed me to offer my participants ‘actionable’ information in exchange,
including referrals or accompaniment (acompañamiento). I always listened very carefully
and respectfully to all my informants. Many of them visited our apartment, met Paola (my
wife) and the rest of my family, spending time together also in their homes, work, or other
places. I am still in contact with several people and along the project I always respected
‘their’ words.
1.5 DISSERTATION STRUCTURE
Papers, places, and familias is a dissertation focused on international migrants from
Mexico living with their families in New York for over ten years. It is about people
exclusively born in Mexico who for the most part lack the authorization from the U.S.
federal government to be legal immigrants; to raise their children with the rest of the
school-age population; to work and prosper however they desire; to move freely across
borders and across countries, and to be fully part of –or to develop membership in–
multiple communities and institutions in more than one country if they want to.
Chapter 2 explains key concepts such as immigrant “illegality” and “limited social
inclusion” (Yrizar Barbosa et al., 2019) under the current deportation- and immigrationenforcement regime. I offer a theoretical model based on the principle of social mobility as
one aspect of immigrant integration that should be available to international migrants in
contemporary societies. This model emphasizes my interest in the centrality of immigration
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status (papeles), local ecosystems (places or lugares), plus forms of capital and dynamics
within family households’ (familias), all of which are crucial to understanding
contemporary processes of social inclusion and exclusion at the national or local level. The
chapter is structured in three sections, first presenting a tridimensional model of immigrant
inclusion and exclusion, then referring to present and past migration theories on integration,
and closing with references to subjectivity, deportability, and immigrant illegality.
Chapter 3 examines the contexts of social mobility among Mexicans in New York
using sociodemographic and migration-related variables. The chapter has four sections. In
the first section, I focus on variables such as nativity, age, sex, marital status, and
household type. This data shows the growing presence of the Mexican population across
the five boroughs between 2000 and 2015. The second section includes data on U.S.
citizenship status and the Mexican-origin electorate in the city, plus estimates of the
undocumented population at the state and local level in New York. Third, the chapter looks
into the historical flows and returns of Mexicans up to the present day, demonstrating that
there is not one single “Little Mexico” in NYC and highlighting relevant differences
between the first immigrant generation (i.e. the foreign-born) and the second (i.e. the
domestic- or native-born) in terms of educational attainment and household income. The
fourth section deals with the familial context by presenting data on key variables for
immigrant socioeconomic mobility, such as educational attainment, language, household
income and poverty. At the end, I discuss an important paradox for Mexican families in
New York in terms of educational gains for the U.S.-born but distressing poverty rates in
urban households headed by women.
Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter of this dissertation, based on my
ethnographic work with 53 family households. This chapter is about outliers, because it
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focuses on extreme cases of families who have experienced exceptional upward mobility
based on the theoretical model I suggest, despite being long-term unauthorized immigrants.
In this chapter I make the point that the contemporary undocumented population in the
United States is far from homogeneous; and there might be a small group of people that are
able to use or develop their human and social capital across borders in order to be upwardly
mobile, despite their immigration status and across different local ecosystems.
In Chapter 5, I aim to analyze how certain collective practices and common
interactions with institutions in local ecosystems offer community support for LTUs from
Mexico living in family households. The focus is on Mexican immigrants I met at Los
Nómadas food truck, a street vendor in Queens, and volunteers from Catholic FBOs in
Long Island. The chapter has three sections. In the first section, I define precarious
immobility. The second presents cases of precarious immobility for undocumented mothers
and fathers, emphasizing how educational attainment and organizational support explain
their higher or lower immigrant vulnerability. A third section identifies differences between
a more hostile environment for immigrants in Long Island and immigrant-friendly New
York City. This section also addresses the two levels of vulnerability to potential
detentions, deportations, or loss of goods and properties after negative interactions with law
enforcement agents.
It is important to clarify two separate issues discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 that are
also relevant for the rest of the chapters. First, my understanding of immigrant family
household is broad and not fixed; that is, all the people I interviewed lived with immediate
kin (parents, siblings, children) or not so distant relatives (grandparents, aunts, uncles,
cousins) in households in New York, and in very few cases were people who had their
partners and children in Mexico or were de facto couples (juntados, non-married), with or
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without children. The second issue is that, while this dissertation focuses on the immigrant
social integration and the social mobility of unauthorized migrants in places of destination,
I also discovered throughout my research that the international migration project in itself, as
an individual or non-individual experience, is a form of transnational socioeconomic
mobility.
For example, many international migrants, despite having unauthorized status in a
more developed or wealthier country of destination and after settling for an increasing
number of years, experience positive forms of social mobility in general terms and
compared to the experience of their non-migrant peers in their country of origin. However,
because of their irregular immigration status and the risks associated with experiencing
deportation, the interruption of this migratory trajectory by the state or the government in
the destination could considerably diminish the initial positive social mobility in destination
and place of origin. This, the condition of immigrant precarious immobility, is essentially
tied to an unauthorized status, first determined in relation to the population or society in the
country of destination, and second to a condition of immigrant vulnerability, or the
challenges and risks associated with being deported and facing a lifetime ban from a
country that for many years was home.
Chapter 6 deals with deferred mobility, a type of precarious immobility for family
households with DACA relatives. This situation occurs when the granting of partial status
opens up educational and work opportunities previously denied because of lacing legal
immigration status. This type of mobility is directly related to DACA recipients increasing
their mobility prospects because they can get better jobs and better educational
opportunities. In addition, this chapter shows that residing in immigrant-friendly NYC,
versus less-immigrant-friendly Long Island, explains a higher or lower vulnerability. In
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particular the degree of vulnerability is based on the types of interactions these
communities have with police agents or because of potential links with organizations able
to provide community support. The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first one,
the two socioeconomic extremes of “DACA learners” and “DACA laborers” (a
terminology used and explained in detail in the chapter) are presented for four groups of
immigrants. The second section explains the one extreme of learners for DACA recipients
in the Bronx, while the third describes the other extremes of laborers for DACA recipients
in towns of Eastern Long Island. The chapter closes by pointing out that most of the
immigrants interviewed put great value on education, however not all of them got support
to access higher education or lived in encouraging places for undocumented families.
In the final chapter, as a conclusion for the dissertation, I summarize the findings
from: the tri-dimensional theoretical model of immigrant social integration, an analysis of
the contexts of mobility for Mexicans in New York (i.e. legal, geographical, familial), and
three empirical chapters tracing the social mobility of those upwardly mobile, those facing
precarious immobility with some degree of vulnerability, and immigrant youth
experiencing deferred mobility. In this last chapter I also review limitations encountered
while doing this dissertation work, as well as some policy implications and
recommendations.
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CHAPTER 2. IMMIGRANT SOCIAL MOBILITY AND LIMITED INCLUSION
Discussions on integration and social mobility of contemporary international migrants in
the United States and Mexico should not overlook, nor underestimate, the role of
immigration status. Since 1965, the flow of migrants from Mexico has constituted the
largest wave of immigration to the United States. This chapter presents an analysis of how
undocumented status gets constructed at the national level, suggesting a theoretical model
of full inclusion/exclusion. This chapter aims to look at a larger context within which the
idea of place or local ecosystem, also proposed by Robert Smith in the MIDA project,
comes into play. Therefore, local ecosystems could magnify or diminish the impacts of this
larger ‘macro-national’ system –or under a “deportation machine” in the words of historian
Adam Goodman (2017)– for unauthorized immigrants, thus affecting their level of
vulnerability and their possibilities for social mobility and inclusion.
About half of the approximately 11 million people born in Mexico and residing in
the United States are undocumented, unauthorized, or experiencing what scholars call
“immigrant illegality”. That is, there are between five and six million Mexicans that
according to the U.S. federal government lack lawful status, either because they crossed the
border clandestinely (e.g. ‘entry without inspection’), overstayed their valid visas, or lost
their immigration status. 15 If the Mexican origin population in the United States is taken as
a whole –approximately 36 million people–, one out of six lives ‘without papers’.
Furthermore, if we consider that during the 2009-2013 period it was estimated that
there were 5.1 million children under age 18 living with at least one undocumented parent,
or that 4.5 million children who are U.S. citizens have one undocumented parent, it could

15
According to Warren (2019) the estimated undocumented population from Mexico in recent years was
closer to 5 million noting that, from 2010 to 2017, this population fell by 1.3 million.
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be argued that the condition of immigrant illegality might be shared with younger
immigrant generations from Mexico and other national origins. The lack of lawful presence
and status is extremely problematic for Mexicans and other immigrants (from Latin
America and Asia), because the aspiration to move upward in the social and occupational
hierarchy usually requires access not only to more familiarity with the U.S. and better
education but to basic documentation and formal socio-political participation, including the
right to vote, be elected, due process, to get an ID or a driver license and to move freely
across borders. 16
The condition of ‘immigrant illegality’ here refers to the lived experience of people
born outside of the U.S. (usually in Mexico) who are generally unable to change their
immigration status from unauthorized or undocumented to legal. It is often overlooked that
‘legal immigrants’, such as Legal Permanent Residents, might become ‘undocumented’ or
can be deported too if they fail to comply with the U.S. immigration law or bureaucratic
process. Scholarly works since the late 1990s have increasingly used the concept of
‘immigrant illegality’ to explain a condition experienced by millions of individuals from
different countries –mainly from Latin America and the Caribbean, but also from Asia and
Africa. Scholars have consistently argued and collected evidence to show that the condition
of immigrant illegality is not only constructed legally, but also socially, politically, and
culturally. 17

Recent work by sociologists Sofya Aptekar and Amy Hsin (2019) shows that undocumented immigrants
from Asian countries have different paths, attitudes, identities, and trajectories compared to Mexicans or other
Latinxs. According to these researchers, Asian undocumented people in New York do not conform to a
negative ‘unauthorized’ stereotype, they are not seen as that and do not think of themselves in that way.
17
Undocumented Mexican New Yorkers may have different impacts (positive or negative) of their legal
status and place of origin; unlike people from Asian countries, for example, because they may be viewed by
others as “illegal” automatically. But that might also give them entrée into community-based organizations or
other institutions that could assist them and serve as support mechanisms. However, since Mexicans in New
16
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This chapter is divided into three sections. First, I introduce a theoretical model
exploring extreme situations of either full social inclusion or exclusion for immigrants
considering the essential roles played by immigration status, local ecosystems or place, and
combinations of forms of capital within family households. Second, I refer to the more
specific theoretical contributions of U.S. authors on assimilation, integration, and
incorporation of contemporary immigrants in urban settings. In the third section, I present
key concepts and literature associated with the emergence and analysis of the current
deportation regime in the United States. My intention towards the end of the chapter is to
reflect on subjectivity and deportability within the study of unauthorized migration,
vulnerability, and social mobility.
2.1 TRIDIMENSIONAL MODEL OF INCLUSION-EXCLUSION
I analyze the social mobility of immigrants from Mexico as a proxy for immigrant
integration and social inclusion. I am particularly interested in ‘long-term undocumented’
adult migrants or LTUs (people living in the United States as unauthorized immigrants for
ten or more years). Besides immigration status and place, I combine a group of variables
associated with socioeconomic status that have been studied by various scholars across
disciplinary lines: human capital (Bayer et al., 2008) and social networks (Massey et al.,
1987; Munshi, 2003), associated with family dynamics within the household (Smith, 2008).
A higher level of human capital usually allows greater access to resources. Social networks
are vital for migrants and for the migration process itself, for example to lower risks at
different stages of settlement. I argue that the positive combination of these two variables
within family households can contribute to the success and exceptional socioeconomic

York are a smaller or more recent group compared to other Latinx groups, those organizations might be
directed by or aimed at Dominicans, Ecuadorians, or other groups. Thanks to Holly Reed for these key ideas.
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upward mobility of some Mexican immigrants despite their lacking unauthorized status or
residing in a hostile, non-immigrant friendly or unwelcoming place.
Figure 2.1, which visually summarizes the key variables under analysis in this
dissertation, suggests the different levels of social inclusion possible when comparing
immigration statuses, local institutional contexts, and combinations of human and social
capital within family households. These scenarios can be visualized in the form of three
axes, where “x” goes from being a U.S. citizen (+) to being undocumented and not able to
change their status (₋), “y” goes from the welcoming social ecosystems for immigrants and
minorities (+) to unwelcoming places (₋), and “z” goes from high, strong, and positive
combinations of human and social capital to (₋) low, less, or negative combinations of
capital.
Figure 2.1 Theoretical model with points of full social immigrant inclusion and exclusion in
the United States

Based on the current literature about immigrant assimilation and integration or
incorporation under the current mass deportation regime, I use the concept of limited social
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inclusion for immigrants to analyze relational and negotiated interactions of foreign-born
Mexicans in the United States. These interactions basically occur between the two
theoretical points of total or full inclusion and total or full exclusion across the three-axis
explained above (see spheres in Figure 2.1). An example of full inclusion could be when an
immigrant has total access to all the ‘socially valuable goods’ and institutions of the
destination society.
The concept of limited inclusion refers to the idea that migrants navigate various
social ecosystems or institutional contexts in the receiving society. Despite not being able
to gain full formal citizenship (e.g. nationally, with all political rights), these migrants
could be identified as part of larger (e.g. transnational) and smaller (e.g. urban or suburban)
communities. They also are able to use different tools and resources associated with their
levels of human and social capital to navigate new contexts. These processes of limited
inclusion are not immutable, nor do they occur only via legal immigration status, but are
constantly changing and socially constructed by multiple actors and institutions across
time. For instance, in federal or decentralized immigration systems the possibility of
separate and conflicting immigration enforcement regimes could take place, and there are
several examples of tensions between the U.S. federal government and individual states
challenging actions, discourses, and policies to include or exclude immigrants. 18
To further explain how this model works, a person who is an LTU with low forms
of capital in an inclusive ecosystem will go in the lighter (yellow) cubical space (V) shown
in Figure 2.2, of what I call a tridimensional model of immigrant social integration. The
darker (green) cube (I), on the other hand, represents the only theoretical space in which
18
In the case of the United States there are instances where individual states challenge the federal
government's immigration policy, for example becoming sanctuary cities, and thus become more inclusive
places (at least in the political discourse) for all immigrants, or states with different policies towards DACA.

32

immigrants would not experience any kind of major exclusion because (1) their
immigration status is legal, (2) they live for the most part in an inclusionary context or local
ecosystem, and (3) because they have high, strong or mostly positive combinations of
human and social capital within their families. Therefore, the green/darker cube denotes
only positive degrees of immigration status (papers), welcoming local ecosystem (place) for
immigrants, and positive combinations of capital within family households, leading
towards full immigrant inclusion. That is to say that in the other seven cubes or spaces
(from II to VIII) there is limited social inclusion of immigrants with varying degrees in
each of the three axes, representing the key variables in this model and study.
Figure 2.2 Eight spaces in a tridimensional model of immigrant social integration

The ordering of these seven spaces in their relationship to social mobility can be
further explained. Cube IV represents a scenario in which integration and social mobility is
least likely to occur, because the negative combination of factors makes full exclusion a
stronger possibility. This means that immigrants located in cube IV, under the worst-case
scenario, are not able to access ‘socially valuable goods, resources or institutions’
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(paraphrasing Alba and Foner, 2015), because they are unauthorized, the local ecosystem is
overwhelming exclusive, unwelcoming, and negative for them (such as facing intensive
‘scrutiny’ in the words of Robert Smith and the MIDA Team project), and their forms of
capital are very limited, scarce or weak.
The other six cubes, just like the yellow/lighter cube V, represent various scenarios
that immigrants could face with varying degrees of social integration. For example, their
upward or downward mobility will be related to how determinant each factor is:
immigration status (e.g. their ability or structural possibilities to transition from an
unauthorized status to a legal one, or crossing from the negative “x” axis to the positive),
context or local ecosystem (e.g. their ability to move from a hostile place to a more
immigrant friendly location), or acquisition, development or transferability of forms of
capital within their families. However, it could be argued that when a person is closer to the
green/darker cubicle space (I), even while in cube IV, a positive process of social
integration is more likely to happen.
The last and most important U.S. immigration reform that allowed a change of
immigration status for undocumented immigrants occurred in 1986 under IRCA
(Immigration Reform and Control Act). 19 In more than three decades, the U.S. Congress
has not been able to reach a consensus to approve new legislation of this type. Legislators
have thus far been unable to pass a broad set of laws allowing for the regularization of the
undocumented population, a large and diverse group of people settling in family
households all across the United States. Far from recognizing the binational or
multinational sociodemographic, cultural, or economic nature of human mobility across
19
Also known in the United States as the Simpson-Mazzoli Act. In Mexico some scholars –such as Manuel
García y Griego (1987), Mercedes González de la Rocha & Agustín Escobar Latapí (1990), and Rafael
Alarcón (2016)– referred to IRCA as la Ley Simpson-Rodino.
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regions and continents, U.S. immigration policies have been focusing on unilateral border
and interior enforcement. After more than three decades, the U.S. government has not been
able to successfully address the fact that over 10 million human beings, born elsewhere and
for the most part economically dynamic, are settling without full political rights within the
U.S. society, oftentimes with U.S. citizen children, partners and other close relatives.
Federal legislation and restrictive policies on immigration and border enforcement
after the 1990s have caused the clandestine crossing to the United States from Mexico to
become increasingly risky, expensive and penalized (Alarcón & Becerra, 2012; Alonso
Meneses, 2013; Cornelius, 2001; Slack et al., 2013). Multiple changes in U.S. federal
legislation and policies –and in some cases at the state and local level– have aimed to make
the daily life of undocumented persons more difficult, not only in their jobs and homes but
also in public spaces (Chavez, 1992; S. J. García, 2017; Menjívar & Kanstroom, 2015).
Along with the policies of border enforcement during the Clinton administration (19932001), negative changes towards the undocumented population include the approval of
IIRIRA (Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act) and AEDPA
(Antiterrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act) in 1996, further criminalizing this group
(see Abrego et al., 2017). After the 1990s, the number of LTU immigrants, mainly adults,
increased steadily.
Considering theories about the assimilation or integration of international migrants
in different contexts (Alarcón, Escala, & Odgers, 2016; Alba & Foner, 2015), and in light
of the current regime of mass deportations (De Genova, 2002; De Genova & Peutz, 2010), I
use the concept of limited social inclusion of immigrants to underline the processes of
social interactions conditioned by immigration status that occur between people born in
Mexico living in the United States and the rest of the individuals that make up the society
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of the receiving country (Yrizar Barbosa et al., 2016, 2019). The origins of the U.S. mass
deportation regime can be traced back through xenophobic, nativist, racist and openly
discriminatory laws, and policies at the federal level, such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882 and Operation Wetback in 1954. The most recent developments of the mass
deportation regime are a response both to the increase in the undocumented population after
IRCA and to anti-immigrant attitudes post-9/11, including new actions under the Trump
administration. Some of these negative attitudes were supported by government officials
and by private actors extracting gains or economic profit from the mass deportation and
selective detention of immigrants.
The limited social inclusion of immigrants is exemplified in several executive
actions by different U.S. presidents to give temporary relief to various groups of
immigrants in vulnerable situations. One historical example took place during the Dwight
D. Eisenhower Administration (1953-1961) in 1956 (American Immigration Council,
2014). A more recent one is the Temporary Protection Status (TPS) created by the
Immigration Act of 1990. Another clear and recent example of limited inclusion is the
executive action for immigrant youth known as DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals), which allowed deportation to be deferred for undocumented immigrants born
after 1981 who met certain educational requirements. DACA benefitted mainly people from
Mexico (about 80% of over 700,000 recipients around 2018). The DACA program was
suspended for new applicants on September 5, 2017 by the Trump administration, putting
the nearly one million people who applied at risk of deportation. 20 TPS and DACA are
contemporary limited inclusion measures for immigrants because they do not offer a
permanent legal immigration status –at best they are temporary legal immigration statuses–,
20

By June 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against Trump’s bid to end DACA.
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nor a path to permanent residence and U.S. citizenship. When achieved, TPS and DACA
offer protection against deportation and provide authorization to work formally, with
renewals every two years (and after paying a fee each time).
The concept of limited inclusion is essential to analyze processes and interactions
that occur between individuals and local ecosystems. Within these ecosystems, immigrants
manage to navigate communities that may be ‘more or less’ inclusive, exclusive, or perhaps
mixed towards foreign born minorities. The form this navigation takes, or even individual,
family or community strategies developed by immigrant groups to respond, could be
determined by the levels of human and social capital of the international migrants
themselves. These processes of inclusion or exclusion at the local or regional level, despite
being affected by the national legal framework, could show greater flexibility and
heterogeneity (meaning there is a lot of diversity and complexity).
In sum, the tridimensional model of immigrant social integration in tandem with the
concept of limited social inclusion are helpful to analyze the contemporary experience of
immigrants in United States because they capture variation in the experiences of foreign
born immigrants, influenced by legal-migratory status, local ecosystems, and forms of
capitals within families. The model, emphasizing the weight of immigration status (i.e.,
between the spectrum of unauthorized and authorized), indicates that when the effect of
these three variables is only (or mostly) positive the expected outcome will tend toward full
inclusion for immigrants. A legal immigration status, a welcoming or immigrant friendly
context, and positive forms of capital within families are factors contributing to the upward
social mobility of immigrants. This type of mobility contributes to the social integration
process, defined by greater access to socially valuable goods by the non-immigrant native
population as Alba and Foner (2015) have suggested. Full inclusion in the host or
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receiving-destination society, from my perspective, is an ideal scenario allowing immigrant
groups to achieve more opportunities or access pathways towards the theoretical well-being
experienced by an ‘average non-immigrant native’ person. 21
2.2 FROM ASSIMILATION THEORY TO LIMITED INCLUSION
In the past, immigration status was not considered a fundamental variable in the
initial studies of social mobility, assimilation, integration, or inclusion for foreign born
residents in the United States. There are several reasons explaining the lack of attention to
immigration status that go beyond the scope of this chapter, including the fact that in the
first half of the 20th century the size of the undocumented population was considerably
smaller –in absolute and relative terms compared to now–, and perhaps that the legal
mechanisms to achieve legalization were less stringent and more available to many people,
mainly from European countries, arriving at the time (see Ngai, 2004). These studies have
also generally not discussed or calibrated scales, degrees, or types of immigrant
vulnerability within the undocumented population.
The classic assimilation theory was constructed during the early 1920s and 1930s.
For Brown and Bean (2006), classic assimilation theory explains that those immigrants who
have resided the longest in the host or destination society, as well as the members of later
generations, share greater similarities to the majority group than immigrants who have
spent less time in the host society. The classic assimilation model was expanded with the
academic works of psychologist Irvin Child in 1943, historian Oscar Handlin in 1951, and
especially of sociologist Milton Gordon in 1964. During the late 1930s, Child studied the
second generation of Italian Americans in Connecticut, identifying and comparing groups

21
Meaning ‘mostly white and middle-class native-born citizens,’ but I am aware there is a lot of diversity in
an ‘average non-immigrant native’ experience.
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with loyalty to the Italian identity, assimilated to an American identity, or indifferent or
apathetic to either identity. Handlin narrates the experiences of European immigrants who
arrived in the United States at the dusk of the nineteenth century. Milton Gordon (1964)
developed a discussion of assimilation that seems to stand apart from other works,
principally because he discusses several stages and dimensions of assimilation that follow
the acquisition of cultural practices and language from the host society. These linear stages
of assimilation, analyzed by Bean and Stevens (2003), are: cultural (including linguistic),
structural (i.e. educational, occupational and labor market, including wages, earning, and
employment 22), marital, ‘identificational,’ and civic assimilation. Gordon’s model predicts
that, over time, the behavior and characteristics of immigrants and the U.S.-born natives
become similar, and that discrimination and prejudice decline. 23
Later on, Richard Alba and Victor Nee (2003) expanded and refined Gordon’s work
in order to argue that certain institutions play decisive roles in the assimilation process.
Their approach was called neo-assimilationist. According to Alba and Nee (2003, p. 845), a
common argument held by many critics of the classic assimilation theory was that “[t]he
option of assimilation will be less available to the second and later generations of most new
immigrant groups because their non-European origins mean that they are more distinctive,
with their distinctiveness of skin color especially fateful.” However, for Alba and Nee this
argument “treats perceptions of racial difference as more rigid than they have proven
themselves historically.” Another key point outlined by Alba and Nee is that the

According to Richard Alba, Gordon never discussed these, and by ‘structural’ “he meant social integration
with the majority” (personal communication).
23
By “natives” I am obviously not referring to Native Americans, in a way the only or first people native to
the land that we know now as the United States.
22
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relationship between the immigrant minorities and the mainstream was multi-directional,
affecting and changing each other in different ways.
For the study of the post-1965 and post-1990s waves of immigration in the United
States, new theories and models emerged, such as the racial/ethnic disadvantage model and
segmented assimilation theory (Portes & Zhou, 1993). The segmented assimilation model
challenged some of the Chicago School contributions, adding discrimination and ethnic
difficulties to access the labor market as obstacles for assimilation. Amid this theoretical
model are the writings of Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan in 1963, Gerald Suttles in
1968, Andrew Greeley in 1974, and Michael Novak in 1972. The segmented assimilation
model studied how migrants or different ethnic enclaves, specifically the second
generation, became incorporated into different societal structures, as well as the outcomes
resulting from these incorporations. There were basically three patterns that Portes and
Zhou (1993, p. 82), discussed: the first was growing canonical assimilation or integration
into the dominant white, middle-class society; the second was assimilation to the lower
class, which leads to permanent poverty; and the third was some economic progress
accompanied by the conservation of immigrants’ cultural values.
The segmented assimilation theory (SAT) constitutes a very important effort to
better understand the process by which the second-generation experiences incorporation
into a stratified society in the United States. The Children of Immigrants Longitudinal
Study (CILS), the ‘empirical tool’ of this theoretical approach, also represented a major
contribution to the study of immigrants' offspring in America, especially considering the
post-1965s multiracial and culturally diverse waves of immigration. For Portes and Zhou,
SAT constitutes a framework for analyzing the immigrant experience in the United States
during a specific historical period, emphasizing structural and cultural factors including
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major economic changes, pervasive racial discrimination, and social inequalities. For SAT
scholars, the core question is “into what sector of American society a particular group
assimilates” (1993, p. 82), between the three paths or forms of adaptation outlined by
Portes and Zhou. SAT, as a framework, does a good job acknowledging social diversity,
different minorities, and contextual complexities and relationship across and within ethnoracial groups. However, this theory exaggerates the differences between the immigrant
groups and the general population, stigmatizing ‘permanently’ the immigrant experience of
each group, and putting more emphasis on the second generation in detriment of an analysis
of the first generation (and its weight and influence across generations). 24
Alejandro Portes and Philip Kasinitz have re-energized the debate on immigration,
race, ethnicity, institutions, and integration in the United States. Portes (2012, p. 565)
argues that the theoretical and empirical literature on contemporary immigration can be
classified around three broad questions: first, “the question on immigrant assimilation,”
including the possibility of social change in the host or destination societies; second, the
multidimensional “costs and benefits of immigration” (economic, social and cultural); and
third, the studies on the second generation, or what he describes as “the fate of the
descendants […] and the extent to which they succeed in reaching social and economic
parity with the native born”. When he analyzes the social tensions among the actors
involved in each of these questions, Portes highlights “the unbalance of the forces at play,
leading inevitably to outcomes in favor of the status quo” (2012, p.575), or limited change.

Legacies (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001) supports empirically SAT in many ways, but obviously falls short
(over or sub) representing national groups, overlooking the influence (and social dynamics) of the U.S.Mexican border in San Diego, and paying scant attention to the undocumented status of students (including
1.5 generation) and parents. Zhou (1997) does a good job discussing SAT; she puts over the table the
dichotomy for those becoming Americans: “smooth acceptance” or “traumatic experience.”
24
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Kasinitz (2012, p. 579) acknowledges the “remarkable developments” in
immigration research within sociology, but he suggests to move forward and, from my
interpretation, to go beyond Portes’ classification (see Alba, Kasinitz, & Waters, 2011). In
particular, Kasinitz (2012, p.585) emphasizes the study of migration policies, the role of the
state in international migration and “the need for international comparisons […] not only of
the different migrant populations, but also of the different ways the issue of membership is
being constructed and played out in the various receiving societies,” in this case perhaps
highlighting the question of race. Moreover, Kasinitz (2012, p.588) believes that in the near
future we will observe new forms of incorporation and exclusion in different spheres of
social life, “and this will increase the need for comparative research, both between nationstates and within the United States, as more and more states and local governments seem
determined to try to create their own immigration policies.” These two analyses seem both
complementary and intellectually stimulating in their own right, and certainly will lead to
new research questions.
The academic literature on social integration or incorporation, below the “structural
assimilation” envisioned by Milton Gordon, includes various sub-categories, including
spatial, political, civic, and economic. For example, some researchers have focused on the
political incorporation or political socialization of international migrants in the United
States and Canada (Hochschild et al., 2013; Landolt & Goldring, 2009). Other researchers
have done work on “economic incorporation” using strategic variables (Lo & Wang, 2004),
like ownership of a house. 25 Meanwhile, authors like Bean, Brown and Rumbaut (2006)
bridge the gap between political and economic incorporation by addressing both in the

25
For a recent important work looking at immigration status, home ownership and how deportations
perpetuate the racial stratification of Latinos see Rugh & Hall (2016).
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Mexican case. Increasingly, these authors and other recent works have analyzed integration
by looking at the acquisition of citizenship, participation in politics, and learning the
English language, but also the access to education, and increases in earnings.
During the past 25 years, social scientists from diverse disciplines have conducted
studies on unauthorized migration in America (Donato & Armenta, 2011). There is a
growing body of theoretical, empirical and multi-disciplinary work on the social
construction of ‘immigrant illegality’ (Hiemstra, 2010; Menjívar & Kanstroom, 2015; Ngai,
2004) and its consequences for specific groups such as immigrant youth and undocumented
students (Chávez et al., 2015; Gonzales, 2011, 2015; Suárez-Orozco & Yoshikawa, 2015),
deportees (Alarcón & Becerra, 2012; Brotherton & Barrios, 2009; Coleman & Kocher,
2011; Hagan et al., 2011; Slack et al., 2015), or for mixed immigration status families also
known as “binational” or “transnational” families (Abrego, 2014; Chavez, 1992; Fix &
Zimmermann, 2001; Menjívar & Abrego, 2012; Mummert, 2012; Yrizar Barbosa &
Alarcón, 2015). Yet, there are few case studies looking at how illegality is lived within and
across multiple contexts (Dreby & Schmalzbauer, 2013; Marrow, 2012; Smith,
forthcoming). For example, the New York metropolitan area could be perceived as a
sanctuary for the undocumented, but a report reveals that Long Island is a considerably less
friendly destination (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2009), presumably because of the
“suburban free riding” phenomenon, when local officials decide to rely (mainly) on central
cities to serve immigrants (de Graauw et al., 2013).
For immigrants in the United States, particularly those who arrived after the early
80s from Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia and other countries, immigration status has
become an essential element in their processes of social integration. Alba and Foner (2015,
p. 29) consider that for the unauthorized population, “the challenges of integration are
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insoluble without changes to American law.” They define integration as the processes that
increase opportunities for immigrants and their descendants to obtain valued elements of a
society and achieve social acceptance. This definition is central for the theoretical and
empirical concepts developed in this dissertation.
2.3 UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT VULNERABILITY
International migrants are designated as such after crossing nation-state boundaries
and are deemed as undocumented or unauthorized immigrants by national governments
exerting politico-administrative power on behalf of society. For Foucault (1982: 781-782)
state’s power “is both an individualizing and totalizing power.” Therefore according to this
perspective, the struggle of our time is not against forms of domination or forms of
exploitation, but against forms of subjection, forms of subjectivity and submission, “that
which ties individuals to himself and submits him to others.” 26 For at least half a century,
the U.S. and Mexican governments have extracted multiple forms of profits from
undocumented or unauthorized immigrants.
Can we extrapolate some these Foucauldian ideas to the present situation of
immigrants in the United States, particularly to the case of long-term undocumented
Mexicans residing with their families in the United States? Considering prevalent ethnoracial hierarchies in receiving societies or the increasing levels of criminalization, structural
According to Foucault’s reflections on subjectivity: “The conclusion would be that the political, ethical,
social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate individuals from the state and from the
state’s institutions but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization which is linked
to the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality
which has been imposed on us for several centuries” (Foucault 1982, 785). In addition, Foucault’s ideas on
“progressively governmentalized” power relations (p. 793) could help us to understand the prevalent national
security (or securitization) concern about the growing number of ‘migrant populations’ trying to cross the
North and Central American borders –through deserts, jungles, mountains or rivers, over fences or walls.
Particularly in the case of the North and Central American migratory systems where the perpetrators have
been armed groups abusing migrants, allegedly supported by the U.S. and Mexican governments or by
criminal organizations (e.g. Los Zetas). These questions open the gate to explore in more detail how forms of
discipline and security affect migrant populations today in Mexico and the United States, by tracking down
human rights violations against international migrants.
26
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violence, human rights violations, border and interior enforcement towards undocumented
migrants since the late 1980s, not only in North America, but in the Mediterranean Region
(see Carling, 2007) and other immigration systems, the answer is yes. In these territories we
see societies with power relations and modes of production based on social hierarchies
favoring the native-born (usually Non-Hispanic whites or Anglo Americans), increasingly
dependent on cheap labor, and with high levels of labor exploitation, mostly consisting of
low-paid immigrants. Border enforcement and interior immigration policies designed and
implemented by the U.S. state are based on expert knowledge that can be considered
modern techniques of power, and that negatively affect undocumented immigrant subjects.
The power to produce and consume under the existing capitalist system has
marginalized and undervalued the life of individuals with the ‘wrong’ nationality,
individuals exploitable and vulnerable across several dimensions of social life who are
relegated to the ‘shadows’ and ‘margins’ of cities and towns across receiving societies. Not
only have immigration laws and ‘regulatory’ frameworks of national and regional (i.e.
subnational) governments neglected the conditions, necessities, decisions, and everyday life
of millions of individuals categorically seen as ‘unassimilable’ others (see Ngai, 2004), but
we have also seen indifference and negative discriminatory attitudes adopted by various
other sectors of society towards international migrants.
‘Undocumented subjects’ have been socially constructed in the United States
throughout more than three decades of restrictive immigration laws and enforcement
policies towards foreign-born migrants, who are both economically needed and sociopolitically undesired by the U.S government and anti-immigrant sectors in society. The
undocumented Mexican population in the United States is also the result of historical
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economic inequalities as well as socio-cultural, political, and geographic factors connecting
the two countries and numerous regions across the border since the early 20th century.
After the last major immigration reforms in the United States in 1986, and more
evidently since 1993, the U.S. federal government began developing policies and strategies
to control the border with Mexico, and migration from the rest of Latin America and the
Caribbean. The selective enforcement of major clandestine border crossing areas, such as
the San Diego-Tijuana region in the West and the South Texas-Norther Tamaulipas area in
the East, caused migrants to attempt crossings through remote and inhospitable areas. After
two decades with more than 5,000 deaths from attempts to cross the U.S.-Mexico border,
migrant communities have become more aware of a crossing that is increasingly dangerous,
difficult, and expensive (Alonso Meneses, 2013). Despite the declarations by NGOs and
scholars of a humanitarian crisis (Isacson & Meyer, 2012), thousands of migrants primarily
from Latin America and the Caribbean still attempt dangerous and costly journeys to
clandestinely cross the U.S.-Mexico border; even at the height of the War on Drugs in
Mexico, exemplified by the San Fernando Massacres of 2010 and 2011. 27 Historically,
Mexican and Central American migrants have fled economic and political hardships, but in
more recent years they are increasingly fleeing harsher conditions, corruption, organized
crime, gangs and drug trafficking violence after decades of rampant inequality, corruption
and systematic foreign interventions (see París Pombo, 2017; Spener, 2009).
For about a quarter of a century, commercial and economic liberalization between
the United States and Mexico has led to more surveillance and enforcement of their shared

In 2015 over two hundred thousand Mexicans were apprehended, a considerably lower figure compared
with 2005 when the estimate was slightly over a million (Perez Espino, 2017). The San Fernando Massacres
were the mass murder of over 250 migrants by organized crime groups in the state of Tamaulipas, in
Northern-Eastern Mexico. See the work by Sergio Aguayo and his team at: https://eneldesamparo.colmex.mx/
27
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border. This situation has negatively affected the movement of people in North America
and the United States, especially Mexicans who are unable to get the proper migratory
documentation. James Hollifield (2004) calls this situation the “liberal paradox,” where
nation-states are ‘trapped’ due to the fact that financial capital, goods and services can
easily move between borders, while human beings cannot, because they represent higher
‘political risks.’. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that the Immigration Reform and Control
Act (IRCA) signed by Reagan in 1986 occurred around the same time that Mexico became
part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Neither is it a coincidence
that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed during and after
several new border enforcement policies were passed by the Clinton administration, starting
with Operation Blockade in El Paso, Texas (1993), Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego,
California (1994), Operation Safeguard in Nogales, Arizona (1995), and Operation Rio
Grande in Brownsville, Texas (1997) (see Andreas, 2009; Nevins, 2010; Spener, 2009).
Adding the Secure Fence Act of 2006, these operations together were able to deflect the
routes of clandestine crossers to less accessible and distant areas of the border, particularly
the Sonora-Arizona desert (Sapkota et al., 2006). More recently and considering the 2019
“Trump-AMLO migration agreement” there is USMCA or T-MEC.
In a detailed analysis of immigrant ‘illegality’ as a sociopolitical condition
configured more openly by the U.S. government after the 9/11 attacks, Nicholas De Genova
(2007) explores the politics of race, immigration, and citizenship in the United States. De
Genova criticizes the growing relationship between terrorism and immigration – implied by
certain politicians and governments–, or between ‘national security’ and international
migration (see also Hammond, 2011). In describing the negative panorama for
undocumented migrants, De Genova (2007:426) asserts that “U.S. immigration law and its
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enforcement creates an apparatus for the everyday production of a durable and enduring
migrant ‘illegality’,” in a way attempting to reach the chimera of mass deportation ‘À la
Mitt Romney’ (Washington Post, 2012) or “self-deportation” (see Goodman, 2017).
However, for De Genova, ‘illegality’ is secondary compared to migrant “deportability”
which is “the possibility of deportation (…) from the space of the state.” He explains that
by this latter condition, “some are deported in order that most may remain (un-deported) –
as workers, whose particular migrant status may thus be rendered ‘illegal’ and sustained
indefinitely.” He adds that there is “economic profitability of migrants ‘illegality’ and
deportability” (p.427) due to selectivity on a political basis. De Genova concludes that
citizenship “is a distinctly political technology for the fragmentation and alienation of
human productive powers and creative spaces” (p.442), an argument that seems closer to
Karl Marx’s early writings on alienation than Foucault’s ideas. De Genova (2010) is among
the first social thinkers to use the term “deportation regime” on a global scale.
Reflecting also on Foucauldian ideas, Coleman and Kocher (2011) examine the
significant shift in the U.S. immigration enforcement policy, from an outwards-looking
power perspective to an inwards-looking power-perspective. For these geographers, the
approach to ‘the problem’ of border and interior immigration enforcement is evidently
concerned with a territorial perspective rather than a social one. Coleman and Kocher refer
to the “Non-federal detention and deportation” actions, and they basically analyze two
programs, applied by subnational authorities but enhanced by the federal government:
‘Secure Communities’ and the 287(g) agreements (this latter program is based on a Bill
Clinton law era). Drawn from fieldwork data obtained in central North Carolina and
government statistics, these authors point out a strategy that merges criminal law
enforcement with immigration law enforcement (‘crimmigration’), mining the collaboration
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between police’s work and communities’ trust in them (see also Hagan, Rodriguez, &
Castro, 2011). Coleman and Kocher (2011: 235) explain how the power of the state when
exercising detention and deportation of undocumented migrants “encourages the
disappearance of immigrant bodies from the public sphere.”
The importance of these federal immigration enforcement programs and the
collaboration with states, counties, and cities becomes more clear when we note that the
DHS reported that from 2005 to 2015, apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border steadily
decreased from 1.3 million to 200,000, while the number of people deported by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) –arrested not trying to cross the border, but
working, in the street, or after minor infractions, such as traffic violations– increased from
170,000 in 2002 to 400,000 in 2009 (see Alarcón & Becerra, 2012). This major shift from
border apprehension to detentions in the interior and massive numbers of deportations
provoked many critics and immigrant groups to call President Barack Obama the “deporter
in chief.” 28
Regional immigration enforcement policies with racially discriminatory
components have also been around for a while. These policies were there during the Obama
administration and even before the openly anti-immigrant policies in Maricopa County
under Sheriff Arpaio. Zygmunt Bauman (2009) noted that racism is a policy first and later
becomes ideology, explaining that “Like all politics, it needs organization, managers and
experts.” For authors such as Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich (2011:191) “the sweet enchantment
of color-blind racism in Obamerica” is pervasive, enhancing an ideology where the role of
race is no longer a central factor in the future of people living in the United States, but

28
According to Alarcón and Becerra (2012), a central element in the analysis of these estimates and flows is
to identify and separate “removals” and “returns” in the data reported by DHS.
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according to them, “Today, discrimination is mostly subtle, apparently nonracial, and
institutionalized.” This ideology could be considered a “racial project” according to Winant
(2000). 29
Perhaps one of these subtle, allegedly nonracial, and institutionalized practices is
the participation of states’ governments in immigration enforcement tasks, particularly in
enforcing federal immigration control, as in the cases of Arizona, Alabama, and other
states, counties and cities that have collaborated with federal programs such as Secure
Communities or 287(g) MOAs. According to Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich (2011:202) “colorblind racism is in many ways central to Obama’s stance on race, his post-racial politics, and
his own persona […] the blessing of having a black president may become a curse as he can
legitimate white’s color-blind news”. In the Obama era, episodes of subtle racial
discrimination by subnational authorities continued, representing an extension of systematic
historical ethno-racial discrimination, now in the form of the “Anchor Babies alert” (see
Huang, 2008). This included discussions in the United States about moving from ius soli
(citizenship by birth) to ius sanguinis (citizenship by bloodline) and neglecting ius domicilii
(citizenship by residence)–or “driving while Mexican” as a major cause of deportation.
Particularly worrisome is the fact that while Obama was openly talking in favor of
immigration reform after three decades of little change, he became the President with the
highest number of formal deportations in the history of the United States, in large part
because of collaborations with local administrations. President Obama did not create the
deportation regime but it seems that, as part of a political strategy to negotiate a deal with
Republicans in Congress and their demands for immigration enforcement, he was
For Winant (2000:23) “Today, a racial project can be defined as racist if it creates or reproduces a racially
unequal social structure, based on essentialized racial categories; it essentializes or naturalizes racial
identities or significations, based on racially unequal structures; or both” [Italics in original].
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responsible for leaving on ‘autopilot’ immigrant enforcement policies and actions that
stimulated an exclusionary and discriminatory set of governmental practices. To be fair, in
his final years President Obama steered deportation in the direction of immigrant with
serious criminal records.
A more discriminatory phase against ethno-racial minorities and foreign-born
immigrants in the United States has been initiated under the political slogan “Make
America Great Again.” The launching of Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign started with
an announcement promising to “build a great, great wall” in the southern border that
Mexico was going to pay for. 30 In that same discourse when referring to DACA, Trump
also promised to “terminate President Obama’s illegal executive order on immigration,
immediately.” 31 He claimed that Mexico was “sending people that have lots of problems
(…) bringing crime” and who were “rapists.” Later on, during the third presidential debate
and once more referring to border enforcement and deportation, he targeted undocumented
immigrants living in the United States, particularly those he called “bad hombres.” After
two years in the White House, according to journalistic work (Lind & Zarracina, 2019)
Trump increased (1) the number of immigration arrests by day on average in 2018, to 436
compared to around 300 in 2016; (2) the number of immigrants in ICE detention each day
on average, to 44,631 compared to 34,376 in 2016; (3) the denials of visas, green cards, and
other legal immigration statuses, up 37 percent from fiscal year 2016; and (4) greatly
reduced the number of refugees resettled in the fiscal year 2018 to less than 23,000 –way
below the 44,000 cap set for the year. On November 2016, as president-elect, Trump
declared in a TV interview for ‘60 minutes’ his plans to deport “probably 2 million” or

30
31

Full speech available at: Time Staff - Ideas (2015)
See towards the end of the first section of this chapter more details about the status and origins of DACA.
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possibly 3 million people (Chappell, 2016), basically by reactivating federal policies to
target undocumented immigrants but also by restricting immigration in general, including
both legal and temporary. 32
CONCLUSION
One way to link the study of social mobility and limited inclusion considering the
tridimensional theoretical model proposed earlier, I argue, is by dissecting undocumented
immigrant vulnerability under the current mass deportation regime. As it will be presented
in subsequent chapters, this vulnerability is a concept related to actions causing harm or
suffering to undocumented immigrants, particularly due to risk of deportation, family
separation or loss of other goods and properties. Perhaps, going beyond policies targeting
‘deportable subjects’ and ‘unassimilable others’ by governments against vulnerable lowincome and undocumented immigrants (as well as against other people in mobility, such as
asylum seekers or claimants for humanitarian protection), it is time to consider the idea of
anti-immigrant mobility regimes. Even when these anti-immigrant regimes, typically at the
macro-national level, attempt to limit different forms of mobility, such as socioeconomic or
geospatial, the role of immigrant status (legal context), place (geographical context) and
family household units (familial context) are central to mediate negative effects and
identify the gradations of immigrant vulnerability.
The modern U.S. mass deportation regime could be defined as a set of
governmental ideas and actions oriented toward the legal, sociopolitical, and physical
exclusion of foreign born and ‘non-naturalizable’ individuals residing without bureaucratic
authorization by the federal government (see De Genova, 2010; Heyman, 2008; Chavez,
See the work by Jonathan Blitzer on Stephen Miller, Trump’s closest advisor on immigration:
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/03/02/how-stephen-miller-manipulates-donald-trump-to-furtherhis-immigration-obsession
32
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2008; Brotherton & Barrios, 2009; Kanstroom, 2010; Abrego & Menjívar, 2011; Dreby,
2015). The crafting of this type of immigration regime cannot be fully understood without
acknowledging the interplay of two phenomena: (i) an open, unilateral, and publiclyaccepted discourse focused on national security in relation to the War on Drugs and
terrorism, and (ii) veiled, also real and increasingly-documented, although not frequently or
openly recognized, discriminatory policies (both racial and social), supported by radical
nativism, xenophobia, anti-humanitarianism, and neoliberal discourses. These latter policies
frequently target dark-skinned and low-paid transnational workers. Under this immigration
enforcement regime there are several political and economic actors at play, beyond the
nation-state and its levels of government: extracting or preserving forms power for their
own interests, and therefore maintaining a dominant social position but ignoring and
probably underestimating the consequences and costs of expanding detention and
deportations for individuals, families, and communities.
The contemporary U.S. mass deportation regime, heightened in the past two
decades, could also be considered a collection of multi-government restrictive policies
oriented towards the social exclusion of non-desirable ‘others’ or ‘unwanted’ immigrants.
This group of others are often conceived and generalized not only as outsiders or marginal
individuals, but erroneously and stereotypically labeled as ‘law-breakers’ or ‘free-riders.’
At the same time, these individuals who are socially and legally defined as others, and
perhaps considered as unassimilable foreigners and disposable labor, are demanded by
employers and consumers to occupy the worst-paid jobs in the lowest tier of the labor force.
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CHAPTER 3. CONTEXTS OF MOBILITY FOR MEXICAN NEW YORKERS
To deepen the study of social mobility among Mexicans in New York, in this chapter I
present data about the contexts they inhabit, particularly referring to sociodemographic and
migration-related variables. Here I pay close attention to nativity, immigration status and
place or geographic location for Mexican family households in the five boroughs and New
York State during the past two decades, with an emphasis on New York City and Long
Island. 33 This last place is relevant due to the importance of studying suburban destinations
with less welcoming or ambivalent environments for the foreign-born, compared to ‘urban
sanctuaries’ such as New York City. In this chapter, I argue that immigration status (‘legal
context’), locality (‘geographical context’), and ‘familial context’ in the United States are
central to better understand the socioeconomic mobility of Mexicans in New York.
Most of the initial content in the chapter does not incorporate unauthorized status
because of data limitations (that category was not created or included in any variable in the
datasets used), except for the second section which does incorporate immigration status
using indirect estimates. 34 The second and third sections open the scope to New York State
and Long Island as areas with a less significant undocumented population from Mexico. 35
According to Smith’s (2013) estimates, the numbers for the Mexican-origin population in

Parts of this chapter were elaborated based on a report published by the Center for Latin American,
Caribbean & Latino Studies at the CUNY Graduate Center, part of the Latino Data Project between fall 2016
and spring 2017 (Yrizar Barbosa, 2018). The report was based on U.S. Census Bureau’s Public Use
Microdata Series (PUMS) data for 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015 organized and released by IPUMS USA at the
Minnesota Population Center of the University of Minnesota. The chapter refers to tables and figures from
this report that were edited and included in the appendix. For a previous report on the Mexican population in
the New York City metro area see Bergad (2013).
34
I use the terms unauthorized and undocumented interchangeably in this chapter and the dissertation.
35
The New York-Newark-Jersey City (NY-NJ-PA) metro area had the largest concentration of unauthorized
immigrants –all nationalities– in the United States (1,150,000) according to Pew Research Center estimates
based on augmented 2014 American Community Survey (IPUMS). These estimates do not specify how many
of them were born in Mexico. However, relying on estimates produced by the Center for Migration Studies
between 2010 and 2014, somewhere around 75 and 78 percent of all the undocumented population from
Mexico in New York State were living only in New York City.
33
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New York could be larger –about 400,000 in 2010– due to undercounts in the 1990 and
2000 census as a result of recent arrivals, unauthorized status, irregular housing and overcrowding conditions within this population.36 A fourth section is focused again on New
York City, including sections on education, language, household income and poverty, labor
market participation, occupations and health insurance between 2000 and 2015.
One way to explain the data from several sources included in this chapter is by
considering trends in well-being or by considering the following question: Do Mexicans
appear to be improving their socioeconomic mobility in New York over time? 37 As I will
elaborate in the conclusion, the answer is far from simple. The argument I present is that
those immigrants with regular, valid, or legal immigration status, residing in better or less
hostile places towards the foreign-born, living in stronger family households with more
education have better prospects to be upwardly mobile. For the same reasons, those
immigrants who are unauthorized, living in considerably more hostile localities, and have
weaker families with less schooling have less socioeconomic mobility. However, some
interesting questions to complicate this theory include: what might be happening to those
who reside in supportive places but are undocumented in families with low or very low
educational attainment, or to those who live in hostile areas but have solid families with
very high education and have close relatives with a valid status (such as DACA). For
instance, indicators in New York City seem conflicting when looking at the growing levels
of education among U.S.-born Mexicans but increasing poverty among children or female
See also Chapter 2 in Smith, Waisanen, & Yrizar Barbosa, 2019. In fact, a recent report by the Mayor’s
Office for Immigrant Affairs (MOIA, 2018) calculated that about 35% of the approximately half-million
unauthorized immigrant New Yorkers in the city reside in overcrowded households and almost 60% are rent
burdened. According to this report overcrowded households are defined by having more than one person per
room and rent-burdened households are defined as paying 30% or more of their household income on rent.
37
I am in debt with Richard Alba for suggesting a similar question, in terms of the socioeconomic ‘condition
and position’ of Mexicans in New York, that turned out useful for the interpretative structure of the chapter.
36
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headed households. All in all, this chapter provides baseline demographic and quantitative
data as a key step to further address upward mobility among unauthorized Mexicans, using
qualitative fieldwork conducted between 2015 and 2017 in the Bronx, Queens, and Suffolk
County.
This chapter also explains the gradual settlement of the Mexican population in New
York. In a time of less circular migration and increasing border enforcement in the United
States, particularly since the 1990s, a key question to address is how unauthorized
immigrants from Mexico, living in family households, are transforming from sojourners,
engaging in transnational migration, into de facto residents, workers and parents raising
U.S. citizens. I argue that in order to understand how this process occurs, it is paramount to
analyze legal immigration status, the places or local ecosystems where families have
settled, and to look closer at their intra-family dynamics, including human and social
capital within their households. These three elements –papers, places, and families– are
fundamental to explain the levels of social mobility Mexican New York families experience
under the current deportation regime and the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the Trump
administration.
3.1 MEXICANS IN NEW YORK CITY, 2000-2015
First generation immigrants from Mexico represent the largest foreign-born group
residing in the United States in the early 21st century. However, within NYC Mexican
immigrants born abroad and their offspring occupy a lower position in the population
rankings among the foreign-born compared to the five largest Latino national subgroups in
the city. In 2000, Mexicans represented about 2.4% of the total population in the five
boroughs. This estimate was considerably lower compared to two other Latino subgroups,
Puerto Ricans (10.3%) and Dominicans (6.6%), but above the estimates for Ecuadorians
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(1.9%) and Colombians (1.3%). In 2015, the percent of Mexicans in New York City rose to
4.4% and for the first time, compared to previous years of study, the number of native-born
and foreign-born Mexicans reached parity. 38 Interestingly, the number of foreign-born
Mexicans in New York City declined from 197,000 in 2010 to 189,000 in 2015. During the
first fifteen years of the new century, Mexicans were the third largest Latino national
subgroup in the City behind Dominicans and Puerto Ricans.
What are the key demographic factors affecting the socioeconomic mobility of
Mexicans in the United States? Before addressing how papers, places, and familias matter, I
will focus on the Big Apple’s Mexican origin population, a group with a remarkable growth
from approximately 195,000 in 2000 to 376,000 in 2015. Mexicans retained their position
as the third largest Latino/a national subgroup in the City during these fifteen years. In
2015, Mexicans represented 4.4% of the total population in the City, considerably lower
than the Dominican (8.5%) and Puerto Rican (8.2%) populations. Since 2000, in contrast to
the other four largest Latino subgroups in the City, the Mexican population has been spread
across three main boroughs: Queens, Brooklyn, and the Bronx. In 2015, Queens had the
highest number of foreign-born Mexicans (67,837) and Brooklyn the highest number of
native or U.S.-born Mexicans (47,567), also referred to as domestic-born. Nativity (or
country of birth), age, sex, marital status, and household type are important demographics
to consider when tracing the socioeconomic mobility of Mexicans in the United States.
Also note that the Mexican population of metro New York is newer than in other regions.
The majority arrived after the 1980s, in contrast to other parts of the country where there is
a long-standing Mexican population and different cohorts of immigrants. Further, Mexicans
in New York have largely come from atypical areas (rural and urban)– regions that are not
38

See Table A.1 in appendix.
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long-time sources of immigration to the United States such as tows in Guerrero or the city
of Puebla. 39
Nativity, age, and sex
Since 2000, there has increasingly been a more balanced distribution of the
Mexican-origin population by nativity. As late as 2005, foreign-born Mexicans
outnumbered the U.S. born across the five boroughs. For example, in 2000 71.3% of the
Mexicans in Queens were born in Mexico and only 28.7% were born in the United States,
while in 2015 these percentages changed to 58.8% and 41.2% respectively (mostly
children). In 2015, Queens had the highest number of foreign-born Mexicans (67,837)
while Brooklyn had the highest number of native-born Mexicans (57,843). 40
Transformation toward an older and less masculine profile of Mexicans in New
York City was also distinguishable in the analysis of nativity, age, and sex. By 2015, the
median ages for both the native and foreign-born Mexicans increased. The median ages for
the Mexican-origin population changed from 24 years in 2000 and 25 years in 2005 to 26
years in 2010 and 2015. However, crucial differences are evident when we analyze age by
nativity. For those born in the United States, the median age in 2000 was 8 years in the city
–6 years in Brooklyn–, while in 2015 it was 12 years old –19 years in Manhattan–. For
those born in Mexico, the median age in 2000 was 27 years while in 2015 was 36 years old
–-38 years in Queen–-. These stark contrasts and changes in socio-demographic profiles are
noticeable in the age pyramids of the native-born —younger, equally distributed by sex—
and foreign born —older, more men but increasingly more women— across the four

39
40

Thanks to Phil Kasinitz for stressing this point about the history of Mexicans in New York.
See Table A2 in appendix.
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periods of analysis. This data shows the transformations of Mexican families in the city:
more women and children.
Marital status and household type
The marital status and household types of New York’s Mexican population have
received scant attention from researchers in recent years. These data indicate that the
percentage of married Mexicans (either with the spouse present or absent) experienced a
slight decline between 2000 and 2015, from 32.7% to 26.7%. 41 Another trend that perhaps
reflects the increasing presence of younger U.S.-born Mexicans is that the percentage of
people who declared single or never married increased approximately 8.0%, growing from
61.5% in 2000 to 68.7% in 2015. 42 Half of the Mexican population in New York City
reported living in a married household in 2015. Furthermore, the number living in
households headed by women without husbands present increased from 15.6% to 24.0%. 43
This is striking, perhaps meaning that women with no husband present are taking care of
more children due to economic tensions in the household, but further research will be
needed to uncover that. Additional data on household characteristics for Mexicans in the
city show that the average number of “own family members in household” (4.7 to 4.2
people) and the number of “families in the household” (1.7 to 1.5 families) declined slightly
between 2000 and 2015, with minimal differences between 2005 and 2010 (an especially
important issue to look at since so many women are not in the labor force 44).

This percentage includes children, an age limit was not set but it will be crucial to do it for future analysis.
See Table A.3.
43
See Table A.4.
44
This is good observation to keep in mind that Holly Reed brought to my attention.
41
42
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3.2 PAPELES IN THE CITY AND STATE: LEGAL CONTEXT
One important aspect relating to social mobility concerns the number of Mexicans
in NYC who changed their immigration status over this fifteen-year period. The number of
Mexicans in the City who were U.S. Naturalized Citizens doubled between 2000 and 2015
(from 13,200 to 30,800). Meanwhile, the percentage of Mexicans who were not U.S.
citizens (i.e. those who could be Legal Permanent Residents, visa holders, and people with
other immigration status, including those unauthorized or undocumented) decreased
remarkably, from 60% to approximately 40% (the percentage was estimated for all the
Mexican-origin population). This decrease could be partly driven by births to Mexican
families. The importance of these findings is not exclusively related to the magnitude of
change. This is very relevant because most scholars treat legal immigration status as a fixed
category, but in fact it changes. The ‘legal context’ for the socioeconomic mobility of
Mexicans matters a great deal because achieving legal status will likely causes more
upward mobility.
Citizenship status and electorate in the five boroughs 45
Immigration status and its association with nativity and citizenship are essential
variables in the examination of socio-economic outcomes for Mexicans and their
descendants in the United States. Data for the Mexican origin population in New York City
indicates a key trend in this regard: the number of Mexicans-born individuals who are U.S.
citizens more than doubled in the fifteen-year period, increasing from approximately
13,000 in 2000 to 30,000 in 2015. The two boroughs with the largest numbers of
Naturalized Citizens were Queens (13,233) and Brooklyn (8,872). A larger number of
Mexicans with papers in NYC might indicate more upward mobility in this community.
45

See figures A1, A2 and A3 in appendix.
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A subsequent pattern corresponds with the decline of Mexicans in New York City
who are “Not U.S. citizens.” According to these data the percentage of Mexicans who were
not citizens decreased from 60.0% in 2000 to 55.0% in 2005, and then from 51.0% in 2010
to 41.0% in 2015. Once again, this decline could be strongly related to the growth of the
U.S. born population. It is important to note that this category corresponds not only to those
who could be unauthorized or undocumented immigrants (with rare exceptions, they are not
obtaining citizenship), but to those with Legal Permanent Residence or other lawful status.
The astonishing growth of the Mexican electorate in New York City is perhaps best
explained by the rising number of Mexicans born in the United States who have recently
reached voting age. In 2000, only about 30,000 New York Mexicans could vote in U.S.
elections. Five years later, there were approximately 5,000 more voters; in 2010 there were
approximately 27,000 more, reaching a total of approximately 62,000 people of Mexican
origin in the electorate. Yet by 2015, the estimate of Mexicans who could vote in the Big
Apple was around 95,000 people. In other words, the electorate of Mexican origin in New
York City tripled between 2000 and 2015. More and more Mexicans in the electorate could
mean new political and other type of opportunities to promote social mobility in the city.
Unauthorized Mexican New Yorkers: Estimates since 1990s
Lacking legal immigration status likely causes less socioeconomic mobility,
particularly for a specific group of people sharing this feature for over three decades. To
present a clearer picture of the unauthorized Mexican population in New York City it is
important to provide some recent estimates at the state level and delineate trends after the
late 1980s, when the last major immigration reform took place in the United States. It is
equally relevant to stress that these estimates are based on indirect methods using
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inferences and relying on sources which generally did not ask directly about detailed
variables or categories for citizenship and immigration status. The top panel in Figure 3.1
shows how the entire undocumented population in New York State increased between 1990
and 2007, when it reached a peak of about a million people, and then declined to about
725,000 in 2016.
Figure 3.1 Unauthorized population in New York (1990-2016) and unauthorized Mexican
immigrants in New York State and New York City (2010-2014)
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Sources: Pew Research Center estimates based on augmented U.S. Census Bureau data; see also Passel &
Cohn, (2014) and Passel, Cohn, Krogstad, & Gonzalez-Barrera (2014) (for top panel); Center for Migration
Studies (CMS); see also Warren, (2014, 2016, 2019), Warren & Warren (2013) (bottom panel).

The panel in the bottom of Figure 3.1 only includes estimates for the Mexican
population (i.e. foreign born and unauthorized) in New York State and New York City for
2010, 2012, 2013, and 2014. The different years between the two panels is due to data
availability, the years in the bottom were the only ones publicly available and the ones I
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could obtain directly from the Center for Migration Studies. 46 Basically, these estimates
show that after 2007 there have been fewer undocumented immigrants at the state and city
levels. For New York State in 2013, the estimates increased to 180,000 compared to
previous years (still below the numbers of 2010), and in 2014 there was another decline. In
New York City, the estimates dropped from 2010 to 2012, but 2013 and 2014 showed a
small growth, reaching close to 140,000 (still under the 2010 estimates; overall, the decline
corresponds with national estimates). Another key feature of the unauthorized Mexican
population in New York is that for the years there is available information (2010-2014) this
group mainly resided in the five boroughs of the city: between seven and eight out of ten
undocumented Mexicans in New York State were located in the City. In New York City, out
of four irregular migrants one was from Mexico.
Figure 3.2 and Table 3.1 show the Center for Migration Studies estimates for the
five boroughs and the other non-NYC counties that integrate Long Island and other areas of
interest in NYS. The data demonstrates that in 2014 Queens became the county with the
largest presence of undocumented Mexican immigrants in New York City (over 48,000),
followed by Brooklyn and the Bronx (each over 36,000). The data also shows that in 2010
the Bronx was the borough with the highest number of irregular immigrants from Mexico
(close to 47,000). Two years later in 2012, Brooklyn absorbed the majority of this
population. Manhattan and Staten Island occupied the fourth and fifth places of settlement
for undocumented Mexicans between 2010 and 2014. In the two other counties located in
Long Island, Nassau and Suffolk, the estimates of unauthorized Mexican immigrants have
been well below 10 thousand individuals, hovering below 5 thousand in 2013 and 2014.
46
According to Passel & Cohn (2019), New York is one of six states with the largest undocumented
population showing an important decline over a decade, a statistical significant change of -375,000 between
2007 and 2017; that is, going from about 1 million unauthorized immigrants to about 650,000 people in NYS.
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Suffolk County showed a dramatic decline from about 8 thousand in 2012 to a little less
than 4 thousand two years later.
Figure 3.2 Unauthorized Mexican immigrants in New York City and Long Island, selected
years (2010, 2012, 2013, 2014)
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Source: Center for Migration Studies; see also Warren, 2014, Warren & Warren, 2013.

But beyond what we know, why do we care about the geographic distribution of the
unauthorized Mexican population in New York City and other neighboring areas? How
does this distribution affect socioeconomic mobility? What causes this dispersion when we
consider immigration status? This information is important because the socioeconomic
mobility of Mexican immigrants is deeply related to the type of jobs, schools, or other
institutions accessible to them. In addition, this geographic dispersion might affect mobility
because it could hinder the development of solidarity networks or cohesive groups
providing different types of support when aspiring for common goals or articulating certain
demands related to the community's socioeconomic needs. Further, the geographic
dispersion of undocumented Mexicans in New York City and New York State could be
associated with conditions of exclusion, marginality, and vulnerability precisely due to
immigration status. That is, unauthorized immigrants face disadvantages when dealing with
landlords or neighbors who are U.S. citizens or not undocumented. Mexicans without
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papers living in the City might face less disadvantages than those in the suburbs because
there are policies or institutions protecting tenants regardless of immigration status. The
upward mobility of Mexican immigrants in New York is greatly affected by the
combination of immigration status and geographic dispersion in urban and suburban areas.
Table 3.1 Mexican-undocumented population in New York by areas or regions of interest,
2010, 2014 and 2017
2010
2014
2017
New York Metro Area (NY-NJ-PA)
253,000 241,688
n/a
New York State (all counties)
201,580 178,098 133,500
Long Island (2 counties: Nassau and Suffolk)
12,951
5,170
n/a
Syracuse Metro Area and North East areas (31 counties)
1,167
2,245
n/a
Hudson Valley (11 counties)
*
29,179
n/a
Rochester Metro Area (6 counties)
*
1,421
n/a
New York City (five counties)
152,459 139,588 105,411
Queens
42,391
48,060
24,925
Brooklyn
40,115
36,844
35,184
Manhattan
17,298
13,673
10,780
Bronx
46,635
36,560
28,176
Staten Island
6,020
4,451
6,346
*Data values under 1,000 suppressed.
Source: CMS, 2016 (based on the augmented ACS, IPUMS). Estimates for 2017 were provided by
Robert Warren and Michael Nicholson at CMS via personal communication (e-mail), February 2019.

3.3 PLACES/DESTINATIONS: GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT
The East Coast has not been historically considered a major destination for
Mexicans in the United States. While New York and New Jersey are among the top
immigrant receiving states in the United States, compared to states like Texas, California or
Illinois, and to urban destinations such as Los Angeles, Houston or Chicago, the numbers
of Mexicans in New York State and the five boroughs of the Empire City are considerably
smaller (see Table 3.2). However, in the past three decades, the estimates of Mexican New
Yorkers have been rising. In 2014, Mexicans were the third largest Latino/a group in the
New York-Newark-Jersey City (NY-NJ-PA) region, although well below Puerto Ricans
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Table 3.2 Top 10 metropolitan areas by Latino/a population

(27%) and Dominicans (21%). As shown in Table 3.2, Mexicans in the New York metro
area are still far from reaching a million people. 47
As in the Chicago metro area, Mexicans in New York are part of minority groups
defined in terms of national origin and as a share of the Latino/a population (i.e. as ethnoracial minorities). Latinxs in metro areas like New York, Chicago, or even Dallas and
Phoenix, represent less than one third of the total population. In eight out of the top ten
Latino/a U.S. metro areas, the Mexican population occupied the first place among countries
of origin. Mexicans in these eight metro areas represent a majority within the Latino/a
groups, making up between 76% and 80% of the Latinxs in Houston, Los Angeles, and
Chicago, and between 84% and 90% in Dallas, Riverside, Phoenix, San Antonio, and San
Diego. Large communities of Mexicans have been living in ‘NY-Metro’ since the 2000s.
Over a century of Mexicans in New York, but still new on the block
There is a long history of Mexicans in New York, but this group of immigrants is
more recent compared to most Mexican communities in the United States. Scholars focused
on the Mexican community in New York (Galvez, 2010; Pries, 2017; Pries et al., 1997;
Ragland, 2003; Rivera-Batiz, 2004; Rivera Sánchez, 2007; Smith, 2006; Valenzuela, 1999),
using different periodization and analyses, suggest that this group went through at least five
stages throughout the past century. The initial stage began about a decade before the
initiation of the Bracero program, during the 1920s and 1930s. Historian David Badillo
(2009) has documented this era by gathering evidence of the Mexican settlements in New
York through U.S. Census reports as well as in Catholic churches, local records, and by
using the groundbreaking work of anthropologist Manuel Gamio. According to Census
47
As pointed out by Holly Reed (personal communication), NYC has such a diversity of immigrant groups
that even the top Latinx groups are Caribbean origin, a key aspect in terms of the context of the city and state.
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estimates collected by Gamio (1971), the number of Mexicans in the state of New York
went up from 353 in 1900 and 555 in 1910 to 2,999 in 1920. A majority of Mexicans in
New York State in the 1930s lived in New York City –about 2,000 in uptown areas in the
borough of Manhattan– and they “came across the border into Texas as unskilled workers
and immediately ran into strong discrimination (…) they hoped to return to Mexico, no
matter how much they might earn” (Badillo, 2009, p. 112). According to the 1930 U.S.
Census estimate, the total foreign-born Mexican population in the state of New York was
2,744, out of 12.6 million people.
Considering Smith’s (2006) analysis, a second phase of Mexican immigration was
situated in parallel with the Bracero Program between the mid-1940s and the mid-1960s,
while a third occurred from the mid-1960s to mid-1980s. Both phases were characterized
by a large presence of people from the Mixteca region, which Smith (2006, p. 20) defines
as a “cultural and ecological zone that includes the contiguous parts of Puebla, Oaxaca, and
Guerrero.” Some key distinctions between these two phases include the socio-demographic
and immigration status profile in each case. During the Bracero era we find more
‘institutionalized circularity’ among mainly male temporary workers, while after 1964 the
presence of women increased, and connections established between U.S.-based employers
and Mexican employees persisted despite the absence of a guest-worker program or a
binational policy to regulate the flow of workers and families across international borders.
The fourth stage, between 1986 and 2000, is characterized by the ‘amnesty’
provisions of IRCA as well as by the emergence of subnational and national legislation
directed towards the ‘illegal immigration problem.’ In 1990 a 14-mile-long and 10-feethigh fence was erected along the San Diego border with Tijuana. In 1994 a Republican
assemblyman in California introduced Proposition 187, also known as the Save our State
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(SOS) initiative. During the Clinton administration, the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform
and Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) was introduced. This legislation aggressively targeted
people who were undocumented, including making it more difficult for spouses and parents
of U.S. citizens to challenge a deportation order in court (see López, 2015).
The fifth and final phase of Mexican migration to New York after 2000 is
characterized by at least three elements. The first is the growth of the second generation
(i.e. people born in the United States with at least one parent born in Mexico). The second
is the growing geographic dispersion within the state and the city itself –in which more
Mexicans moved outside the city towards suburban or rural areas, but also to different
neighborhoods within the city. And the third is longer stays for those undocumented or
unauthorized Mexicans who have had to face the growing pressures and fears of the
contemporary “mass deportation and limited inclusion regime” as has been explained in
previous chapters (see also De Genova, 2002; Menjívar & Kanstroom, 2015).
An emergent phase for the study of Mexican immigration and social mobility has
been taking place since 2012 with the implementation of DACA or Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals. This executive action that deferred deportation to a subgroup of
DREAMers, approximately 750,000 and about 80 percent of them born in Mexico in 2017,
is central to explain the socioeconomic mobility of immigrant youth and mixed
immigration status families in New York and other states. Those individuals who achieved
DACA status are generally able to improve their access to public and private services (e.g.
labor market, financial goods) and elude immediate deportation (more of this in Chapter 6).
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NYC and Eastern Long Island as destinations
Focusing on more detailed demographic data of NYC and Eastern Long Island, two
central areas of interest, is paramount in order to identify the processes of socioeconomic
mobility developed by Mexican immigrants. In the analysis of these geographical contexts,
we can dissect and consider the effect of immigration status on the upward mobility of
people in two places with contrasting histories and attitudes towards foreign-born or other
minority groups. The Mexican population in the five boroughs almost doubled over a
fifteen-year period (2000-2015). 48 In the first decade of the new century, Brooklyn was the
borough with the largest number of Mexicans (regardless of nativity). In 2015 the estimated
number of Mexicans in Queens surpassed Brooklyn by a very small margin. These two
boroughs concentrated approximately 60.0% of the city’s Mexican population in 2015,
followed by the Bronx (22.0%), Manhattan (12.0%) and Staten Island (5.0%). In contrast to
Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Ecuadorians, and Colombians, since 2000 Mexicans have not
been concentrated in one or two boroughs only, but dispersed between three: Queens,
Brooklyn, and the Bronx. Puerto Ricans have been concentrated mainly within the Bronx
and Brooklyn; Dominicans in the Bronx and Manhattan; and Ecuadorians and Colombians
overwhelmingly in Queens.
By 1990, New York City had one of the largest Latino populations of any city in the
United States with almost 2 million residents, a similar figure as the City of Los Angeles. 49
These are the “two major immigration centers in the country” and the two metro areas
containing, in most recent years, “almost one-quarter of the U.S. foreign population”(Foner
& Waldinger, 2013, p. 343). According to the U.S. Census, these two places were the only
See tables A.5 and A.6, as well as maps A.1 and A.2 in appendix.
Parts of this section were first elaborated and presented in a Population Association of America annual
meeting with support by the CUNY Institute for Demographic Research (see Yrizar Barbosa et al., 2016).
48
49
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cities with more than a million Latino-origin residents by 1990. Since the 1950s, Los
Angeles has been the main U.S. destination for Mexican migrants. While Los Angeles has
been considered the Mexican capital outside national territory (the city with the highest
number of Mexican nationals abroad –around 2.6 million in 2007–, see also Alarcón,
Escala, & Odgers, 2016) NYC represents a more recent destination (see also Lobo & Salvo,
2013; Smith, 2013). In NYC, Mexican migrants are not the largest minority group, but their
presence has increased greatly in the last 30 years.
A first assumption made here is that the Mexican community is integrated by all the
Mexican-origin population –and not only by those born in Mexico–, but Mexican
immigrant clusters are initially determined by people born in Mexico. 50 This means that the
core clusters of interest identified in this dissertation are defined by the first generation of
immigrants, not by the second or any other generations. But before analyzing the
“Mexican-born” immigrant clusters, Map 3.1 shows the major concentrations of Mexicans
in NYC and nearby areas in New Jersey in 2010 and Map 3.2 for the East End of Long
Island, in this case including all people with Mexican ancestry for that year. In the upper
left side (see Map 3.1), we observe two census tracts with a percentage of Mexican-origin
population between 36 and 54%, which could be considered immigrant or ethnic clusters
located in the state of New Jersey. 51
50
To clarify, in this research the ‘Mexican community’ in New York is made up of those born in Mexican and
subsequent generations living in the United States. Most of the data sources for this spatial overview come
from the U.S. Census Bureau at the census tract level for the five boroughs of New York City but also for the
New York Metro Area. For NYC I selected the 2006-2010 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates.
The shapefiles come basically from three sources: the U.S. Census (Tiger/line shapefiles in 2012) and the
New York City Department of City Planning (BYTES of the BIG APPLE). Overall this work constituted a
first step in order to follow the work by Logan et al. (2002, p. 319) in Los Angeles and New York, which is
“the first study to systematically identify ethnic neighborhoods, compare them with non-ethnic
neighborhoods, and estimate models predicting which groups members live in these neighborhood.”
51
Using 2006-2010 estimates for New York City, as it explained in the chapter, people born in Mexico
comprised 2% of the population in the five boroughs. Therefore, the intervals for the initial maps in this
chapter were designed bearing in mind this information.
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Map 3.1 Mexican origin population in New York City, 2010
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Map 3.2 Mexican origin population in the East End of Long Island, NY, 2010

An overview of New York City’s boroughs allows us to identify at least half a dozen
potential Mexican-American clusters in the following areas: Port Richmond in Staten
Island; Coney Island, Sunset Park and Bushwick, in Brooklyn; Ravenswood, Long Island
City and Jackson Heights, in Queens; East Harlem in Manhattan; and Mott Haven and
Fordham in the Bronx. Among the neighborhoods or urban areas with the lowest
concentrations of Mexicans in NYC are Richmond Valley in Staten Island; Crown Heights
and Lefferts Gardens in Brooklyn; and the Upper West Side in Manhattan. Map 3.3 shows a
closer look at the concentration of Mexicans in five neighborhoods around Manhattan,
Queens, and Brooklyn.
But how geographically dispersed is the Mexican-born population in NYC
compared to other major groups? Map 3.4 addresses this question by showing the
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Map 3.3 Mexican origin population in five New York City neighborhoods, 2010
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Map 3.4 Mexican foreign-born geographical distribution in New York City compared to the foreign-born from China and the
Dominican Republic, 2006-2010

percentage of the population born in Mexico by census tract and contrasting it with the
distribution of Chinese- and Dominican-born immigrants. According to Pamuk (2006, p.
58), an immigrant cluster is defined as “a set of contiguous tracts that contain at least one
tract with a level of immigrant concentration (core) of at least 10% points above the
references area’s average for that immigrant group.” In NYC, using the 2006-2010
estimates, people born in Mexico comprised 2% of the population, and people born in
China and the Dominican Republic represented around 4% each. Accordingly, a Mexicanborn immigrant cluster consists of at least one tract in which Mexico-born persons
comprise at least 12% of the tract population and two or more contiguous tracts in which
Mexico-born persons comprise at least 7% of the tract population (9% for China and
Dominican Republic). 52
Map 3.4 is useful in order to compare the Mexican versus the Chinese and
Dominican immigrant clusters. These two additional immigrant groups were selected not
only because they represent a significant part of the immigrant landscape in NYC, but also
because their social networks and migration selectivity factors could be different from the
Mexican case (see Yoshikawa, 2012). Chinese-immigrants are known for having strong
social-networks and there is an extensive literature detailing how their immigrant
communities work with stronger solidarity compared to other nationalities, like the case of
I was able to identify 16 Mexican-origin ‘core-inner city clusters’ in 2010 in New York City (see
appendix). These clusters were built under the same criteria: two or more census tracts with a Mexican origin
population above 12 per cent, which is 10 points above the 2 percent average by census tract for the region.
Of the 16 clusters, four are located in the Bronx (around Fordham, High Bridge, Melrose and Mott Haven);
one in Manhattan (East Harlem); four in Queens (Astoria-Ravenswood, Jackson Heights, Long Island City,
and south of Hunter Point-Sunnyside Gardens); six in Brooklyn (near Williamsburg, Bushwick, North of Fort
Greene, Brooklyn Heights, Sunset Park, Coney Island and Brighton Beach); and one in Staten Island (close to
Port Richmond). To construct these polygons, I edited MapInfo’s cosmetic layer and employed the polyline
tool. These same polygons from 2010 were used other maps (not included) for the Irish- and Italian- born
experience in the 1940s compared to these 16 Mexican clusters, using data from the U.S. Census obtained
from the Minnesota Population Center, National Historical Geographic Information System (V. 2.0.
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 2011). Thanks to Deborah Balk, David Halle, and Frank Donnelly
for map advising.
52
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Chinatown in NYC with a “solid organizational structure” (see Zhou, 2009). Dominicans,
on the other hand, represent one of the largest immigrant groups in NYC, and their
presence in the national landscape is particularly resilient in the North-East, especially in
the Boston Area (see Levitt, 2001). Map 3.4 shows how dispersed or fragmented the
Mexican-born-immigrant population is when comparing this community to Dominican and
Chinese immigrants. For example, it seems the latter are concentrated basically in three
main areas: Chinatown (South-east Manhattan), Southern Brooklyn, and Eastern Queens
(Flushing). These Chinese areas seem comparatively ‘thicker’ when comparing them with
areas populated by Mexican immigrants, especially considering the number of census
tracts, which could be related to the group’s size. According to this map, Mexicans are
‘fragmented’ or dispersed between the five boroughs, with small clusters where Chinese
and Dominicans are not clustered, such as Staten Island or the Bronx. 53
ACS data from 2006-2010 allowed the identification of 14 Mexican-bornimmigrant clusters in NYC, and an additional analysis including the two key variables
mentioned before: overcrowding and poverty. I selected these two variables because they
are increasingly being used by migration scholars in the U.S., but not by researchers from
Mexico interested on how Mexicans live in the United States. In Table 3.3 and subsequent
cartographic exercises, I calculated rates for Mexican-born immigrants using these two
variables. Mexican clusters are above the average percent of crowding in the city (around
2.8 compared to 2.5). Mexican clusters with the highest crowding rates are located in
The idea of fragmentation in this case, or the concept of social fragmentation, requires a conceptual
definition, perhaps as a condition of spatial or geographic dispersion associated with ‘weaker’ social networks
and ‘younger’ ethnic communities, perhaps also with less ‘organizational’ history and structures, and
therefore with low political mobilization and, in the case of low-wage immigrants, with higher levels of
vulnerability and precariousness. More data will be necessary to contrast the characteristics of different
groups across clusters. This could be part of other larger research and interventions projects looking at
Mexican immigrants and other groups across different U.S. cities.
53
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Jackson Heights and the Mid- South Bronx. Mexican clusters in the Bronx show the highest
poverty rates, from 35 to 45%, while the lowest are in Western Astoria. From an
ethnographic perspective, it could be extremely interesting to do more research in those
areas and analyze in more depth how people in families live in these neighborhoods.
Another area to analyze poverty rates is in Staten Island, where the clusters seem to go in
opposite directions in terms of crowding and poverty. Clearly most of the Mexican-born
immigrant clusters have higher percentages of crowding and poverty rates compared to the
rest of the city, but not necessarily compared to other immigrant areas or groups.
Table 3.3 Mexican-born immigrant clusters in New York City, 2006-2010
Borough/Cluster/Area
Queens
Jackson Heights
Western Astoria
Long Island City
Brooklyn
Bushwick
Brighton Beach
Sunset Park
Manhattan
East Harlem
Bronx
Long-Wood-Stock
Mid-South Bronx
South Bronx
Belmont
South West Bronx
Staten Island
North East Staten Island
North West Staten Island

Number of
census tracts

Crowding
rate

Poverty
rate

Population
Total
Percentage

38
6
4

9.9
6.8
2.9

20.1
12.0
18.5

25,819
2,343
749

14.31%
11.61%
14.04%

16
4
23

5.7
7.4
7.7

29.9
25.7
24.5

8,975
3,095
13,000

13.45%
15.81%
14.00%

8

6.0

33.6

6,239

12.45%

4
3
4
4
4

3.7
6.8
7.7
6.4
13.3

44.2
35.3
44.8
43.7
41.8

1,659
1,974
2,846
3,095
3,017

9.78%
12.07%
10.84%
15.81%
11.49%

5
6

2.6
2.9

25.1
15.5

681
2,758

4.36%
11.56%

Rest of the City
2,068
2.5
16.9
101,833
Source: Estimations by author using data from U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2010 ACS.

1.33%

Why is this overview pertinent in relation to the geographical context for Mexicans
in New York and their socioeconomic mobility? Are they settling in different places that
might promote or inhibit mobility? As data shows here and in later chapters, Mexican
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immigrants in the Bronx have faced a more difficult geographical context because they
reported, overall, higher poverty rates contrasted to those in Queens and even compared to
the other boroughs. Except for in Staten Island and two other clusters (Long Island City in
Queens and one cluster the Bronx), the crowding rate was very high and might also be a red
flag or signal of a less favorable context in which to promote upward mobility.54
But how are the experiences of Mexican immigrants outside New York City
different in other local ecosystem within New York State, which could be less welcoming to
the foreign born and with less ethno-racial diversity? What data from other immigrant
groups or other national origin groups might be helpful to understand the degrees of
socioeconomic mobility that Mexicans experience across different places or geographies in
New York? Table 3.4 includes variables about migratory experience, household type and
tenure, income and poverty for people born in Mexico, U.S.-or native-born population
(non-immigrants), and for Central and South American foreign-born people in different
places of interest in New York, such as Suffolk County, the Bronx and Queens. As one of
the two non-NYC counties on Long Island, Suffolk is a good case to study because it is a
suburban NYS area that includes sub-regions with a large presence of Mexican migrants
that were part of the MIDA project. ACS data from the U.S. Census Bureau at the state and
county levels indicate that individuals born in Mexico and living in Suffolk County, a very
large territory and an infamous location after a hate crime in 2008, 55 could be of less
socioeconomic disadvantage compared to those in Queens and the Bronx.

Perhaps the crowding rate partially reflect housing types and land use in different boroughs (personal
communication with Holly Reed).
55
See Garland (2019) available at: https://hechingerreport.org/after-a-hate-crime-a-town-welcomesimmigrants-into-its-schools
54
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Table 3.4 Selected variables for natives (U.S.-born), compared to Mexican and other Latin American foreign-born groups in Suffolk
County, the Bronx, Queens, and New York State, 2006-2010

First generation Mexicans in the Eastern county of Long Island are a considerably
smaller group (less than 7,000 people) compared to those in the Bronx (almost 43,000) or
in Queens (about 50,000), but with higher rates of naturalization, married-couple families,
median household income, and home ownership. For those immigrants ‘with papers’ or a
valid immigration status, this geographical context is favorable for upward mobility.
However, from these sources and data we cannot show that this was the case for all
Mexicans in New York, assuming they moved to the suburbs as their economic situation
improved. However, from interviews conducted with Mexicans in the East End of Long
Island, this geographic region appears to be home to a mix of upward mobility cases with
legal status, and some direct migration cases to Long Island due to family ties but
undocumented status.
Turning back to the Census data, approximately 13% of foreign-born Mexicans in
Suffolk were naturalized citizens, which more than doubles the 6% reported for Mexicans
in the Bronx but is closer to the 10% of Queens and the 11% for the total Mexican foreignborn population in New York State. Interestingly, this 13% is well below the percentage
reported by foreign-born Central American migrants (22%) and South American migrants
(46%) in Suffolk. About 40% of the Mexicans who are not U.S. citizens in this suburban
county entered the country between 1990 and 1999, while the percentage during this same
period for those in the Bronx was close to 45% (which is closer to the one reported for all
Mexican in NYS: 43%). These numbers, particularly the higher share of Mexicans in the
suburbs with valid immigration status compared to the city (but still lower than Central and
Southern American) might indicate a more favorable situation for the upward mobility of
those with ‘papers’ that still might be considered a recently arrived minority group.

81

In Suffolk, the share of women born in Mexico was higher (43%) than in the two NYC
counties also under examination; the rate for the Bronx and NYS was similar (39-40%) while for
Queens the rate was lower (36%). Compared to those in NYS, Queens and the Bronx, Mexicans
in Suffolk reported higher rates of ‘in married-couple family household type’ (56%), as well as
higher than average household size (4.95), and average family size (4.58). These suburban
Mexicans in Eastern Long Island had a median household income of $49,500 USD, with more
workers per household (2.43) comparatively speaking, lower poverty rates (18%) than other
Mexicans in the two counties or in NYS (30%), and also reported a higher rate of
homeownership, with more rooms (less crowded) and vehicles available. It is obvious but
important to note that compared to NYC, people in Suffolk County have a harder time
transporting without a car. These estimates are evidence of a suburban group of people in a better
socioeconomic position, particularly if they are not undocumented. This group of documented
Mexicans living in the suburbs of Suffolk, some of them owning their family households, are in a
geographical context favorable for their upward mobility.
3.4 URBAN REARING: FAMILIAL CONTEXT
When looking at the familial context for Mexicans in New York, the focus here is on
variables such as education, language, household income and poverty. There were positive gains
in educational attainment among New York City’s Mexican adult population (25 years of age and
older), particularly for those born in the U.S. Between 2000 and 2015, the percentage of
Mexicans in the City with “a bachelor's degree or more” increased. Perhaps these educational
gains have been or will be correlated with generation, or with the upward mobility of people in
family households with multiple statuses and immigrant generations.
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There are mixed findings when examining household income among the population in
question. On the one hand, the percentage of Mexicans living in the city with a median
household income of $100,000 or more was estimated around 19.1% and 20.0% in 2000, 2010
and 2015. This same percentage was steadily higher for the foreign-born in the four years of
study. However, the Mexican population in the city occupied the third position in median
household income in 2015 ($46,000 USD) compared with the five largest Latino national
subgroups in New York. Mexicans reported a higher median household income than Dominicans
($40,000) and Puerto Ricans ($44,000), and a considerably lower income compared to
Colombians ($84,000) and Ecuadorians ($67,000). The Mexican median household income in
2015 was also low when compared to major ethno-racial groups in the city, such as non-Hispanic
whites ($95,500), Asians ($68,000) or non-Hispanic Blacks ($58,400). These findings illustrate
complexity and heterogeneity among Mexican international migrants (see also Garip, 2016).
Educational attainment and language
Mexican immigrants in New York, like other groups of Latinos and foreign-born
individuals, praise education, particularly for their children. Mexican parents in NYC, usually
with less years of education compared to Colombians and Ecuadorians, have been seeking
opportunities to access schools, generally understanding the links between educational
attainment and upward mobility. Education strongly promotes mobility in general, and especially
among Mexican immigrants and their children. In 2015, the Mexican adult population in New
York City (25 years of age and older) had a slightly lower percentage of individuals with a “BA
or a higher” (13%) compared with the two Latino subgroups more alike in terms of population
size and basic socio-demographics in the city: Dominicans (15%) and Ecuadorians (14%) .
Additionally, Mexicans had higher rates of non-graduates (44%) compared to the same two
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subgroups (Dominicans 40%, Ecuadorians 37%). Educational attainment for Mexicans in NYC
steadily increased between 2000 and 2015. The percentage of the Mexican adult population (25
years and older) that finished college (got “BA or higher”) has grown 4.1% between 2000 and
2015. Even more importantly, the percentage of individuals who did not graduate high school
decreased 15.0% between 2000 and 2015. The number of Mexicans who have graduated college
has steadily increased from 22.5% in 2000 to 31.2% in 2015, perhaps all this meaning better
educational prospects and more opportunities for younger generations. 56
The biggest difference in high school completion rates within the Mexican community is
the extraordinary gap between native-born and foreign-born Mexicans. While approximately
51.0% of foreign-born Mexicans in the city did not graduate high school, only 10.0% of
domestic-born Mexicans 25 years of age and older failed to finish in 2015. The college
graduation rate among U.S.-born Mexicans was an astounding 43.1% in 2015, while for the
foreign born it was 7.3%. What would this difference look like for other Latino groups with
perhaps similar sociodemographic characteristics in New York City such as Ecuadorians or
Dominicans? Is there an ‘ethnic-national origin’ pattern? Native-born Mexican and Ecuadorians
have about the same rate of those who did not graduate from high school unlike their
Dominicans peers who have a considerably higher rate (18%). In the case of the foreign born, we
see that for Mexicans the rate of people who did not graduate from high school is the highest
(50%) among these three groups, followed by Dominicans (45%) and Ecuadorians (36%).
Interestingly, the educational success of the Mexicans born in the United States is noticeable for
those who reported a BA degree or higher (43%) compared to Dominicans (25%) and
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See figures A.6 and A.7 in appendix.
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Ecuadorians (36%). On a different scale, the rate of attainment of a BA or more for foreign born
Dominicans was the highest (13%) among the three groups. 57
Data from 2015 revealed that most Mexicans (25 years of age and older) who have
graduated college in New York City are in fact native-born. Additionally, most Mexicans who
have graduated college live in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens. If these trends hold steady, this
proportion of graduates is likely to increase in the future. 58 Keeping track of these numbers and
estimates on education will be crucial in future studies tracing the social mobility of Mexicans in
New York, as well as the study of social inequalities for immigrants.
The percentages of Mexican educational achievement differ by nativity. In the most
recent year of study, Manhattan was the borough with the largest number of Mexicans with “BA
or more”: 9,200 in total (around 5,900 of them were U.S.-born). These are noteworthy changes
when looking at previous periods, considering that in 2000 the number of Mexicans (native and
foreign-born) in the city with “BA or more” was around 8,000 people. The stark disparity in
educational attainment among the Mexican population in New York City by nativity, indicates
essential differences between the first (foreign-born) and second (native-born) immigrant
generations. This is validated by the fact that older foreign-born migrants participate more in the
labor market while their younger children attend educational institutions in the United States. 59

See figures A.8 and A.9 in appendix.
See Figure A.10 in appendix.
59
In 2015, the largest number of Mexicans with a BA or higher resided in Manhattan (9,217) followed by Brooklyn
(8,376) and Queens (6,280). The largest number who did not graduate high school resided in Brooklyn (32,294)
followed by Queens (26,592) and the Bronx (20,769). Furthermore, the most Mexicans with a high school diploma
in 2015 were residing in Queens (24,401) followed by Brooklyn 14,444), and the Bronx (4,023). The number of
Mexicans with a graduate degree (masters and PhD) in the five boroughs increased from approximately 2,402
people in 2000 to nearly 8,937 people in 2015. Graduate degree numbers in the Mexican origin population in the
City have grown steadily between 2000 and 2015. Compared to the foreign-born, native-born Mexicans have seen
the largest growth in individuals with a graduate degree: from approximately 1,264 people in 2000 to nearly 5,974
people in 2015 –nearly a fivefold increase. It is likely that more mobile or richer Mexicans, perhaps part of the elite
in Mexico, are relocating to NYC to work in well-paid sectors or occupations, such as in finances. See also Figure
A.11 in appendix.
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Education, nativity, and immigration status for Mexicans in New York matter a great deal
when analyzing mobility. First generation immigrants from Mexico who lack papers are less
likely to experience upward mobility compared to those who are U.S.-born or have valid status.
More years of education and ‘papers’ are factors promoting upward mobility, while low
educational attainment and unauthorized status inhibit mobility.
English is another factor promoting upward mobility among Mexicans living in New
York, particularly if they are foreign-born adults. The percentage of Mexicans in New York City
(5 years of age and older) who did not speak English (at all, or at any level of proficiency)
decreased from 16.0% in 2000 to 8.0% in 2015. 60 In 2000, only about 16.0% of all Mexicans in
the region reported not speaking English, then slowly declined in 2005 and 2010 to
approximately 15.0%, and then sharply to 8.1% in 2015. To make more sense of this pattern it
will be essential to make distinctions between the U.S.-born from those born in Mexico.
In 2000 and 2015, the percentage of Mexicans who reported speaking Spanish at home
remained steady at 89.0%. Percentages of speaking Spanish at home have remained the same
across the four periods, with a very minor decline in 2015. In addition, rates of English spoken at
home by Mexicans have remained stable between 2000 and 2015 (at 10.0% and 11.0%
respectively).
Patterns of language spoken at home by both foreign and native-born Mexicans show
small changes between 2000 and 2015. U.S.-born Mexicans reported levels of English spoken at
home around 22.5% between 2000 and 2015. 61 More specifically, rates of English spoken at
home for domestic-born Mexicans decreased from 24.0% in 2000 to 20.0% in 2015. Perhaps this
decrease could be associated with the suburbanization of ‘more acculturated’ families, possibly
See figures A.27, A.28 and A.29 in appendix.
In future work and estimations, it will be important to distinguish between children living with their parents and
adults in their own households. Thanks to Richard Alba for pointing this out.
60
61
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leaving the city. Levels of Spanish spoken at home steadily increased from 75.0% in 2000 to
79.0% in 2015 for domestic-born Mexicans. Foreign-born Mexicans reported that Spanish
spoken at home remained the same in 2005, 2010, and 2015 at a rate of 95.0%; this was a slight
increase compared to 2000 when 93.0% reported speaking Spanish at home. Percentages of
English spoken at home for foreign-born Mexicans have fluctuated between 6.0% and 3.0%
between 2000 and 2015. In 2000, 6.0% of foreign-born Mexicans reported speaking English at
home, the highest percentage among the four-time frames studied, with the lowest rates of
reported speaking English at home was in 2010 at 3.0%. Educational attainment and English
proficiency will likely continue to be fundamental variables to keep track of the social mobility
of Mexicans in New York, as elements of human capital, greater access, and support to them are
fundamental to societal and communitarian well-being.
Household income and poverty 62
National origin and nativity remained essential characteristics in determining household
income for the five largest Latino subgroups in New York City, including Mexicans. To assess
how Mexicans rank in terms of factors promoting or inhibiting upward mobility, it is very useful
to compare them to other more similar groups, particularly to Dominicans and Ecuadorians but
also Puerto Ricans and Colombians. Like Mexicans, those from Ecuador and the Dominican
Republic form immigrant groups who speak the same language, have a large share of
unauthorized immigrants, and live and work in similar communities. These groups, however, are
less recent arrivals compared to Mexicans.
The five largest Latino groups in NYC experienced an increase in median household
income between 2005 and 2010 overall. Ecuadorians had the highest median household income
The estimates in this section analysis have been adjusted to 2015 dollars. See in the appendix figures A.12, A.13,
A.14, A.15, A.16, A.17, A.18 and A.19.
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among the five largest Latino subgroups in the city in 2000, 2005, and 2010. Ecuadorians
reported the greatest median household income in 2010 compared to the other subgroups
($65,217). Puerto Ricans had the lowest median household income among the top five Latino
subgroups in the city in 2000 and 2010, while that was the case for Dominicans in 2005 and
2015. In the four years of analysis Mexicans did not have the highest or lowest median
household income in the group, but in 2005 they reported the second lowest income ($41,869).
Dominicans also experienced a decline between 2000 and 2005 and Ecuadorians between 2010
and 2015. It is important to keep track some of these estimates because in subsequent chapters I
will focus on the household income reported by Mexican families while doing fieldwork.
Again, place of birth was key for an analysis of Mexican income in the city. Native and
foreign-born Mexicans experienced loss in median household income between 2000 and 2005
with an increase in 2010 and a decrease in 2015. Yet, the foreign-born population reported higher
median earnings compared to the domestic-born between 2000 and 2015. Perhaps far from a
surprising finding, this difference could be explained by comparing older workers born in
Mexico versus the considerably younger U.S.-born population. 63
Within the Mexican population across the five boroughs between 2000 and 2015, the
foreign-born living in Queens reported the highest median household income ($65,434) in 2010,
while among the U.S.-born population, the highest income levels ($70,652) were among those
living in Manhattan. Breaking down by lowest income among nativity and borough in each year,
native-born Mexicans in the Bronx reported the lowest median income ($28,400) in 2015, while
the foreign-born Mexicans in the Bronx reported the lowest amount ($36,000) for the same year.
With the notable exception of 2005, the percentage of Mexicans living in New York City
with a median household income of $100,000 or more was estimated around 19% in 2000, 2010
63

Estimates should be taken with caution because they appear higher than expected in 2010.
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and 2015. The share of Mexicans with a median household income above the $100,000 threshold
was higher for those born abroad in in the four years of analysis. 64
There were marginal changes in the percentage of Mexicans living in poverty over this
fifteen-year period. Approximately 33.0% of Mexicans in the city lived in poverty between 2000
and 2015. The Mexican origin population was more likely to live in poverty compared to other
Latinos, such as Colombians and Ecuadorians, but shared similar percentages with Dominican
and Puerto Rican immigrant population.
Poverty rates were consistently higher among Mexican women. In 2000, about 36.0% of
all Mexican females lived in poverty, while their male counterparts hovered around 31.0%. The
poverty rate for native-born Mexicans increased from 35.0% in 2000 to 41.0% in 2015, and
decreased for foreign-born Mexicans from 29.0% to 25.0%, evidently related to the role of U.S.born children. By 2015, poverty among U.S.-born Mexicans had risen to its highest at 41.0.0%,
while poverty rates for foreign born Mexicans was at its lowest at 25.0%.
Why is this? One possible explanation could be because more U.S. born minor children
are being born into younger families, that is to say, families who are still settling and perhaps
also making less money. This could be happening whether the parents or the heads of these
families are U.S. citizens, or have another regular status, or if they include long-term
unauthorized parents. Another explanation for the high poverty rates of domestic-born Mexicans
is probably related to the fact that this is a younger group of people, and many are born to young
parents who have been undocumented for a long time. Furthermore, we could speculate,
considering other basic demographic variables, that foreign-born Mexican men are more likely a
group of intense workers, younger compared to the rest of the labor force but older than U.S.born Mexicans (perhaps with more than one job or several occupations). This group is very
64

To see more differences between the U.S.-born and those born in Mexico see figures A.12-19 in appendix.
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active in the labor market with higher wages than women generally, perhaps working for more
days and hours than the average U.S. worker and certainly more than younger native-born
Mexicans. In addition, it is important to highlight that there is also a growing population of
Mexican children living in female-headed households. 65
In the familial context of mobility, children in families facing economic hardships will be
less likely to be upwardly mobile. Poverty among young Mexicans, aged 0-14, increased
substantially by 2015. 48.0% of this age category lived in poverty, an increase from 40.0% in
2000. Native-born Mexicans in this age group were also much more likely to live in poverty
(49.0%) than foreign-born (25.0%) by 2015. These are very important findings, because they
speak to a declining situation of well-being for New York City Mexican families. Alternatively, it
could be argued that better-off Mexican families are leaving the city. Finally, Mexican females
reported levels of poverty of 50.0%, 4 percentage points higher than males in 2015. In sum, these
pieces of data show that Mexican family units and households without men and with minor
children are in a position of disadvantage or in a familial context inhibiting mobility.
CONCLUSION
This chapter presented a brief demographic overview of Mexicans in New York and
analyzed three contexts of socioeconomic mobility: legal, geographical, and familial. The
Mexican origin population in New York City increased steadily from about 200,000 in 2000 to
380,000 in 2015. The Mexican population in the five boroughs has experienced marked changes
in terms of nativity, sex, and age distribution since 2000. Mexicans retained their position as the
third largest Latino/a national subgroup in NYC during these 15 years. In 2015, Mexicans
represented less than 5% of the total population in the city, well behind Dominicans and Puerto
This proposition and data might find an echo in the community service society argument (i.e. poverty increases
when young undocumented parents have children).
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Ricans (about 8% each group). Since 2000, the concentration of Mexicans has spread across
three counties or boroughs: Queens, Brooklyn, and the Bronx. In 2015, Queens had the highest
number of foreign-born Mexicans (~68,000) and Brooklyn the highest number of native-born
Mexicans (~48,000). The Bronx, with the lowest median household income among the nativeand foreign-born Mexicans in 2015 ($28,400 and $36,000 respectively) compared with the other
five boroughs, occupied the third position in the population estimates for Mexicans in NYC.
Mexicans in New York, U.S.-born and foreign-born, with or without ‘papers’, have been
settling across the five city boroughs and throughout several counties in the state over the past
two or three decades, originating from several municipios in Southern-Central states in Mexico
and most notably from the State of Puebla. It is important to keep studying how the lack of legal
immigration status limits their socio-economic mobility as individuals and families, as well as to
identify characteristics of their local ecosystems that could be less immigrant friendly or
welcoming as in the case of Suffolk County in Long Island (these differences between NYC and
LI will be shown in more detail in subsequent chapters).
The geographic dispersion of Mexicans in New York City and in Long Island should be
seen as a key feature that might facilitate or limit their macro-level integration prospects
compared to other immigrant groups and minorities. For example, all the Mexican clusters
analyzed here were above the average percent of overcrowding in the city, and those in the
Bronx showed the highest average poverty rates, while the lowest rates were located in Queens.
Compared to Dominican and Chinese immigrants, the Mexican-born immigrant clusters are more
dispersed within the city.
Considering the burden to upward mobility imposed by unauthorized status, it might be
worthwhile in future research work to look at conditions and variables related to the communities
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of origin and the transnational ties being established by individuals and families under the
current U.S. deportation regime. While geographic dispersion in New York might be an
important signifier to explain what promotes or inhibits upward mobility, perhaps geographic
dispersion in Mexico (within states and municipalities) might also explain similarities or
differences within a larger group of Mexicans. Most migrants from Mexico, particularly from
rural areas, might be starting off at a disadvantage. In later studies, it might be important to
address how the poverty and low education of migrants from rural or semi-urban areas within
and among Mexican states inhibits upward mobility upon arrival in the United States.
Reconsidering the question about the conditions, position or well-being of Mexicans in
New York, the information presented in this chapter illustrates some contradictions and
paradoxes. For instance, in NYC there are increasingly more voters of Mexican origin, most of
them being U.S. or domestic born, while the estimates of unauthorized immigrants from Mexico
in NYS have been declining. This ‘legal context’ requires further examination, in particular with
the increasing deportation numbers since the Obama administration and after Trump was elected.
Furthermore, stakeholders and advocacy groups may want to start targeting Mexicans
specifically or crafting their messages and outreach towards heterogenous Mexican populations.
The fact that there are more Mexicans in the electorate might signal a new era in how they are
perceived by well-established political actors or in how they decide to participate in future
political processes. These changes could mark a new era in local political campaigns or in how
Mexicans will continue participating in future elections and political campaigns.
Mexicans in New York City consolidated their position as the third largest Latino
population in the five boroughs between 2000 and 2015, behind Dominicans and Puerto Ricans
and above Ecuadorians and Colombians. Mexicans are also wedged between other Latino
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subgroups across different socio-economic measures, including household income or labor
market participation (i.e. employment and unemployment rates). Additional studies are needed to
uncover how and to what extent there might be conflict and solidarity among Mexicans, other
Latin American groups, non-Hispanic immigrants and different ethno-racial minorities across a
wide gamut of scenarios, including the search for desirable resources, such as housing,
educational opportunities in schools or developing political alliances.
Legal or valid immigration status, place and family are factors that can promote or inhibit
the socio-economic mobility of Mexicans in New York City and the State, especially in terms of
household income and educational opportunities. It is paramount to continue documenting how
potential penalties or advantages for Mexicans and their families in the United States (for
example as workers, entrepreneurs, students, parents, or heads of households) might be
associated with their demographic profile, immigration status, neighborhood characteristics,
educational attainment, labor trajectories, health access, language ability and even phenotype.
One fundamental paradox for Mexican families in New York remained over the 15 years
examined here: U.S.-born Mexicans have achieved increasing educational gains, but high
poverty rates in urban households, particularly those headed by women, have remained
unchanged. The demographic of female migrants born in Mexico has increased, and these
women in turn reside with more relatives and U.S.-born children in the city. Therefore, the
increasing participation of Mexican women and their children in the labor market, in New York
City and New York State, requires further investigation in order to identify potential barriers,
obstacles, incentives or opportunities available to them. The promises and challenges of minority
mobility and the demographic transition to ethnographic diversity in the United States (see Alba
& Yrizar Barbosa, 2016) for native-born Mexican youth, their parents and other immigrant
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family households in New York could be inextricably tied to changes in immigration status and
more inclusive local ecosystems.
What do these contexts of mobility for Mexicans in New York mean? How all the
information and data presented up to this point are useful to have a clearer sense of how common
are the stories of ‘exceptional’ upward mobility or ‘precarious’ immobility among Mexican
immigrants? How many relatively successful undocumented families are there? I argue that cases
like the ones presented in the next chapter were not the rule, but an exception in my fieldwork.
However, in order to get a more accurate idea of how many undocumented people are, in fact,
upwardly mobile in the United States despite legal status requires additional demographic and
ethnographic work. Nonetheless, the cases I present in Chapter 4 are really important because
they highlight the need to do more research and strategic interventions with local partners,
paying close attention to the theoretical model and variables suggested earlier in the dissertation,
in order to discern, study and trace if these families are more than outliers and thus it is worth
looking at their experience in ethnographic detail to figure out the processes that led to the
unexpected outcomes.
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CHAPTER 4. EXCEPTIONAL UPWARD MOBILITY SIN PAPELES
Claudio and Marcela Arias in Queens introduced me to foods I had not eaten before (lobster
cream, kale salads, roasted brussels sprouts, grilled branzino, lamb chops) that Claudio had
learned to cook at an upscale Mediterranean restaurant in Manhattan. Both had done some
college or post-high school education in Mexico, spoke English very well and together had a
family income of over $80,000 annually. Marcela worked as a personal assistant in private
universities and personal care offices. Claudio opened his own carpentry business in Brooklyn
after working several years in a furniture store. Their kids talked to me about college, and one
was already planning on going to graduate school. The first hint that Claudio and Marcela were
undocumented came from the joke one of their closest relatives made when I returned from
Mexico by saying “you don’t look so tan,” meaning that I had flown into New York with a visa,
rather than crossing the desert. 66
Rodrigo and Fernanda Iñiguez arrived with their two children in separate cars (recent
models of Asian manufacture) to meet me at an upscale coffee place in a Long Island East End
beach town. I had met them through work at a local Catholic immigrant services organization in
the area. I knew their children planned to go to college: one has been attending a community
college in Suffolk (but later he/she took time off to work after getting DACA). 67 The Iñiguez
family earned over $70,000 per year. When we met at the coffee place, Rodrigo ordered drinks
and food in English for everyone; he insisted on paying and used a debit card. Fernanda
confessed that when she drives and sees cops around, she gets very nervous. Meanwhile
Rodrigo, who had two minor traffic tickets, does not feel the same way, and he said they live in

All names and last names are pseudonyms. IRB File #2015-1317. After several interactions, indirect and direct
questions, the immigration status of 92 participants was fully verified (see Table 8.1 in the appendix).
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To protect the identity of informants and their children, on purpose I do not openly disclose their gender.
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one of the safest places in the world. The Arias and Iñiguez are two immigrant families, whom I
studied, that demonstrated exceptional upward mobility.
In this chapter I analyze the cases of Familias Arias and Íñiguez, who have experienced
exceptional upward mobility in households headed by long-term undocumented immigrants. I
explain that their upward mobility is exceptional because out of 53 families in my study (headed
by undocumented or DACA-status immigrants), only half a dozen reported a family income
above $70,000. 68 This is a threshold more likely to be seen among immigrants with lawful status
or other non-immigrant minorities. 69 The Arias and Íñiguez families also displayed strong and
consistent educational planning for minors and adults. Throughout the chapter I address how
individual and group factors in each family combine to promote this exceptional upward socioeconomic mobility. These factors that promote upward mobility for unauthorized immigrants
like the Arias and Íñiguez families include (i) having more years of formal education (in Mexico
and the United States); (ii) developing or transferring labor skills across borders (see Hagan et
al., 2015), allowing long-time tenure in jobs or prosperous self-employment; (iii) participating in
stronger or more reliable networks with relatives, friends or neighbors with valid immigration
status; and (iv) positive intra-family dynamics when making key decisions (see Dreby, 2015;
Smith, 2008).
Immigration status is not the only factor shaping life chances for undocumented
immigrants in New York. It is possible to be upwardly mobile, within limits, for certain
unauthorized individuals heading family households in the city and the suburbs. It is not
surprising that immigrants with more education and perhaps some English proficiency on arrival
will do better, meaning being more economically and educationally successful. However, it is
See Table 8.2 in appendix. The annual median family household income for 53 Mexican families was $35,500.
In 2015, the Mexican population in the City had the third lowest median household income ($46,000) compared
with the five largest Latino national subgroups in New York (see Figure A.12 in the appendix).
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important to stress three points about the effects of legal status. First, much of the literature
implies that undocumented status completely neutralizes any upward mobility. That is, the cruel
natural experiment of immigrant illegality limits job opportunities, leads children to wake up to a
nightmare or inhabit a “limbo” (see Gonzales, 2015), generally making whatever class or
educational advantages some migrants might have had irrelevant, although this is not always
true. Second, undocumented status effectively controls and defines immigrants’ trajectories. But
then, because of specific characteristics, including pre-emigration qualities or community
characteristics (including human and social capital within transnational, binational or mixedstatus families), some people are still able to make the most of it despite a precarious
immigration status. And third, even when ‘immigrant illegality’ seems omnipresent, a “ball and
chain” (there in the back of their minds, frequently exhausting to mind and body), some factors,
as I will show here, can make it tolerable, such as family, community, or a less hostile police
force in their place of residence. 70
4.1 MOVING UPWARDS
Among the top cases of Mexican families with a high household-income above $60,000
USD a year, two were headed by long-term undocumented immigrants who were effectively
planning the educational trajectory of their children and of themselves: Familias Arias and
Íñiguez. Upwardly mobile families are schematically presented in Table 4.1, which considers the
effects of seven variables affecting immigrant social mobility as mentioned earlier. In this
section I will focus on these two specific cases, paying close attention to the seven variables and
the two principal outcomes explained before, in order to elucidate their upward mobility patterns.
I decided to focus on these families because they are helpful to illustrate how different
combinations of these factors are related to the same outcome or point in that direction.
70

I am grateful to Phil Kasinitz for sharing with me these ideas and pointing out in detail these three points.
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Table 4.1 Three cases of upwardly mobile families in New York, 2015-2017

Factors →
↓ Familias
Arias,
in Queens:

Marcela,
Claudio, and two
minors.

Íñiguez,
in Suffolk:

(i) Papers, or
immigration
status effect?
(parent & child)
––

Parents/heads: LTU
Children: USC

––

Parents/heads: LTU
Child: DACA

Rodrigo,
Fernanda, and
one minor.

Hernán,
in the Bronx:

Emilio, plus
seven adults and
one minor.

––

Parents/heads LTU
Children: DACA
and USC

Places or
ecosystems

(ii)
Org.

––

++

++

(iii)
Police

Human
Capital

(iv)
Educ.

++

––

++

Acronyms:
LTU: Long-term undocumented person.
USC: U.S. citizen.
LPR: Legal permanent resident.
DACA: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival Recipient.
Org.: Organizational activity in CBOs or FBOs.
Police refers to interactions with police or law enforcement agents.
Educ.: Educational attainment.

(v)
Skill?

++

++

++

++

+–

––

(vi) Social
networks:
strongreliable?
++

++

+–

(vii) Intra-family:
Partneringparenting
decisions?
++

++

+–

Outcome
Upward
mobility

(high household
income, strong
educational
planning)
2 earners, 4 people

Upward
mobility

(high household
income, strong
educational
planning)
2 earners. 3 people

Approaching
upward
mobility

(high income, some
or weak educational
planning)
5 earners, 9 people

Note: Symbols in cells should be interpreted as follows:
– – negative or mostly negative
+ – moderate or mixed
+ + positive or mostly positive.

Familia Hernán was included in Table 4.1 because it is a helpful example to explain
variation of key independent variables in additional ‘successful’ cases of upward mobility for
Mexican families in the Bronx and Suffolk County. Emilio Hernán was a young DACA recipient
who finished high school but decided not to go to college because of economic constraints. Even
though Emilio’s parents suggested he should go back to school, he decided not to because he saw
how much they were working to make ends meet. Emilio lives in an apartment with eight people,
his two parents, two adult siblings with their partners and their children (e.g. Emilio’s
nieces/nephews). The estimated family household income of Familia Hernán was $118,000 USD
in 2017, a mixed-status family in which seven adults were born in Mexico and crossed the border
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‘without inspection’ and two minor children were born in New York (see more details about this
case in the appendix).
The fact that only a few Mexican families are upwardly mobile, I argue, is exceptional
when we look at other households headed by long-term unauthorized immigrants identified
during this research (see Figure 8.3 in appendix showing distribution of income and education in
quantiles). Furthermore, my analysis suggests that this ‘virtuous’ mobility is more directly
related to human capital, social networks, and intra-family dynamics than to where these families
reside or the place where they are currently living. This is not to say that place, local ecosystems,
or context do not matter, especially for unauthorized immigrants. However, place seems to be
less consequential for those undocumented immigrants with more formal education, close
relatives, friends or neighbors with legal status providing strong support when in need; or for
those with partnering-parenting decisions that effectively distribute roles and duties in the
household, allowing positive dynamics inside the immediate family circle that favor a certain
egalitarianism.
Familias Arias and Íñiguez are headed by parents fluent in English, with high levels of
educational attainment and extensive binational labor trajectories. As I will show in more detail
throughout this section, these two families are embedded in dense local and transnational kinship
networks with multiple immigration statuses and valuable resources. Unlike the Hernán Family,
the Arias and Íñiguez families have weak or no relationships with local community-based
organizations (CBOs). For the Hernán Family, the proximity and organizational support
provided by a local CBO became a more consequential factor considering that the strength of
their human capital, social networks or ‘intra-family household dynamics’ were more mixed or
moderate. In comparison with the Arias and Íñiguez families, Emilio Hernán and his family are
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‘approaching upward mobility’ because they showed lower per-capita household-income and
lacked strong educational planning.
The exceptional and ‘successful’ upward mobility of the Arias and Íñiguez families could
be explained by three conditions, maximized not by their irregular immigration status or the
place they inhabit, but by their intra-family household dynamics. The first condition is the ability
of family heads to binationally transfer or develop labor related skills. That is, they were able to
apply practices, conocimientos o saberes (“knowledges”), and skills learned in Mexico to their
jobs and occupations in the United States. This characteristic could be understood as part of the
‘immigrant selectivity’ of individuals once they leave their place of origin, which in these cases
was extraordinary because it was a ‘social class’ characteristic transmitted from one generation
to the other. A long-time-tenure on more than one job in the destination country, part of the
concept of developed labor skills and a second condition I identified, is evidently less related to
practices in the origin country and more so to continuous labor trajectories of international
migrants supported by local networks and ties, usually with the support of close multiimmigration status networks. The third condition, practically absent among most cases but
present in the Arias and Íñiguez families, is the adoption of more positive and egalitarian roles in
order to share decisions as a family household unit.
Before moving forward with each of the cases, I think it is important to explain briefly
how I encountered and identified these four families. The Arias family is part of a larger group of
people whom I encountered through an amateur soccer team based in Queens. I initially met
some of their members and players working on another research project designed and
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implemented by CUNY, Baruch College, and the Mexican Consulate in New York 71 After
several meetings and spending several hours talking and hanging out with multiple families
connected to the soccer group, Marcela and Claudio Arias started asking questions about my
research in Mexico and New York. Eventually they introduced me to more people from their
hometown, something I accepted once my research protocol and IRB were approved. 72
In the case of the familia Íñiguez it was slightly different. They were one of the first
families I interviewed and have been following up with in Long Island since 2015 as part of the
MIDA research team. We met at a local business not far from Riverhead, in Suffolk County, in
order to learn more about one of their children who received DACA and was supported in this
process by an FBO partnering with the MIDA project. This situation was very similar in the case
of the Hernán family, who the MIDA team knew had DACA beneficiaries and was connected to
a CBO located in the Bronx. Unlike the Arias and Íñiguez families, with familia Hernán I relied
only on interviews and follow ups with some of their family members, and I did not meet or
interact with all their immediate family members. Again, it is important to keep in mind that
these three families, from my perspective, have been able to avoid the worst outcomes associated
with an unauthorized immigration status, to a certain extent because they reported positive socioeconomic prospects for themselves and for their children, but they still expressed to me fear and
worries about experiencing detention and deportation.

The Seguro Popular project in 2012 allowed me to gain trust among a few of my first informants and learn more
about the different communities of origin for first generation Mexican immigrants in New York City, particularly in
Queens and the Bronx (Smith, Waisanen, et al., 2019).
72
In 2013, with a Summer Research Travel Fellowship from the Center for Latin American, Caribbean and Latino
Students at the Graduate Center, I was able to visit for the first time several municipios in the states of Puebla and
Tlaxcala, as well as in Mexico City. This first visit to that region allowed me to learn about different communities of
origin and to start conversations with people familiarized or directly associated with New York-bound migratory
flows since the late 1990s. The places I saw and the persons I met offered me very valuable material and
connections to continue developing my research in New York, helping me to establish rapport with many families.
71
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How do the seven factors associated with the socioeconomic mobility framework
proposed apply to the Arias and Íñiguez families? In the case of Claudio and Marcela, their
family is upwardly mobile in a more immigrant-friendly place, with rare negative police
interactions, and without substantive CBO participation or help. However, as I will explain
shortly, in the case of the Arias family, my intervention to avoid a potential legal malpractice or
scam consisted of “providing limited support” (suggesting and referring them to other CBOs). In
the case of Rodrigo and María Fernanda, their family is upwardly mobile in a considerably less
immigrant-welcoming place, under more intense or harmful police scrutiny affecting immigrants,
but with considerably more CBO support. Yet, unlike the family in Queens, the social network
for the Íñiguez family in Suffolk was made up of more relatives with lawful status.
4.2 FAMILIA ARIAS, QUEENS: MOBILITY WITH A ‘BALL & CHAIN’
“I have a question,” said the older Arias child to a Mexican American lawyer in a tiny
office not far from Grand Central. “When I’m 21, can I file a petition for them” (“puedo
pedirlos”)? “Unfortunately, it is not that easy,” answered the lawyer. We waited for over an hour
to get a second opinion on their “10-year law” case and the answer to that question felt like a
bucket of cold water. I also accompanied the family to the Mexican Consulate to talk with
another lawyer and the answers were the same. During several conversations, Claudio Arias told
me that lacking papers was like a “ball and chain,” a heavy burden or an incurable disease.
Having two or three jobs at the same time allowed the Arias family to increase their
income considerably. Figure 4.1 shows how the Arias family household income has changed
since they arrived in New York City. They transitioned from getting paid $8 per hour in the
1990s, mostly used to pay rent, to making $90,000 in 2018 as a couple with over four jobs: in a
restaurant, doing sales and fine carpentry work, cleaning houses, as a personal assistant, as well

102

as helping to clean offices and rooms for health specialists. Between 1993 and 2017, the amount
they paid in rent increased from $7,800 a year, sharing with other families or relatives, to
$21,600 annually for their own space in a four-bedroom, two-bathroom, refurbished apartment
with a backyard and parking spaces. They still dream about being able to buy a property and
becoming home-owners, ideally not far from Queens and close to their children, extended
family, and old friends. Here I will explain how their income increased (in nominal dollars; in
2018 the median household income in Queens was around $69,000). 73
Figure 4.1 Familia Arias, Queens: Parents and family household income, 1993-2017
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Even when the Arias family did not actively participate in CBOs, I “acted” like one when
I suggested that they seek additional legal advice for the family. This allowed me to see,
firsthand, positive partnering-parenting decisions when facing a huge scam. “El que no arriesga,
no gana” (or ‘nothing ventured nothing gained’) said Claudio Arias when I told him that it
seemed too risky to move forward with the agreement to change his and Marcela’s immigration
statuses. The Arias family was making enough money to hire a lawyer for what is known by the

73

This estimate was available on July 2020 at: https://datausa.io/profile/geo/queens-county-ny
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Latino immigrant community in New York as the “10-year law” (ley de los 10 años, see Figure
4.2). 74
Figure 4. 2 Front page in El Diario de Nueva York warning about the infamous 10-year law,
August 12, 2016

When I read the agreement in the dining room of their immaculate four-bedroom
apartment in December 2016, this “law” was not mentioned as such. Instead, the legal services
provided by the firm were listed as “cancellation of deportation and representation in the
appointment with the asylum office.” An Ecuadorian coworker had recommended to Claudio a
lawyer and an immigration law firm based not far from their neighborhood in Queens. The cost
was $15,000 USD per person. I urged Marcela and Claudio to talk to other lawyers who then
explained to them that the ‘10-year law’ was not a law but an ‘eventual’ cancelation of

This is basically an agreement to receive legal services and gain lawful immigration status via asylum. This is
connected to the idea that after a decade of living in the U.S. without papers and having U.S.-born minor children,
families may have a stronger case. Familia Arias asked me for help to go over a “10-year law” agreement as the
only possible solution at the time for their lack of papers. My suggestion was to talk with more than one lawyer.
74
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deportation. By early 2017 they were in the process of making a first payment for about $3,000
USD, but eventually they decided to discontinue the process after taking my advice to talk with
more than one immigration lawyer. Marcela told me on several occasions that the ‘10-year law’
option was Claudio’s idea and that she did not want to take that risk. The fact that immigrant
families with high income and education, like the Arias, are still exposed to fraud or legal
malpractice highlights the negative effects of being undocumented.
Claudio, Marcela and their two U.S.-born children represent an exceptional case of
upward mobility compared to other cases of family households in New York headed by
undocumented immigrants from Mexico. They have been able to achieve this in part because
they are not negatively affected by the place where they live, not only because of their high
human capital and strong social networks, but because New York is a ‘sanctuary city’ for
immigrants. Despite not being active members of any CBO or immigrant-serving organization,
and aided by the fact that they did not have any major negative interaction with police or law
enforcement agents, the Arias family has been able to transfer from Mexico to the United States
their high formal educational and substantial labor trajectories. Once in New York, they did not
stop learning and are consistently planning the educational prospects of their children. Claudio
told me in early 2019 that their older kid is already thinking about getting a master’s degree. The
most important source of information and resources they have is their network of relatives and
friends, the people they see and talk to every weekend. Marcela and Claudio have also developed
positive intra-family dynamics allowing them to keep more than two jobs, and at the end of the
day the decision to stop their ‘10-year law’ case was made as a couple.
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No CBO, driving “con cuidado”
In 2018 Marcela and Claudio bought a brand-new SUV, something they had desired for a
long time and also partly as a graduation gift for their oldest child. This SUV was a clear symbol
of their work as a family. The Arias family displays a middle-class lifestyle not only with their
new car, but also by sending their older child to a private college, buying multiple video games
for their younger one, and buying good seats to watch the New York Mets and the Mexican
men’s national soccer team playing in nearby cities. We attended multiple games together and I
particularly remember seeing one of their children crying of happiness and disbelief after Andrés
Guardado scored a questionable penalty against Panamá in New Jersey. They also attended the
final game of that tournament in Philadelphia, against Jamaica, to which they drove “con
cuidado” (carefully) with other relatives and friends who were undocumented. Marcela
explained once that she was scared of taking the train to other cities, so that is why they travel
with people they trust.
Marcela, Claudio, and their children do not regularly participate in any local CBOs,
although there are many available to them in Queens and NYC. They have always lived in
neighborhoods in Western Queens, and beyond the amateur soccer teams they have formed with
relatives and friends, their most significant organizational experience was with a folkloric
dancing group. Marcela was extremely active with this group when she and her children
participated, but it was solely for recreational purposes. An organization of this nature from the
area where the Arias live is shown in Figure 4.3, a picture that for me is a formidable image also
demonstrating a place in New York City that embraces culture and immigrant diversity from
Latin America.
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Figure 4.3 Front page and excerpt in free newspaper featuring folkloric Mexican dance groups,
June 30, 2017

I noticed that the Arias’s lack of interactions with CBOs narrowed their options not only
for receiving help with immigration advice but also with educational issues. This was perhaps
less true for the parents because they were able to find multiple affordable options that satisfied
them and gave them results. This lack of institutional or organizational support was more
noticeable in the case of their children. For instance, none of their children attended any
afterschool programs and they never received assistance with their homework. Their older child
never considered applying to public colleges, including CUNY or SUNY, and their family only
considered private schools. In 2016 this child was attending a private college with a tuition close
to $25,000, although he/she was a beneficiary of the New York State Tuition Assistance Program
(TAP). Like other parents in their close network of friends and relatives, the Arias family only
paid for private tutors to help their children with homework, instead of relying on public
resources.
In 2015, when I first interviewed them, the Arias parents told me they liked Queens and
the neighborhoods where they resided, around Astoria, Sunnyside, Woodside, and Jackson
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Heights. They told me these places were safe. And even though they have two finished houses in
Mexico, one in a small city and the other in “el rancho” (their rural hometown), they had no
intention of going back to Mexico. This was true in 2015, in 2018 under the Trump
administration, and in the immediate future. When Marcela and Claudio were young adults, after
leaving el rancho to study and work, they decided that they preferred to live in big cities rather
than small rural towns.
The Arias family has been living for over two decades in Queens without any serious
interactions with the New York City Police Department or any other police agency. They have
never been victims of crime in New York. Marcela, however, still remembers with some
resentment one time in which a police officer put handcuffs on her. This happened around
Sunnyside, not far from their apartment. Her youngest child was throwing a tantrum because
he/she wanted a toy. When a police officer asked them what was going on, the angry child said
in English that Marcela was not her mom. Marcela, with her limited vocabulary at the time,
could not explain to the officer what was really happening. Luckily, a neighbor passing by saw
the situation and vouched for Marcela, clarifying the misunderstanding, an incident perhaps
demonstrating the perils of being undocumented and how close this could have been to a
deportation if the misunderstanding had not been dismissed.
There are some other interactions with the NYPD reported by close relatives, friends and
neighbors of the Arias family living or working in the same area that are worth mentioning. One
occurred several years ago, in the early 2000s, when Javier Arias Hernández, Marcela’s brother,
was assaulted and beaten late at night around Woodside while coming back from work. His
family was scared, and because of their immigration status, decided not to call the police. When I
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asked them about the incident now, Javier, Marcela and Claudio agreed that it was a mistake not
to call the police back then and they would do it now, because they trust NYPD. 75
Before and after Trump’s election, I kept track of three separate police interactions in
Queens involving Carlos Jano Marín, neighbor and friend of Claudio. He is undocumented, does
not have any children, and lives with his Colombian girlfriend. They are partners in a local
business. He drives with a valid license from Mexico City without an expiration date. The first
time Carlos got a traffic ticket, after a decade driving in NYC, was for failing to do a full stop.
The policewoman was hidden, he did a quick stop, but the officer gave him a ticket for “reckless
driving.” He asked me to go with him to traffic court. In English, the public defender suggested
he plead guilty. He got a $25 fine and paid in cash. In 2018 he got another ticket, this time trying
to find parking while his compadre and two kids were in the car. They were missing a seat for
the youngest. A ticket was given: “unlicensed operator.” Carlos did not get a more serious ticket
for lacking the seat, he was allowed to keep driving but without his compadre and the children. I
heard when one officer told him: “Get a license (…) ten cuidado con los nenes (be careful with
the babies),” showing how the police were not asking about or interested in his immigration
status. He paid $165 for that ticket. A third and last interaction happened in early 2019, when he
was stopped for a broken tail light, also in Queens, on a weekday around 9PM after leaving
work, and with his girlfriend in the car. He showed his driver’s license, and while reaching for
his Mexican passport, they were allowed to leave without tickets, a huge relief during the current
climate of federal anti-immigrant sentiment. 76

75
When Javier applied for DACA, he had a hard time finding evidence for time of arrival or early presence in New
York. In fact, Marcela remembered that paperwork from a dentist appointment helped Javier with his DACA
application.
76
According to Lind & Zarracina (2019) the first two years of Trump’s policies affected larger numbers of
immigrants: 436 immigration arrests per day on average in 2018, compared to 300 in 2016; 44,631 immigrants in
ICE detention each day on average, compared to 34,376 in 2016; 620,311 denials of visas, green cards, and other
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Binational capital: Education and skills
With an average education of over 11 years, and plenty of work experience in Mexico,
Marcela and Claudio dream about being able to buy property in New York City. This dream is
still beyond reach even with the multiple jobs they have been able to keep in Manhattan and
Queens. On a draft letter to an immigration judge shared with me (it was one the requirements by
the law firm in their “10-year law” case, and it was originally in Spanish) Marcela wrote:
In New York I noticed many changes in my life in a very short time. I quickly found a job and so I
was able to help my family on both sides of the border. I worked in two clothing factories, in a
restaurant, in a coffee sales franchise, in a printing press, in a medical office and recently as a
personal assistant. I realized how I started from below to what I have achieved now, getting better
jobs and salaries. Unlike in Mexico, I realized that I could work and study at the same time, so I
started taking English, cooking, and baking classes. The courses I took were always free or very
low cost, so I took advantage as much as I could. The United States has helped me develop a lot
educationally and culturally. Over the years I have learned not only the rules of this country, but
also the traditions and cultures of other peoples. This has allowed me to better develop my work
and be able to understand myself with different people in this country. I have also been able to
practice folk dance, play soccer, and participate in different activities within the community.

Like his wife, Claudio also recognized opportunities in a new country:
Upon arriving in this country, after coming from a remote town in Mexico, I found majestic cities
as well as technological and economic advances that I never imagined. The first years were very
difficult, having to work in activities that I never imagined. One of those was working in a sewing
factory, where I had to work up to 12 hours a day with only a short break to eat. I also worked in
several restaurants washing dishes and delivering food at home without speaking English. Without
having any experience in those jobs, I managed to get ahead. I had the good fortune to meet people
who at some point were in my same situation, and therefore clearly understood my feelings and
did not hesitate to help me to overcome my obstacles. I attended a school to learn English and
many of my American friends helped me learn that language. I have always been fortunate to meet
people who never hesitated to help me learn something new and take advantage of the
opportunities offered by this wonderful country.

In these letters, written with the help of their older child, they mentioned several times the
potential health and educational challenges their children could face if they were forced to go
back to Mexico. 77 Their youngest child has a long history of special care including being part of

legal immigration statuses, up 37 percent from 20; even the deportation worries among Latinos grew from 47
percent in 2017 to 55 percent in 2018. See Smith, Yrizar and MIDA Team (2019) on the “Greenlight Law” in NYS.
77
“Violence in my country is without a doubt my biggest concern” they both wrote in their individual letters,
showing how aware they are of the critical situation Mexico is facing (after 2006) in public safety and security.
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an Individualized Education Program (IEP), as well as psychological therapy and asthma
treatment. That they were able to obtain an IEP and receive other assistance for their children,
indicates how Marcela and Claudio are able to navigate U.S. institutions because they speak and
read English, and because their education level is above average compared to other
undocumented Mexican immigrants in New York.
We can explain the Arias’s upward mobility by paying special attention to their abilities
to transfer skills across the border, coming with high levels of education, and obtaining more
education in New York. Marcela and Claudio both had over 10 years of formal education when
they left Mexico. They both did carreras técnicas (technical careers), Claudio after finishing
secundaria (9th grade) and Marcela once she graduated from prepa (high school). He specialized
in computers, becoming a young technical support specialist. She wanted to be a doctor or
dentist and was able to get into a medical school in a public university but was unable to pay for
the schooling. Instead, she went to study as a pharmacy technician. One thing in their families’
history that they had in common was that their fathers were inter-city bus drivers and their
mothers had little to no education, leading to unbalanced gender situations at home. Another
thing that they had in common as young students is that they started getting paid work when they
were 15 years old. Claudio and Marcela were already trying to go beyond the educational
attainment and occupations held by their parents. They were already ambitious, hardworking,
motivated people before leaving el rancho.
Claudio learned carpentry from his grandfather, which enabled him to get a job in
carpentry in NYC and learn more from other South American immigrants. He later opened his
own shop, making more money than he would have as an employee. Claudio is accustomed to
having more than one job simultaneously since he left school. His first formal job was in sales in
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a shoe store; he eventually became a regional distributor in cities such as Puebla, Mexico City,
Veracruz, and Tlaxcala. He remembers earning $300 pesos per week, which was not much, so he
started riding his bike (over 20 miles per day) to work in a tortillería (tortilla factory) “I didn’t
know el descanso (to rest) at that moment, and up to this day; having two jobs was nothing new
to me.” An opportunity to become a computer specialist suddenly opened. He was offered a job
to clean offices, and his boss allowed him to keep working cleaning in the morning and taking
classes in the afternoon.
Marcela’s first work experience, when she was 8, was helping an aunt cleaning houses in
Mexico City. Marcela and her parents eventually moved back to el rancho in Tlaxcala. After
finishing high school, she went back to Mexico City to work in a pharmacy and to study. She
also did temporary and odd jobs with her aunt: cleaning stores and selling cosmetics. In the
pharmacy she had a fixed salary, did deliveries, and got tips, eventually becoming a cashier. She
sent money to her mom back home. When she heard that her father was going to cross to New
York, Marcela asked to go with him and reunite with Claudio. Her boss had offered her a raise,
but Marcela decided to cross the border with her father.
In Queens, Marcela and Claudio Arias learned English and committed to having more
than one job at a time. Their firm decision to learn the new language happened after having
multiple embarrassing experiences. By 2015, they were both fluent bilingual speakers and avid
learners and had invested time and money in taking adult classes. Marcela has taken many
different courses available in NYC, some of them free: from healthy cooking and how to prepare
new pastries to administration and cleaning skills. The fact that she was able to get certification
as an assistant allowed her to find better paid jobs. 78
Under New York state law, undocumented immigrants can qualify for various professional licenses and access
professional study programs as undocumented students (see Wernick, 2015), and there are certifications that do not
78
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Claudio was able to keep two full-time jobs: one working at an expensive restaurant in
downtown Manhattan and another as an expert repairing and selling high-end furniture. In the
restaurant he started as a dishwasher and cleaner. His first day working there was the day his
older child was born: the child was born at 3am, Claudio was awake until 6am, and by 4pm he
was at his new job. Claudio became a busboy, and eventually a waiter and manager. Claudio also
remembers when he started in the furniture store mopping the floors and was unable to answer
customers who asked him questions in English. It took him four years to learn English and move
from busboy to waiter at his restaurant job. Claudio stopped watching TV shows in Spanish, took
classes for over two years while working at the same time, and recalls a Dominican comadre
who was very supportive of his efforts to keep learning and practicing as much as he could.
Working as a cashier and helping a relative in an emergency room, Marcela learned
costly and painful lessons about the importance of being able to communicate in English. She
experienced a lot of stress trying to memorize the menu or understanding what customers said.
Years later, her brother-in-law was hospitalized because of a domestic accident. Their family
took him to Bellevue Hospital because neighbors told them about more “Hispanic doctors” there.
But when they arrived, a nurse told them in English: “when you know how to say what happened
to you, I will get you a doctor.” Another patient translated what the nurse said. Marcela was
carrying a dictionary in her backpack, so she started looking for words and finally was able to
communicate with a doctor. She vowed to herself that she would never be in a similar situation
again, and still remembers seeing her relative crying in pain. In current jobs, Marcela realizes

list citizenship or immigration status as a requirement. For Calvo (2017) New York State made more accessible for
undocumented immigrants to obtain licenses for specific professions in 2016. See footnote in Chapter 1.
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that being able to communicate with her bosses in English allows for more flexibility, better
hours, and salaries. 79
Reliable networks
Marcela and Claudio Arias are part of a group of over 30 people, most of them relatives
from the same region in Tlaxcala, plus friends and neighbors from other Latin American
countries. In general, each adult couple has one or two U.S.-born children. Only a few of these
families left children in Mexico. Most of the parents are also undocumented. Only on Marcela’s
side are there three close relatives who have valid immigration statuses: Javier Arias Hernandez
and another younger brother who both got DACA and her only brother-in-law living in New
York, who is a legal permanent resident (see Figure 8.4 in appendix). I identified about six
people they trusted, non-relatives, who were legal permanent residents or U.S. citizens: a couple
from Colombia, a long-time employer from South America, a Caribbean friend, and a two or so
more people from Mexico.
Members of the Arias family network meet almost every weekend when they do not have
to work, usually on Sundays. They also frequently meet to organize large parties and
celebrations. I witnessed and participated in several birthday parties (for kids and adults),
religious celebrations such as bautizos (christening) or presentaciones al templo (for 3-year
olds), and quinceañeras and graduations. I was also invited to celebrate with them Christmas, día
de los Reyes Magos, día de la Candelaria, Mother’s Day (the Mexican and U.S. versions),
Father’s Day, Easter, día de la Virgen de Guadalupe, Mexican and U.S. Independence days, and
Thanksgiving. I accompanied them to picnics and BBQs organized in their backyard, in public
79
These examples might indicate that there is a difference when people work for a locally owned small business
compared to a national chain. Perhaps Marcela and Claudio might never move up if they worked for food-chains in
the suburbs rather than a locally owned restaurant in Manhattan. Probably, at some point, they would have had to fill
out paperwork and show a Social Security Number. Therefore, local economies matter for these families (personal
communication with Phil Kasinitz).
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parks and sometimes outside the city, and most frequently I was invited to watch with them, on
TV or live, sports (soccer, baseball, boxing), concerts, plays, musicals, or even the Super Bowl.
This is a group of people who know each other very well. They provide support among
themselves when necessary, for example, when someone is sick, injured, or has lost a job. They
share information and tips about housing opportunities, buying, or selling cars, recommending
hospital, clinics, doctors, dentists, or even about lawyers. They also share information about how
to access services in the city, including how to renew a Mexican passport, a consular ID card, or
about getting the New York City ID or IDNYC. Among themselves and some other people they
trust beyond their hometown, they run tandas or informal loan clubs, more specifically rotating
savings weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly. They share memories from el rancho, but also create
new moments as individuals and as a cohesive group of Mexicans in New York.
Javier Arias Hernández, Marcela’s sibling, and his wife Hilda share the same sentiment
that Claudio expressed about their immigration status, even with a high family household income
for a family of four (above $80,000 annually in 2016). Javier got DACA in 2015 with the help of
a lawyer who charged him $5,000 for their potential “DAPA cases” as a married couple with two
U.S. minor children. 80 Both Javier and Hilda were born in the early 1980s. He arrived in the
early 2000s and was able to become “one of those DREAMers” as a DACA recipient. Hilda, his
wife, is a visa overstayer with over a decade living in the United States. She decided not to return
to Mexico, even after her Mexican employers decided to steal her passport and visa as
punishment for her refusal to keep working for them as a nanny in Florida.

In November 2014, the Obama administration announced the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and
Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), with the idea of protecting undocumented parents with U.S. born children
from deportation. This program was never implemented, but informants in Queens and the Bronx told me about
lawyers in New York City accepting cases and charging for preparing paperwork related to “potential DAPA cases”
before it was cancelled.

80
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Familia Arias Hernández relies primarily on Javier's income as a waiter in two different
restaurants, although Hilda occasionally brings extra money home by doing childcare work for
relatives, friends, and a few clients. Despite minor misunderstandings and some old family
disputes, the Arias Hernández family has been consistently supportive of Claudio and Marcela.
They have provided last minute loans, visits when someone is sick, and are always ready to play
soccer, go to a picnic, or a family vacation to New Jersey or Connecticut (see Figure 4.4). Javier
and Hilda Aria Hernandez are very close relatives of Marcela and Claudio; they call each other
in times of need and celebration: they are essential members of a strong and reliable kinship
network.
Figure 4.4 Family picnic outside New York State with Familia Arias

The only U.S. citizens who are very close to and usually present in the Arias family circle
are people born or raised in South America and the Caribbean, from places like Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico. These are people whom the Arias family
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really trusts, generally old coworkers or neighbors. When Marcela was expecting their second
child and during the weeks after the delivery, the Arias parents decided to send their older child
to stay with their grandparents in Mexico. Since Claudio and Marcela cannot travel to Mexico
and return easily to New York for lack of papers, they have sent their children to el rancho with
close non-Mexican friends who are U.S. citizens. When the Arias children were old enough to
travel together on a plane, they were sent to Tlaxcala with their South American tías y tíos (aunts
and uncles) who took the opportunity to visit Mexico. This shows a very high level of trust, and
these local and reliable social networks are important for their upward mobility, allowing the
Arias family to access resources across countries and institutions. They also receive advice from
people outside their family networks, which are consist mainly of relatives without lawful status.
Claudio’s long-time boss and two of his main mentors in specialized carpentry, were
from cities in the Southern Cone. Marcela was invited to play in soccer teams formed mainly by
Ecuadorian women who later became friends. Yanny, a Puerto Rican-American married to a
Mexican, both with work experience in Manhattan at bars and restaurants, was the first person
who introduced me to people in the Arias network. These non-blood-related members with legal
status around the Arias family, including friends and neighbors, also provide critical information
and support to the family. One example was when I insisted that they needed a second or third
opinion from a reliable immigration lawyer about their 10-year law agreement.
Marcela, like Antonio Hermosillo, is a hardcore fan of the Cruz Azul soccer team. She
and Claudio get along extremely well with Antonio, who makes less than $24,000 USD a year as
a day laborer (esquinero), 81 and shares a spacious two-bedroom apartment with his compadre

At the begging of my fieldwork in Queens between 2013 and 2014, I had the opportunity to look at data produced
by a local CBO working with esquineros or jornaleros from different Latin American countries, including Mexican
workers who were undocumented. According to the numbers produced by this CBO the estimated annual earnings
81
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Arturo. Arturo Peláez, head of the Peláez family, is one of Claudio’s best friends since childhood
and also a fan of the rival soccer team Club América. He makes approximately $39,000 USD in
2016 as an Uber driver. Antonio has helped Familias Arias, Arias Hernández, Peláez, and others
to bring original official documents from Mexico, to send dollars, medicine, computers or
cellphones to el rancho, and has also traveled with some of the U.S.-born children in these
families to meet their grandparents, aunts and uncles in Mexico.
The Arias family and their closest network of relatives and friends have been extremely
active in local soccer games in Flushing, Queens (see Figure 4.5). As a former player in
women’s leagues, Marcela also keeps in touch with friends from Ecuador, Colombia and Mexico
who were teammates and are also immigrant mothers, some of them no longer living in the city
but in nearby suburbs. This is a good example of complex networks linking people from diverse
countries and backgrounds who support each other.
Figure 4.5 Free newspaper excerpts: soccer leagues with Mexican players in Queens, El Grito Nueva
York, 2012

Partnering since the 80s, parenting since the 90s
Some factors that have increased the upward mobility of the Arias family are detectable
even in their early noviazgo (engagement), and later in their decision making as a pareja

for about 70 male workers –with an average of 40 years of age, mainly working in construction related occupations–
was around $22,000.
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(romantic couple). Claudio and Marcela were neighbors and met when they were 8 years old in
Tlaxcala. They started a noviazgo when they were about 15 years old and got married when their
older child was in first grade. They decided to live together and move to the United States when
they got tired of the bad treatment they received from Marcela’s dad and siblings. Claudio asked
her to move out and live together while he was washing the dishes. He had an “easy crossing”
(that lasted about a week), after leaving a job in Guadalajara. “My thing was more dramatic,”
said Marcela. It took her about four weeks to get to Queens after leaving Mexico City with her
father. In Mexico, she worked and studied with the dollars sent by Claudio. Sharing details about
their border crossings and first days in the United States with this couple and others made for
very intimate and sacred moments. What was relevant in the case of the Arias family is that their
border crossing experiences were planned and mutually agreed upon, and the couple supported
each other both economically and emotionally across the border. 82
Examples of positive partnering and parenting decisions, part of the Arias’s intra-family
dynamics, can be traced in their labor trajectories and the education of their children. At least
since 1993, when their first child was born and Claudio started working at the restaurant, the
couple decided to share responsibilities taking care of everyday activities to support the
household, covering each other to keep two or more jobs at the same time. They rotated
responsibilities for cooking family meals, cleaning the apartment, and grocery shopping. They
made decisions together about how to use the money mutually earned and planned to have a
second child. Years ago (around 2011), when one of their very close relatives (who was also
undocumented) was sent back to Mexico because of a serious illness, they agreed to look after
two nieces/nephews, taking them into their home and caring for them for over a year.
By planned and mutually agreed, I mean that Claudio and Marcela were able to talk and negotiate about when and
how they were going to be together as a couple again, and settling in another country and without documents.
82
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Among their most recent decisions was to buy their brand-new SUV, but also planning
college education for their older child. When their older child was about to graduate from high
school, he/she was accepted into an elite (ivy league) university, located outside of New York.
They had several conversations and discussions about what they should do, because the child
was very worried about leaving home and adding more expenses even when he/she was offered
some financial aid. They collectively decided that she/he would study wherever and whatever
she would like, with Marcela and Claudio providing as much support as possible. A private
school in New York City was the best option because it offered the best academic program for
her/his interests, it did not include extra costs to move out of the city, and because it offered the
best financial aid/scholarship compared to the other offers received.
In the following section I develop a similar analytical story for the Iñiguez family,
although there are a few major differences between the families. First, the Íñiguez family lives in
a different place, in a less-welcoming environment for immigrants and minorities: The East End
of Long Island, in Suffolk County, NY. Second, Rodrigo and María Fernanda Íñiguez have a
solid connection to one FBO that in fact was crucial for their older child in getting DACA. Both
families have developed more human and social capital compared to other undocumented
Mexicans, but for the Íñiguez family, DACA and other lawful statuses was a more significant
factor among their immediate relatives and kinship, who provided support for the family to
become upwardly mobile.
4.3 FAMILIA ÍÑIGUEZ, SUFFOLK: MOBILITY UNDER SCRUTINY
“What does education mean to you,” I asked Rodrigo Íñiguez. “What I have always told
my children,” he answered, “to both, is that education is the most important thing in this country
and in any other country, truly. The more education you can get, it will be better for you.” He
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later explained to me that, along with his wife Fernanda, they always tried to push their two
children to learn Spanish, even when they struggled. At home, they always spoke with their
children in Spanish, and also helped them with their homework. When their children entered
high school it became more difficult, but they were able to find tutoring help at school. Their
older child went to the local community college and spent a year at CUNY. Because of financial
constraints, a decision was made to take a break, and he/she returned to live in the family home.
According to Rodrigo and Fernanda, their goal as a family is for both children to finish college
and work at something they like, eventually allowing them to collectively buy a house. DACA
might allow them to do that.
In 2016, familia Íñiguez reported a family household income of around $72,000. Rodrigo
and Fernanda (born in 1969 and 1971 respectively and married in Mexico) frequently told their
two children to plan and work towards a graduate degree despite their financial obstacles. They
used to tell them often to think beyond college. The older child has attended two community
colleges in New York thanks to DACA but has intermittently dropped out because of economic
constraints. The younger child, also DACA-mented, aspires to be a pediatrician or to study
something related to health, ideally in a college or university not far from Long Island and thus
close to the family.
In 2016, Rodrigo was working as a carpenter in the construction industry and charging
around $30 USD per hour (between 40 and 60 hours per week). He works for a company but also
independently. Before rising in the construction industry, Rodrigo started working in gardening
and landscaping, and he remembers that his first payment in the U.S. was around $4.50 per hour.
Once he left that industry, his salary started to grow (see Figure 4.6). 83 Rodrigo Íñiguez said he
The relationship between the line and the darker curve or area is just to graphically illustrate, according to Mr.
Rodrigo Íñiguez’ story, how his wage improved over the years considering his age while in New York.
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has always been looking for more opportunities. Maria Fernanda is also moving up in the
hierarchy in housekeeping services in Long Island. She oversees expensive summer houses
around the Hamptons, including a mansion owned by a famous Hollywood producer.
Figure 4.6 Familia Iñiguez, Long Island: Rodrigo’s hourly wage, 2002-2016
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Fernanda and her husband reported good health, saying that whenever it is necessary,
they go to the doctor (or the dentist), buy medicine they need, and are always ready to continue
working. As a couple, they have been able to achieve upward trajectories in both pay and jobs.
They decided to both hold jobs and coordinate schedules, sharing household responsibilities, and
they count on the support of relatives (with lawful status) to help raise their children and navigate
a less immigrant-friendly local ecosystem.
On September 5th, 2017, Fernanda called me a couple of times early in the morning
about the announcement by the Trump administration to cancel DACA. She sounded extremely
nervous and distressed. The Íñiguez parents were very worried about what was going to happen
to their DACA-status children, especially with all the information they had provided to the
government. Several months later, in early May of 2018, I was invited to the high school
graduation of the younger Íñiguez child, and they sounded less distressed and worried. The
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Íñiguez children have been able to renew their DACA status on time thanks to their proximity to
a local Catholic FBO and mentioned always being alert to immigration news.
Fernanda acknowledges that lack of status has affected her life because she can’t vote:
“Because I can’t decide the future (…) plus being or living with uncertainty of police,
immigration (officers), and not knowing what could happen (…) that affects myself, not a lot,
but there are some days that emotionally one fells really bad, because of (immigration) status.”
She also thinks that lack of status negatively impacts her “emotional health,” and says her
philosophy is that “You have to take things, not necessarily lightly, but calmly” (Hay que tomar
las cosas no digamos que a la ligera, verdad, pero pues con calma).
When asked about how their immigration status affected their health, neither Rodrigo nor
Fernanda mentioned any direct or major impacts besides mental health. Fernanda was the one
that mentioned more than once that her lack of papers made her nervous. According to Rodrigo,
he did not have any physical or mental issues related to his status, and three weeks before we
met, he had a visit to the dentist “a que me quitaran una muela” (to remove a tooth). However,
he reflected, “Sometimes, like everyone else, I start thinking about money, thinking I do not have
enough for this or that, but it's normal, so it does not affect me a lot (…) What I'm trying to do in
this country is not to stress myself.” For Fernanda and Rodrigo, their status does not represent a
limitation on how they treat themselves in case of an accident or sickness. They do not hesitate
about going to the doctor or buying the medicine they need. Rodrigo has had minor accidents at
work (beyond physical fights with Ecuadorian co-workers), such as falls and cuts that did not
require a major intervention. “This is a very residential area,” Rodrigo explained to me, “so here
almost everyone speaks English, or an interpreter is needed. I speak English and it is not hard for
me to go to a dentist, or any other type of doctor.” This illustrates his good language proficiency.
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The familia Íñiguez living in Suffolk County is another case of an upwardly mobile
family without papers, but this time outside of the immigrant-welcoming sphere of New York
City. This is a difference in the factors of their story but, overall, the outcome is the same,
invoking the concept of “equifinality” (see Ragin, 2008). Like the Arias family, María Fernanda
and Rodrigo Íñiguez have strong local support available –several close relatives with legal
immigration status– and they have very valuable human and social capital –high educational
attainment, English proficiency, and labor market experience from Mexico that was transferable
to their occupations in New York. These elements allowed them to achieve upward mobility via
their family roles, where the two heads of the household work in stable jobs, thus combining to
earn more money. Unlike Claudio and Marcela Arias’s children, neither Fernanda and Rodrigo
Íñiguez, nor their two children have become U.S. citizens or have achieved permanent legal
status. But familia Íñiguez counts on more organizational support to better navigate obstacles as
immigrants in a more hostile environment, under scrutiny because of their lack of legal status.
The support from an organization and a strong kinship network have helped the family to address
some problems, including discrimination from police or other actors in their community, by
having townhall meetings to voice concerns, or by circulating and offering valuable information
to better navigate a more hostile context.
Supportive FBOs, hostile cops
Rodrigo Íñiguez has said that for the kind of work he does, indoor carpenter, his
immigration status has never affected him:
In this area where we are now [East End of Long Island] the people… Americans… are very good
people. In this area, we are not very affected for being undocumented immigrants. The job
opportunities we have are almost the same. There are some cases where they ask for documented
people, but these are a few cases. But that... almost does not affect being an [undocumented]
immigrant (…) A personal example, in some cases, the people, the owners of the houses, there are
a lot of millionaires here, so the people of the houses sometimes require housekeepers, people who
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can take care of the houses all year. Then, obviously, they require documented people. And the
pay is much better... I imagine that for them it is much safer.

I was able to meet, interview, and stay in touch with Fernanda and Rodrigo Íñiguez thanks to two
local Catholic immigrant organizations, technically FBOs, that were partnering with the MIDA
project. One of them is the only organization that familia Íñiguez is affiliated with. This FBO
helped with the DACA application for their younger child because in the case of the older
(already living in another place) the parents paid a private lawyer (for about $400) for assistance
with the application. I argue that the institutional support for the Íñiguez family is more limited
in Suffolk than in Queens, but in contrast with the Arias family, they can trust relatives who are
U.S. citizens to get credit, loans, buy a car, and access insurance. Fernanda mentioned a traffic
accident they had, in which the other driver did not stop on a red light. They were hit badly, only
damaging the car, but thanks to insurance under the name of a relative who was a U.S. citizen,
everything was resolved. Beyond their family living nearby, the support of this FBO has been a
good resource for reliable information on immigration and educational material for both the
parents and children of the Íñiguez family. Fernanda told me that she plans to keep participating
and attending classes offered by the local FBO, while Rodrigo also confirmed that they will keep
supporting their own and their children’s education by getting as much information and
resources as possible, including courses offered by “las madres” (nuns).
The FBO near Rodrigo and Fernanda’s home has been very active in offering multiple
workshops, classes, courses, and other activities that target the Latino community in the East End
of Long Island. They collaborate with other non-religious organizations, advocacy groups and
local institutions and allies supporting immigrants in Suffolk (see Figure 4.7). When I attended
fundraisings and cultural activities, and political rallies organized by this FBO in collaboration
with other organizations, I only occasionally saw Rodrigo and Fernanda at events. However,
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when I talked and interacted with the staff of this FBO, they claimed they knew the Íñiguez
family very well. Staff and volunteers at the FBO considered them one of the “good families,”
meaning they were in a good position economically or educationally compared to other
immigrant families. In fact, Rodrigo and Fernanda told me that sometimes they gave food and
clothes to this FBO so they could distribute these resources to other people in need.

Figure 4.7 Flyers, events, and excerpts by CBOs and FBOs in the East End of Long Island

Like her husband Rodrigo, María Fernanda Íñiguez enjoys living in a place where artists
live in mansions, that is quiet, with a lot of vegetation and fresh air. She feels it is a safe area,
and they are somewhat supported by a few organizations and activists, including by the MIDA
project that has provided their family with educational information for her children, even “Now,
with the new president that hates us to death” (referring clearly to Donald Trump). When asked
about what worries her about living in Suffolk, she reflected “If they would only just give me

126

status, then I could forget everything else.” Fernanda explained more than once that the main
reason she is in the United States is to give their daughters a better chance, so they can have
better opportunities that they would not have in Mexico.
But why, if they live in a non-immigrant friendly place, are Fernanda and Rodrigo not
systematically targeted? Familia Íñiguez might fit what sociologist Angela García (2019) has
called “legal passing,” because “they look” like any other Latino or immigrant family making
more than to be worried about paying rent or putting food on the table. I saw them acting in
public, and especially saw how Rodrigo and Fernanda (but also Marcela and Claudio) interacted
with me and other random people around them when I first met them and afterwards. They both
acted with confidence around white people, speaking English when ordering something, using
cards instead of cash. They dressed in trendy clothes and drove cars of recent models instead of
landscaping trucks or vehicles with out-of-state plates (i.e., not from New York).
Rodrigo acknowledged that certain Mexicans from the region he is from, a rural
municipality with a strong indigenous presence in Puebla, are more “personas humildes”
(“humble people,” meaning poor) and due to their low education, other groups in Long Island,
mainly Ecuadorians, take advantage of them. “Humilde drivers” from Mexico and other Latin
American countries in Long Island are more easily targeted because they have darker skin, drive
older vehicles in bad shape, with plates from other states, and can be stopped by small things
such as a broken taillight or a cracked windshield. They are more easily targeted at DUI
checkpoints and on certain roads they use to go to work at rush hour. When talking about
interactions with police officers in Long Island, Rodrigo Íñiguez said the following:
There are certain towns, around this area, where there are racist policemen (…) I have had friends
who, sometimes, have arrived at work and say “I was stopped by the police… but they treated me
good and let me go” (…) The police here, most of the police officers, are fair (…) There are only
very few who are racists (…) It’s not that the police are supportive around here, but they do not
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take advantage (…) I have not had to call the police (…) I would not hesitate to call the police if
necessary.

In almost 20 years living in New York State, Rodrigo Íñiguez has only had two traffic
tickets. The first time was when he just arrived, in the early 2000s., He was detained for a few
hours, but eventually went to court and things were settled after he paid about $100 for allegedly
speeding. The second time was around 2006, not in Long Island but in Upstate New York while
working as a driver, for which he paid about $80. Rodrigo preferred not to share further details
about his two experiences getting traffic tickets and, unlike his wife, he said he is not
uncomfortable or stressed about seeing police officers or cars.
The Íñiguez parents, like the Arias parents, but also their children, do not fit a
“stereotypical Mexican undocumented family” working in the fields, or in the shadows, with
multiple financial constraints or struggling economically. Rodrigo and Fernanda never lived in
New York City, they went straight to Long Island because they had family living there who
owned property and had good jobs, and who are all legal permanent residents or U.S. citizens. I
remember that when we first met to record interviews, at a big coffee shop full of mostly white
customers and staff, Rodrigo decided he was going to pay for all of us. He ordered in English
and paid with a card. Most of my informants in Queens and the Bronx, except for Familia Arias
(who also had a credit card) and some of their close relatives and friends, rarely used any debit or
credit cards, and they were unable to order fluently in English when we went to stores, coffee
shops or restaurants. 84 Furthermore, when questioned about being afraid everyday of
experiencing a deportation, in separate interviews, Fernanda and Rodrigo both said that no, that
was not their case, and only Fernanda mentioned that she knew someone who had been deported.
To clarify, what I mean to say is that these families are privileged to be upwardly mobile, well-educated, and
perhaps middle class, making them less targeted by law enforcement. Most of the other undocumented people I
encountered in Long Island did not speak English, drove old cars, and were targeted by police.
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Rodrigo Íñiguez did not complain about his community in Long Island, which he
described as “probably one of the safest places in the world.” He identifies isolated cases of
racism among people in his community, including some racist cops in certain towns. But overall,
he said that the U.S.-born natives in the area are very good people. Despite having some fights at
his workplace, mainly with other Latinos, he now has several Ecuadorian, Colombian and
Mexicans friends.
Familias Íñiguez and Ramírez, in contrast to the Arias family in Queens, live in a place
where police have targeted primarily Latinos and Mexicans with out-of-state plates to check if
they had valid driver licenses. A Colombian informant who lived near the Íñiguez family was
able to distinguish between ‘good cops’ (from ‘Sandshire’ town) and ‘bad cops’ (basically State
Troopers and from the ‘Sandshire’ village). 85 This informant, who had lived in Long Island for
over 25 years and was a member of the only CBO the Íñiguez family interacted with, was never
without his documents: “always with papers” he said. He had darker skin and graduated from a
university in Colombia. He particularly remembers an episode in which “bad” cops stopped him
without any reason and demanded he present a driver’s license.: “I just want to know if you have
a driver’s license” asked the police officer. Even in what Rodrigo calls “one of the safest places
in the world,” he expressed concerns about Trump as the new president. He also thinks that these
other Mexican immigrants in the area, especially those who spoke indigenous languages, are
from a rural area, or had very low formal education, were easy targets for police, employers,
merchants, and even unscrupulous lawyers.
The Colombian informant living near the Íñiguez family also pointed out the importance
of making a distinction between the Town Police and the Village Police in Sandshire, because
the latter “is more racist” and they can stop you for any reason. Another Colombian, who was
85

Sandshire is a pseudonym or fictional name for a real place in Long Island.
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part of a fundraising effort organized by one FBO in collaboration with other small CBOs and
pro-immigrant advocates, said in Spanish and English during an annual fundraiser in 2017: “this
event is for immigrants who are afraid, we work with the police and we are here to help.” In
conversation with Mexicans and other immigrants from countries like Guatemala, Ecuador, and
Honduras, they mentioned that usually the local police in their towns respect immigrants, but the
State Troopers do not. On certain local roads and in some towns, Latino/a immigrants face a
higher risk of being stopped by the local police for not having New York State registered plates.
Marcelino, an undocumented person from San Luis Potosí, said in a focus group organized by
MIDA that he was stopped two times in a specific town near Sandshire. In 2008 he got a warning
for not having a driver’s license and having license plate registration from another state. In 2012
Marcelino was stopped again by the same police department and he paid a $400 ticket for not
having a license. The two local FBOs I worked with in Long Island usually had meetings with
the local police chiefs to discuss how to avoid discriminatory or racially profiled stops in their
towns, but in an area with at least nine different police departments and about 3,500 employees,
this was probably not enough. 86
Autodidacticism, continuous learning
Familia Iñiguez is also exceptional among immigrant families because of their high
educational attainment. Rodrigo Íñiguez has been living in the United States for 18 years in total.
He has clandestinely crossed the border twice. First, he came alone (at age 26), and then he
decided to return with the idea of bringing his family with him (at age 33). Rodrigo got a degree
in Engineering from Tecnológico de Puebla; 87 he also worked part-time with a friend fixing
machines for irrigation systems and learned some English before coming to the United States.
Perhaps here it is important to note the idea of Colombian immigrants as “proximal hosts” to Mexicans (see
Mittelberg & Waters, 1992). I am thankful to Phil Kasinitz for pointing out this concept for these cases.
87
A public poly-technic institution or university in the state of Puebla, in the Puebla City Metro Area.
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His parents, who finished secundaria (9th grade) in Mexico, motivated and helped him to go to
school and continue his education, particularly his dad. They live now in Puebla City but
originally Rodrigo and his family were raised in a smaller city in the periphery. Once he started
living in the United States, he started learning English by himself –he describes himself as an
autodidact.
Fernanda had short but substantial work experiences in Mexico. She finished secundaria
(9th grade) and wanted to keep studying, but her parents could not provide the necessary
economic support. At age 21, Fernanda worked as a secretary, and after taking some breaks from
the labor market because of pregnancies, she got temporary jobs as a receptionist. María
Fernanda thinks that her true economic responsibilities started when she moved to Long Island,
paying a monthly rent of $1,500 in 2016, as well as when she began sending payments of
between $100 and $150 to her family back in Mexico, to pay for medicine for a sick relative or
just as a kind gesture. Via the local FBO they trust in the area, she started taking English classes
and now she can easily communicate and understand her employers. At age 45, María Fernanda
is grateful that she and her husband have jobs that have allowed them to live well and pay what
they need, but she also believes that: “Se acaba uno aquí el tiempo, puro trabajo” (“you use all
your time here, it is all about work,” in a negative way meaning there is no time for anything
else).
The Íñiguez parents have been making key family decisions together, always pushing for
the educational development of their children and generally making positive partnering and
parenting decisions. High educational attainment for their children and English proficiency for
themselves were always important goals for the family. Rodrigo remembered that: “When I was
in school, I liked to think about the future: About having a better future, a better payment, maybe
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a car, a good house. That motivated me.” He was very grateful that his dad provided all the
financial support he could, so he was a very responsible student, doing all the homework, never
cutting classes: “It was always clear to me to finish school (…) with a part-time job.” His goal
was always to become an engineer, and his three siblings in Puebla also progressed in their
schooling: one finished preparatoria (12th grade) but passed away, one finished secundaria and
became an ama de casa (housewife), and another one became a schoolteacher in Puebla, working
for the public state system. Rodrigo improved his English in New York by watching TV and
reading newspapers and magazines in that language only. When we first met, Rodrigo told me he
was still planning to keep learning through a local public school program (or the New York State
educational service network of any age): “De hecho, yo tal vez me inscriba en BOCES, parece
que hay unos cursos para leer planos” (In fact, maybe I'll sign up at BOCES. It seems that there
are some courses to read blueprints). 88
Living with old and young relatives who are U.S. citizens, Fernanda feels bad about
nieces and nephews who are U.S.-born and dropped out of school. She shared the firsthand
experience of her sister’s daughter who decided to stop studying: “It’s my niece, it makes me
sad, having the opportunity and she is a young lady like my child [about 18 years old], can you
imagine? It is such a waste! (…) Sometimes I wonder, people who had the opportunity because
they were born here, they have legal status, are citizens and do not want to study, and my
children can’t [because they were undocumented].” “The problem with my older child right now
is the finances,” said Rodrigo.

BOCES stands for Boards of Cooperative Educational Services, a network created in 1948 by the New York State
legislature created “to provide share educational programs and services to school districts within the state” (see more
in: https://www.boces.org/about-boces/).
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Caring for authorized kinship
The Íñiguez parents are very well informed about DACA, and in general they hold
positive views of the United States, although Rodrigo underestimates how his immigration status
has affected their life in general. He did not perceive how lacking papers affected his life beyond
not being able to visit his family in Mexico and crossing the border whenever he wants or needs.
After DACA was threatened with cancellation and with Trump in the White House,
Fernanda told me on April 2018 that, compared to Obama, her family did not experience any
major changes in their lives. A certain degree of fear was still there, but it was the same and did
not increase. Their children were able to properly renew their DACA statuses. I suspect that,
again, the role of a dense network of relatives who have valid immigrant status makes them feel
less vulnerable as individuals and as a family unit. They moved straight from Puebla to the East
End because they had close relatives already living there, offering housing and jobs.
The most important family members for the Íñiguez parents are Fernanda’s older sister
(about 53 years old) and her three adult children, all of them authorized immigrants, legal
permanent residents, or U.S. citizens. Rodrigo, Fernanda, and their young child share one house
with these four relatives. Fernanda’s sister owns the property and they pay a rent to her for two
bedrooms out of six. Technically these are two families in one house, or two-family units with
separate income but sharing some expenses and the same roof. The family household income
report for the Íñiguez was only for them as a smaller group of people and does not include what
their other relatives in the house make.
“Half of my family is here,” says Fernanda, meaning in the United States and mostly in
New York. Rodrigo, however, does not have any immediate relatives. Fernanda has two other
brothers living very close to their town in Long Island, and they interact frequently. She has
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another brother living in New York City whom they see less often. And finally, she has a fourth
brother living in Texas. All of them have families with older children who are U.S. citizens. The
Íñiguez parents helped their children with homework up to high school, a clear parenting
practice. Rodrigo remembers that after he was no longer able to help them “they started to look
for help by themselves.” Since we began meeting, and up to the last time we spoke about several
issues under the Trump administration, Fernanda and her husband have constantly asked for
educational options or opportunities, for information about scholarships or internships for
DACA, or anything else that I am aware of.
When the older child decided to leave college because of financial constraints, even when
she/he was living on her own, she/he was still planning together with her/his parents on how to
go back to college, considering different options and the best time to do it. It is important to note
that this was not just a financial constraint but also a family strategy, because with DACA
someone can work legally and potentially earn more money. Like Fernanda and Rodrigo, the
older Íñiguez child started to assume financial responsibilities between 23 and 24 years of age. It
is also noticeable that the Íñiguez family has made strategic decisions about how to invest their
income. They put all (or most) of the money that Fernanda makes into a saving account, the
family account. Meanwhile, they use Rodrigo’s salary for their everyday expenses. When the
older child dropped out of school and was working, they also decided to start looking for options
to buy a house and decided to use his/her account to start saving towards that end.
CONCLUSION
Since the 1990s, scholars and experts have described the unauthorized population as
vulnerable, exploitable, marginalized, and with limited prospects for integration. I agree that
unauthorized status limits social, economic, political, geographic mobility, and other forms of
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inclusion to a considerable extent. However, what I found in my fieldwork research, as
demonstrated in this chapter, is that when we look closer at migratory and labor trajectories
among those undocumented immigrants from Mexico who live with their families on the East
Coast, there is significant variation in their social mobility. Unauthorized immigrants have been
largely unrecognized and unappreciated in terms of what they learn before emigrating and once
they have settled, all while raising children and working multiple jobs, as in the cases of familias
Arias and Íñiguez in New York.
Marcela and Claudio Arias, as well as Fernanda and Rodrigo Íñiguez, were identified as
some of the few long-term undocumented immigrants heading family households who had high
educational attainment, English proficiency, developed labor skills, strong kinship and local
networks, and positive partnering-parenting decisions, these all leading to exceptional upward
mobility. This type of mobility does not mean they are not walking on a thin rope, potentially
falling under the control of what historian Adam Goodman (2017) denominates a deportation
machine or a “machinery set up for deportation.” In the case of familias Arias and Íñiguez, as
“mixed-status families,” I argue that place is still relevant to accessing key resources towards
their full social inclusion and integration. But it seems that local ecosystems are less
consequential to their social mobility because of their high education, English abilities,
developed labor skills, reliable multi-status networks, and positive intra-family household
dynamics. The latter counterbalance the negative effects of living in a less-welcoming context
(for Rodrigo and Fernanda) or lacking organizational support (for Claudio and Marcela). The
strategy by which these immigrant families take advantage of their human capital, networks, and
family dynamics could be called “transferability of skills with supportive legal-immigrant ties
and positive dynamics within family households.”
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In 2015 the Arias family was earning over $70,000, and their oldest child was attending a
private college in New York City. Two years later the family household income was closer to
$90,000 after Claudio opened a small workshop, and Marcela was getting more hours of work as
the personal assistant of a renowned scientist. The Arias family rent a four-bedroom and twobathroom apartment in an ethnically diverse neighborhood very close to Jackson Heights,
Queens, considered one of the most diverse residential and commercial urban areas in the world.
The older child in the Arias family graduated from a private college in the spring of 2019. The
Arias family is part of a large network of relatives, neighbors, and friends in Queens providing
mutual support. Moreover, Claudio and Marcela organize their household duties to keep three
jobs or more (expensive restaurant in Manhattan, retail store, specialized furniture, and personal
assistant); but they still fear deportation, especially after Trump was elected. Furthermore, they
almost paid for the “the 10-year law” due to misinformation and manipulation by corrupt
lawyers. Due to her unauthorized status and despite available support in New York City, Marcela
fears travelling even by train to neighboring cities such as Washington, D.C., Boston, or
Philadelphia.
Similarly, five essential points to highlight about the Íñiguez Family are also connected to
the model suggested here explaining the upward social mobility of long-term unauthorized
immigrants heading family households. First, they also have high levels of education from
Puebla. Rodrigo finished a graduate degree in a public university and learned English by himself,
a true autodidact on this and other subjects of his interest, especially related to construction, a
niche in which Rodrigo is flourishing. Second, both parents participated in labor markets in
Mexico that helped them to advance in their new occupations in the construction and
housekeeping sectors in the United States. Third, even with weak ties to a local CBO or FBO,
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with that connection they were able to get support in the DACA application process for their
younger children. For the older one they paid a private lawyer. Fourth, Fernanda and Rodrigo
Íñiguez can rely on an extensive and close network of relatives who are U.S. citizens or legal
permanent residents, providing key access to fair housing or to financial and insurance services.
Finally, they also have non-seasonal work, meaning they are employed year-round: Rodrigo in
construction (interiors) and Fernanda as a full-time housekeeper and staff manager in mansions
owned by famous artists, celebrities, and other millionaires.
In 2016 familia Íñiguez was making over $70,000, and their oldest daughter was going to
college in New York. Like Marcela and Claudio Arias, Fernanda and Rodrigo Íñiguez have
decided to share the decision-making on important issues, including: when deciding to pull out
of a potential immigration fraud or malpractice; the education of their children; keeping different
jobs at the same time, or when the oldest daughter decided to contribute to the household savings
and expenses while living away, because they all plan on buying a house in New York. It could
be said that their immigrant bargain was kept, doing very well at school despite immigration
status and working to buy a home as an immigrant family. By 2018 the older Íñiguez child
enrolled in a CUNY college with the support of his/her partner (a U.S. citizen) and the rest of the
family, including Fernanda and Rodrigo. But even for them, who express less fear and worry, the
threat and risk of deportation is there, particularly under the current administration and while
living in a more exclusionary place or ecosystem, like the East End of Long Island.
From a larger research perspective, I have found that there are complex life projects and
ranges of social mobility across and within national and subnational borders when we look at the
seven relevant variables highlighted above and considering other outcomes harder to measure.
However, among the undocumented families I study I have seen mainly “precarious immobility”
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(i.e. people barely making it), and for them inclusionary local policies and organizational support
from CBOs or FBOs matter a lot. I will elaborate more on these cases in the following chapter.
In the absence of immigration reform, what options are left to overcome the barriers associated
with irregular immigrant status? Perhaps the answer could be in the relevance of local and
subnational policies, particularly those stressing better education, professionalization, learning
English or promoting bilingualism; biculturalism or ethnic diversity in general; and in policies
investing more in institutions providing services and useful information for the foreign-born and
their families. Finally, even among those who are not even earning $25,000 per year as a family
of four or more in the Bronx, there is hope that things could change under a new federal
administration, because as Silvia Fernandez’s daughter puts it: “if Trump won that means that
anyone, including her (a 9-year old), can do it”. 89

89

Silvia Fernández is an undocumented mother from Puebla with over 12 years living in New York.
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CHAPTER 5. PRECARIOUS IMMOBILITY WITH COMMUNITY SUPPORT
Like Anastacia Barrios in the Bronx or Socorro Cortés and other mixed-status families in
Suffolk, Yadhira Casillas and about half a dozen other heads of family households I met at Los
Nómadas Taco Truck in Queens illustrate the importance of community support for long-term
undocumented immigrants (LTUs) from Mexico. Mrs. Casillas, a 50-year-old woman from the
municipality of Izúcar de Matamoros, in the State of Puebla, spent over a decade without a
Mexican passport, and her U.S.-born adult children did not know how to vote until recently. “Do
you think Trump will win?” She asked me a few weeks after she became a grandmother. Mrs.
Casillas has lived for over 28 years in the United States and had three children in New York. A
community-based organization (CBO) far from her area of residence and work, after my referral,
helped Yadhira to overcome typographical errors in her birth certificate and provided actionable
information for her children to vote as U.S. citizens. Thanks to this suggestion, Yadhira was able
to renew her passport, get useful information about the political rights of her children, and
through this found out about other organizations, offices, and policies in NYC providing support
to deal with abusive landlords.
Precarious immobility, for the purposes of this dissertation, means a situation in which
families headed by undocumented immigrants are socioeconomically stuck in low-paid
occupations, but their children's lives and prospects are still improved by institutions,
organizations and networks that provide certain supports, help, or protections. Furthermore,
immigrant vulnerability is understood here as a concept associated with events or situations
causing harm or suffering (socially, economically, physically, or emotionally) to foreign-born
people, who for the most part lack authorization or valid documentation. The main elements of
interest related to this concept are the following: risk of detention and deportation, family
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separation, and loss of job, housing, income, or other necessities because of abusive attitudes or
actions by private individuals or law enforcement agents.
In this chapter, I analyze how collective practices and common interactions with
institutions in local ecosystems offer community support –including protection, guidance, or
other assistance– for long-term undocumented immigrants (LTUs) from Mexico living in family
households. Connected to my larger argument about how legal status, place or location, and
family factors affect the socioeconomic mobility of Mexican immigrants in New York,
particularly LTUs, here I focus on the role of community support for those not experiencing
upward mobility. Throughout my research, I observed that for undocumented immigrants with
low family household income, their socioeconomic prospects improved and their immigrant
vulnerability decreased when they received support, help and advice from reliable CBOs and
FBOs (faith-based organizations) or other reliable, supportive or strong social networks.
I focus here mainly on Mexican immigrants I met at one street food cart in New York
City, and faith-based organizations (FBO) in towns in Long Island. These individuals were living
in family households and experiencing what I call “precarious immobility” rather than atypical
or unusual “unauthorized upward mobility,” which I identified only among a few cases (see
chapter 4). For these families, community support is vital to discern levels of immigrant
vulnerability and is a key factor in avoiding downward mobility or deportation. Community
support, from nonprofits or even from informal networks such as street vendors, softens a
condition of socioeconomic immobility for LTUs. Therefore, the main argument from this
chapter is that, while most of the LTU cases I followed were not upwardly mobile, many were
supported by pro-immigrant nonprofits or other institutions. In this chapter, I also contrast levels
of immobility and community support across different locations.
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Latino and Mexican street food workers, most of them young undocumented men, often
expressed the importance of learning about apoyos (support) or ayudas (help) offered by the city,
CBOs, or other institutions in their communities. “The good thing about working on the streets is
that you meet people; it’s not like being in the kitchen,” was a phrase that several workers used
with me at Los Nómadas. This is a food truck in Queens selling tortas, tostadas, and platters
made by Mexican men with varied immigration statuses. 90 This street cart has been operating in
the same place for over 16 years, providing quick bites of Mexican cuisine to an ethnically
diverse clientele, many of whom are low-income workers. In part because of its large and varied
clientele, this has become a space where people share advice on where to find jobs, housing, or
health options, and even vouch for each other when NYPD officers ask for references. Los
Nómadas taco truck acted similarly to a CBO or a quasi-immigrant organization by providing
support for immigrants because it (re)created the dynamics of a community square and facilitated
information exchange.
This chapter has three sections. The first one includes a definition of precarious
immobility and describes how lack of lawful status affects U.S.-born children with LTU parents.
The second section presents four cases of precarious immobility for two mothers and two fathers
heading families, all of them LTU immigrants from Mexico, examining how their formal
education and ties to CBOs can help explain their higher or lower vulnerability. A third section
emphasizes differences between local ecosystems, Long Island compared to New York City, and
distinguishes between two groups of immigrants, their forms of community support and their
levels of vulnerability. In this last section, I also explore how Latino drivers in Suffolk County
differentiate between law enforcement agencies that target immigrants because of lack of
For some time one worker from Guatemala was hired. Other long-time customers and friends were from
Nicaragua, Colombia, Ecuador and Perú. I also found other “Mexican” taco-trucks run by Ecuadorians.
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driver’s licenses, and how FBOs publicly intervene on humanitarian grounds and promote
dialogue in these cases.
5.1 NOT UP, NOR DOWN
Most of my informants throughout my research experience what I call ‘precarious
immobility’. Precarious immobility is a socioeconomic situation in which immigrants are neither
upwardly nor downwardly mobile in terms of family household income and educational
prospects compared to both: the native-born majority in the receiving society and the original
economic status of immigrants in the United States. It was the most common socioeconomic
state for undocumented families in my sample, the rule not the exception. Precarious immobility
among undocumented heads of family households also limits the socioeconomic prospects and
well-being of younger generations being raised in the United States, including U.S. citizen
children (see Goldring et al., 2009; Goldring & Landolt, 2013, regarding ideas and studies about
precarious migratory status in Canada). 91
The concept of precarious immobility is useful because it represents a clear form of
exclusion from “the pursuit of Happiness” by not allowing irregular immigrants to access a legal
immigration status, nor a path to citizenship, therefore prohibiting their access to valuable
resources in the society of settlement (Alba & Foner, 2015) and inhibiting upward mobility. As
shown in the previous chapter and by other scholars, very few undocumented immigrants in the
United States and New York are or could be upwardly mobile. This form of exclusion of the
foreign born who are undocumented can also affect U.S. citizens who are related to
undocumented individuals by blood, marriage, or affinity.

The household income for my participants was around $40,000 per year, much lower than the New York State
median household income of approximately $61,000 in 2016. According to the NYC Mayor’s Office of Immigrant
Affairs (MOIA, 2018) the median earnings for all undocumented people was the lowest compared to other groups
by immigration status: $23,175.
91
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Table 5.1 includes four cases of Mexican family households in New York headed by
undocumented mothers and fathers exemplifying the general outcome of precarious immobility
under the analytical framework utilized in this dissertation. It is important to note that the cases
of two familias headed by Anastacia Barrios and Esteban Salcido, both living in New York City,
are in a less vulnerable position compared to those families headed by Socorro Cortés in Long
Island and Eduardo Naranjo in Queens.
Table 5.1 Four cases of ‘precarious immobility’ by Mexican immigrants in New York, 2015-2017
(i) Papers, or
immigration
status effect?
(parent & child)

Factors →

↓ Familias
(place)
Barrios
(Bronx)
(Anastacia,
Rigoberto
two minors)

––

+

Cortés
(Suffolk)
(Socorro,
Román; minors
in Mexico)

Salcido
(Queens)
(Esteban + one
minor)

Naranjo
(Queens)
(Eduardo + one
minor)

Parents/heads
(separation): LTU
Children: USC
Relatives: LPR

––

Single mother &
partner: LTU
Children: three USC
mostly in Mexico

Places or
ecosystems

(ii)
Org.

(iii)
Police

Human
Capital

(iv)
Educ.

(v)
Skill?

(vi) Social
networks:
strongreliable?

(vii) Intra-family:
Partneringparenting
decisions?

Outcome
Immobility w/

++

++

+–

––

––

––

low vulnerability

(low household
income, some educ.
planning)
2 earners (now
separated), 3 people
Immobility w/

+–

––

––

––

––

––

high vulnerability

(very low household
income, no
educational
planning)
2 earners. 2 people
Immobility w/

––

+–

+–

+–

––

––

––

Father: LTU
Child: DACA

low vulnerability
(low household
income, some
educational
planning)
1 earner, 2 people
Immobility w/

––

––

+–

––

––

––

––

Father: LTU
Child: USC

Acronyms:
LTU: Long-term undocumented person.
USC: U.S. citizen.
LPR: Legal permanent resident.
DACA: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival Recipient.
Org.: Organizational activity in CBOs or FBOs.
Police refers to interactions with police or law enforcement agents.
Educ.: Educational attainment.

Note: Symbols in cells should be interpreted as follows:
– – negative or mostly negative
+ – moderate or mixed
+ + positive or mostly positive.
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high vulnerability
(low household
income, no
educational
planning)
1 earner, 2 people

These two pairs of cases were chosen because they vary on key factors that protect
against the harmful effects of lacking legal status and living in exclusionary places. These are
people who are long-term undocumented immigrants (LTUs) but live in different places or
ecosystems (more immigrant friendly NYC v. less welcoming Eastern Long Island), have had
different experiences of interaction with police or law enforcement agents as foreigners, and also
have varying levels of educational attainment.
Moreover, the cases were chosen from the main outcome category of precarious
immobility but vary on the different kinds of support they received from an array of institutions
or organizations. Along with their unauthorized status, these families also shared negative or
mostly negative effects on their mobility from network supports and intra-family dynamics.
These families are atypical because they are single woman or single man headed households,
with only one child, and therefore are smaller. The four cases were picked because they
exemplify low and high degrees of immigrant vulnerability, and hence they can illustrate how
community or organizational support helps prevent worst-case outcomes (a counterfactual
argument).
To reiterate, these four families are ‘not typical’ in their structure compared to most cases
included in this research for two reasons. The first is because the heads of household are no
longer in stable relationships or couples with another adult partner contributing to the home; the
second, because they each have fewer than four family members. 92 Far from painting these cases
as “failures,” my intention is to say that one case seemed more ‘typical’ in terms of a household
structure of four with two adults and two minor children. Only in the case of the Barrios family
was I able to document and trace the moment in which they were a more ‘typical’ Mexican
This is not to say that ‘atypical’ families headed by one undocumented person are ‘always’ not upwardly mobile.
Undocumented people might be able to be upwardly mobile in a wide array of family types and sizes.
92
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immigrant family of four (a married couple and two U.S. born children) and later, when the
parents decided to live separately but with the mother raising the children.
These four cases are useful to observe how variation in access to organizational support,
interactions with police, levels of human capital, social networks, and intra-family dynamics
causes more or less precarious immobility among families headed by undocumented parents. If
these families show (a) high or somewhat frequent ‘organizational activity’ and (b) more years of
‘educational attainment’ (both variables as positive, mostly positive, moderate or mixed), their
precarious immobility occurs with less vulnerability despite constant interactions with police or
law enforcement agents. But if they show (a) less organizational activity and (b) very low
educational attainment their precarious immobility occurs with more immigrant vulnerability.
It is important to note that long-term undocumented immigrants have become a much
larger group nationally over the past decades. According to the Pew Research Center (Krogstad
et al., 2019), 66% of undocumented immigrant adults in 2017 had been in the United States for
over a decade, while over ten years ago (in 2007) the estimate was around 41%. Furthermore,
these Pew estimates show that in 2017, the undocumented immigrant population in the United
States had been in the country for a median of 15 years.
In this research, following recent collaborative and interdisciplinary efforts (see Ashar et
al., 2015), the levels of vulnerability for undocumented immigrants are signaled by significant
hardships causing harm or suffering (physically or emotionally) directly and individually (i.e. to
LTUs) or indirectly and collectively (e.g. to immediate family members of LTUs who could be
U.S. citizens). The main elements of interests included in this concept are the following: risk of
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detention and deportation, forced family separation, loss of job, housing, income, or other
properties due to violent attitudes or actions by private persons or police agents. 93
The cases of mothers and fathers confronting precarious immobility illustrate how their
children, U.S. born or not, face a disadvantaged upbringing associated with their parents’ lack of
immigration status. These four cases represent contemporary immigrant families headed by
undocumented immigrants who are socioeconomically stuck in low paid occupations, but whose
children’s lives are improved by protective institutions, organizations, and networks. Some
examples of how community support prevents higher levels of immigrant vulnerability are by
providing reliable information about how to avoid deportation, promoting “know your rights”
workshop under harsher immigration enforcement, promoting the protection of family unity or
the right to a family life and providing financial support to supplement family income if one
member (especially the head of the household) is detained and deported.
In conjunction with the four individual cases analyzed in this chapter, two other groups
facing precarious immobility are included in Table 5.2: (i) Los Nómadas workers in Queens and
(ii) Catholic volunteers from a local faith-based organization (FBO) serving the towns of the East
End in Suffolk County. 94 In the case of the street food workers in NYC, their precarious
immobility with less vulnerability is a result of very low human capital (i.e. negative or mostly
negative educational attainment and ability to develop labor skills), positive interactions with law
enforcement agents, and moderate or mixed effects regarding organizational activity and social
networks. In the case of the religious volunteers at the FBO in Suffolk, their precarious
According to the findings by Ashar et al. (2015) on immigrant vulnerability in the United States: “noncitizens face
significant hardships including physical and mental health problems, inability to find jobs commensurate with their
experience and abilities, challenges taking advantage of educational opportunities, and constant worry and stress
about undocumented relatives and long-term family separations. These hardships often prevent noncitizens from
forming the types of institutional connections that would facilitate their social inclusion and may create long-term
barriers to regularizing their immigration status.”
94
In this project, I did not report or notice any remarkable difference between the work of CBOs and FBOs.
93
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immobility with more vulnerability is explained by a hostile context for immigrants, combined
with negative or mostly negative relations with police and very low human capital, despite
moderate organizational activity and mixed effects of social networks. That is, for these two
groups of LTU immigrants with the same or similar levels of human capital and networks,
despite different community support systems (see Cantor, 1989) and public efforts to negotiate
inclusion, the places or ecosystems where they lived were more consequential to determining
their precarious immobility and levels of vulnerability.
Table 5.2 Groups of cases of ‘precarious immobility’ by Mexican immigrants in New York, 2015-2017
Factors →

↓ Familias
or groups
Workers at
Food Truck
in Queens

Volunteers
at FBO in
Suffolk

(i) Papers, or
immigration
status effect?
(parent & child)

Places or
ecosystems

(ii)
Org.

(iii)
Police

Human
Capital

(iv)
Educ.

(v)
Skill?

(vi) Social
networks:
strongreliable?

(vii) Intra-family:
Partneringparenting
decisions?

Outcome
Immobility w/

––

Parents: LTU
Children: USC

+–

++

––

––

+–

––

low vulnerability
(low household
income, almost no
educational
planning)

Immobility w/

––

Parents: LTU
Children: USC
Relatives: LPR

+–

––

––

Acronyms:
LTU: Long-term undocumented person.
USC: U.S. citizen.
LPR: Legal permanent resident.
DACA: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival Recipient.
Org.: Organizational activity in CBOs or FBOs.
Police refers to interactions with police or law enforcement agents.
Educ.: Educational attainment.

––

+–

––

high vulnerability
(medium or low
household income,
some educational
planning)

Note: Symbols in cells should be interpreted as follows:
– – negative or mostly negative
+ – moderate or mixed
+ + positive or mostly positive.

Together, the four individual cases and these two immigrant groups illustrate how parents
and their children face disadvantages associated with the lack of immigration status. All of these
cases are contemporary immigrant families headed by hardworking individuals who are
socioeconomically stuck in low-paid occupations. These are cases of people still far from upward
mobility and experiencing precarious immobility in the city and suburbs. The reason why I do
not use the term ‘downwardly’ mobile is because in all these cases, their socioeconomic and
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educational situation improved compared to the first couple of years after arrival. In each case,
there was an early but limited form of mobility. In the following two subsections, each of these
cases and groups will be explained in more detail by using the seven variable model outlined in
this dissertation.
5.2 APPRAISING VULNERABILITY
The higher vulnerability type identified in the cases of familias Cortés and Naranjo as
well as the lower type identified in the cases of the Barrios and Salcido families, I argue, are both
results of the negative effects of five variables. These variables are (1) lacking strong
organizational support; (2) negative interactions with police or law enforcements agencies in the
places where they live; (3) negative or mostly negative effects of low educational attainment; (4)
unvalued or very limited labor skills; (5) lack of access to strong social networks providing
different types of support, particularly people with legal status; and (6) little to no beneficial
intra-family dynamics in terms of partnering or parenting decisions within the household. As
undocumented heads of family households with an annual income below $36,000 USD and less
than 10 or 11 years of education, I noticed that these mother and fathers transmitted to their
children the idea of “echarle ganas” in order to motivate them to keep studying and trying to be
successful at school, while the parents worked cleaning houses, doing childcare, as dishwashers,
cooks, or grocery store workers. 95 To some extent, these families tried to get ahead with
organizational support by CBOs, other institutions and networks in each locality.
Socorro Cortés had negative or mostly negative effects in six out of the seven variables
suggested in the theoretical framework because she only sporadically receives help from two

In Mexico, the saying “echarle ganas” could be translated as ‘giving it your all’, ‘doing your best’, or ‘moving
forward’ (see Alvarez, 2017; Del Razo, 2012; Salazar-Jerez, 2004). This very popular idea of “doing the best you
can” in Mexico, from a very individualistic perspective, ignores the weight and role of multiple factors, especially
historical and structural, associated with socio-economic inequality and ethno-racial discrimination.
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CBOs in Long Island. This is the reason why she, her partner, and her three U.S.-born children
living in Mexico with their grandmother experience a precarious immobility with high
vulnerability. In the case of Eduardo Naranjo, he experiences precarious immobility with high
vulnerability because of considerably lower educational attainment. In sum, familias Cortés and
Naranjo are two cases of precarious immobility with higher immigrant vulnerability than other
families with low household income and no educational planning, because they do not have
organizational support nor high human or social capital.
In the next sections, I will explain how variations in local institutions and networks can
also serve to protect immigrants and families facing precarious immobility. The presence of
these protective factors, along with more education, helps prevent less favorable outcomes, and
provides positive support. The absence of these factors usually leads families to face higher
immigrant vulnerability and mostly negative outcomes. First, I present two cases of precarious
mobility for undocumented mothers, explaining how they vary importantly in their access to
organizational support, their educational attainment, and their degree of vulnerability in
contrasting locations. Secondly, I describe two cases of undocumented fathers in Queens without
consistent organizational support, displaying similar elements of precarious immobility but with
different degrees of vulnerability. These different levels of vulnerability, I argue, could be
explained mainly because their dissimilar levels of educational attainment and interactions with
CBOs.
Anastacia Barrios: CBOs & GED in the Bronx
One cold Sunday at the Barrios’s apartment, Anastacia told me about an incident that
poignantly illustrates their precarious immobility. Rigoberto, Anastacia’s husband and the father
of her children, was working at the corner deli when someone came in and offered a used bike
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for $10 USD. Their older child had been asking insistently for a Christmas gift like that, so
Rigoberto did not think twice and bought it. Later that day, Anastacia and the kids went to the
deli to greet him. Rigoberto gave the surprise to his child, who was extremely happy. The
mother, however, was worried.
Rigoberto explained to Anastacia exactly how he got the bike and then the parents told
their child that he should not become too attached to it. They explained to the child that if
someone in the street asked for the bike, he should give it to that person. Rigoberto continued
working at the deli, and the rest of the family left towards the apartment. Anastacia walked with
the youngest, while the oldest tried the new bike, going back and forth no more than one block
ahead of his mother and young sibling. They were going to walk for no more than six blocks,
between two stations along the 6 train.
Suddenly the Barrios child came running. A group of seven or eight boys with bikes
surrounded the child and asked for the bike back. The Barrios child did not resist but was scared.
The Christmas gift did not last even an hour. This gloomy episode highlights the bad economic
situation that some immigrant families in a low-income household must endure. Some immigrant
families, such as in the case of Familia Barrios, face “precarious immobility” because they are
not able to provide or secure certain commodities (a special gift to their children) with the money
they make. In this case, a bike was a ‘normal gift’ for a child that the Barrios family could not
afford in the ‘regular market,’ and after getting it in the ‘black market’ it was quickly taken
away.
However, the case of Anastacia and her family in the Bronx is also an example of less
vulnerability as undocumented immigrants because of a more welcoming environment for the
foreign-born overall. Despite facing such precarious immobility, the Barrios family has
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organizational support from CBOs in New York City, ranging from access to formal education to
housing and labor rights, including legal immigration advice. Anastacia was able to get her GED
thanks to the help and intervention of a local CBO. We met through another non-profit that was
providing educational assistance for her children.
Anastacia (age 40 in 2018) left her rural town in the Mixteca Poblana for the first and
only time in the early 1990s. Anastacia was 16 years old and did not have any family in
California, where she was offered a job as a babysitter for an older woman from her town who
was a legal permanent resident (see Yrizar Barbosa & Bermúdez Tapia, 2019). Anastacia crossed
the border only once. Her family lived in poverty, at moments not only lacking food but a table
at which to eat the vegetables left in the fields or the leftovers given by other people in the town.
Anastacia finished secundaria (9th grade) in Mexico, thanks to the support of her mother. Her
father “never provided, always a present figure, but absent”, and instead was a person who spent
most of his time drinking alcohol. The lack of any prospects in Puebla and her desire to
economically support her mother and four younger siblings were important incentives to go
north.
She lived one year in California, as a 24/7 babysitter and domestic worker, before moving
to New York City to stay with her sister Daniela, who initially did not want her there. As a
mother of two U.S.-born minor children and recently separated from her husband, Anastacia
reported a family household income of $35,000 annually between 2012 and 2015, when her exhusband and father of their two children, Rigoberto, had still lived with them.
With the support of a local CBO in New York, Anastacia obtained a GED diploma before
she was married. She decided to separate from her husband because of economic disputes about
property they mutually owned in Mexico. Separating could have made her precarious immobility
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worse because of lower household income; however nearby CBOs offered some guidance,
information, and education about her rights as a mother with minor U.S.-born children, as a lowincome tenant, and also as a domestic worker in NYC. The father of Anastacia’s children pays
for the rent of their small one-bedroom and one-bathroom apartment in the South Bronx, even
though he has not lived there since 2016. The family of three resides not far from the hospital
where the children were born in the Bronx, a neighborhood with high levels of poverty, low
ethnic diversity (70% Latino/a), and at the bottom of a composite of well-being measures at the
urban level (made up of health, education, and income indicators). 96 Familia Barrios has been
actively involved in getting services, participating in more than one local CBO in New York.
This is generally how they get information about schools and educational programs in their area
and beyond. With low formal education, very limited English, two unstable jobs (cleaning homes
and babysitting) and little support from friends or family, Anastacia struggles to fulfill her role as
breadwinner. Anastacia and her two minor children are not experiencing upward mobility but
rather precarious immobility, with low vulnerability because of the unlikely chances of raising
their family household income, but with access to some educational planning with limited
funding.
Courses and classes for her own (adult) education, as well as after school programs for
her children were offered to the Barrios family by CBOs around them. Anastacia was also aware
of the possibility of getting a U visa as a victim of domestic abuse by Rigoberto, a sad episode
that took place around 2002. Anastacia told me that the CBO facilitated her speaking with a
reliable lawyer, for free, and learning about the process as a victim of domestic violence. But she
ultimately decided not to do it because it was “too much psychological burden” for their
As mentioned in Chapter 1, these neighborhoods were compared between 2015 and 2017 using Measure of
America by the Social Science Research Council, DATA2GO.NYC, available at: http://www.data2go.nyc.
96
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children. Anastacia expressed to me an acute awareness of fraud and scams by notarios and
lawyers; she has received periodic information about the progress of DAPA, and was also able to
check with the local CBOs she trusted about rumors and changes in policies under Trump,
including the 10-year law (see Chapter 4).
After 2016, Anastacia has been living with her two ‘Bronxican’ children in a onebedroom apartment. Anastacia is a long-term undocumented mother in charge of a binational
family experiencing precarious immobility. This family has strong organizational support in an
immigrant friendly local ecosystem. Even after her husband moved out of the apartment, their
two children continue to see and spend time with their father on the weekends. When she is not
at work cleaning apartments or babysitting, Anastacia and her two children have been
participating in a folkloric dance group in Queens. One of the children is more interested in
sports, particularly in soccer and basketball, rather than the dance classes. The prospect of
college for the Barrios children looks uncertain because of a lack of funding. These prospects are
somewhat better for the younger child who could get a scholarship, not only because she is a
U.S. citizen but because she is a brilliant, hard-working, and motivated student. Further, this
younger child, by getting good grades and talking about it with other teachers and adults, is
already thinking about becoming a schoolteacher. The older one was researching affordable
vocational or trade school options in New Jersey in order to learn something related to
construction; however he/she was not really excited about school despite being a talented student
in math (I know this because I was his/her tutor).
Anastacia Barrios’s precarious immobility has been lessened with the help of several
CBOs around her home in immigrant-welcoming New York City, providing different forms of
community support. Her low immigrant vulnerability is also the result of frequent and substantial
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interactions with local organizations at different moments of her life, including when she decided
to separate from the father of her two children. These interactions were also beneficial to her
children, who received educational help and access to recreational activities at no (or very low)
cost. She was able to improve her educational attainment thanks to CBOs providing classes and
training to get a GED diploma and even to learn some English. With the help of CBOs, she was
also able to connect with other families by participating in cultural and recreational activities on
the weekends. Her low vulnerability is also the result of the reliable and actionable information
she has received on the rights she has as an undocumented domestic worker, a low-income
tenant, and a mother of two young Mexican-New Yorkers. Anastacia once told me that, by
getting her GED diploma as an adult, she wanted to show her children that education is very
important in life and that it is never too late to keep learning.
Socorro Cortés: One FBO & 6th grade in Suffolk
“What a sad life,” said Socorro Cortés while explaining to me how a phone call from a
coworker saved her and her children in Los Angeles after she visited a clinic in the early 2000s:
I was feeling very bad. (…) the doctor told me: –you are three weeks pregnant– (…) That day I
was going to commit a huge madness. I stood on the train tracks with my two girls and I was
going to commit suicide [voice breaks] (...) I was very depressed. I grabbed my girls and they
were so small: –What are you going to do mom? –; I tell them –Nothing, my children, let’s wait
for the train–. And then my phone rang, a coworker called me: –What are you doing? (...) think
about your children, do not do it for you, do it for your children– (...) I was desperate, without
money, without anything, he [a second ex-partner while living in LA] had stolen everything.

The episode happened before she went back to Mexico with her three minor children (the last
two born in California). After a few months back in Puebla she crossed back without papers to
New York, leaving four of her children with her mother in La Mixteca. Besides her
undocumented status and low educational attainment, her experiences of domestic violence from
physically and verbally abusive male-partners in Mexico and the United States, contribute to one
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of the most dramatic and tough life stories I have encountered. Socorro’s precarious immobility
with high vulnerability could be further exacerbated if she did not have at least occasional
interactions with the suburban Catholic FBO that introduced us.
“You have to receive many blows to revalue life,” she reflected after describing how two
cousins helped her to get all her belongings out of an apartment in less than five minutes, as she
begged the people evicting her from her home in East LA. Her relatives (tíos/as and primos/as)
provided shelter. Some of them even offered to adopt her newborn. She refused. Socorro was
desperate back then, used WIC and attended a free clinic for checkups, only receiving temporary
support from social programs and her extended family living nearby. In order to get food stamps
and public support, she was pushed to rent a place on her own. After asking for help from an
“office for refugees” in Los Angeles, Socorro remembers calling other “offices” to ask for more
support. At that time, Socorro barely had contact with CBOs, but her relatives told her about
these services.
Socorro only finished elementary school in rural Puebla, was very engaged in learning
dressmaking (corte y confección) through private classes, and also attended religious education
classes (catecismo). When we first talked in 2017, via one Catholic educational organization in
Long Island partnering with the MIDA project, she said that never heard of the GED. Socorro
has not been actively involved in any community-based organization (CBO) or faith-based
organization (FBO) during her more than 15 years living in the United States (almost 10 in
California and more than 5 in New York). She has sporadically received support from FBOs, but
that was all. She has never taken adult education classes, except for a few English courses with
the same religious organization in Suffolk.

155

We met when people from this FBO called me in order to help with the case of a
Mexican mother who desperately needed help to bring her U.S.-born children to New York with
valid U.S. passports. These two kids, both under 16, were living in Mexico with their
grandmother. The staff and volunteers at the FBO were unable to help Socorro bring her children
to New York, as they were unsure about the process of renewing their expired U.S. passports.
Someone suggested to call ‘a graduate student from CUNY’ conducting interviews with Mexican
immigrants in their organization.
That is how I became a volunteer for the FBO, as a MIDA partner, helping Socorro in at
least two concrete ways. First, I helped her to file a police report because she was already
consulting with lawyers about how to get a U visa, but had trouble remembering and keeping
track of addresses, dates, and other information. Socorro almost applied for a 10-year law case
(see Chapter 4), and I persuaded her to reconsider options with more than one immigration
lawyer. Second, before I conducted the first recorded interview, I helped Socorro with the
paperwork to try to bring her three U.S. born children living in Mexico to New York. 97 I was
able to assist her with correcting errors in the birth certificates of her two first U.S. born children,
but was still unable to fulfill all the requirements to get her children U.S. passports from the U.S.
Embassy in Mexico City. Socorro has barely articulated any educational planning for her
children; since we met her main objective has been to see and talk to them in person. All this
illustrates how Socorro is a challenging case of precarious immobility with high vulnerability.
Up to March 2020, only one of her three U.S.-born children had been able to visit her. The fact
that Socorro was referred to the ‘CUNY graduate student’ in order to figure out her paperwork

The information and the requirements were very confusing, therefore I decided to do the interview in order to
know more about her personal story and correctly fill out the forms she needed.
97
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and the situation of her children with expired U.S. passports in Mexico shows how difficult it
was to get help navigating bureaucracies across borders. 98
Like a majority of the undocumented people I interviewed, Socorro recognized that
lacking papers considerably affected her family life. “Because if I had papers, well, I could go
and visit my children, and especially my mom” she said, adding as a joke that due to her
immigration status: “someone like me only has the one-way ticket, not the round-trip (…) it’s
even worse with Trump right now, because he is doing more bad things.” She added that people
like her are afraid of going out to work, or taking the bus, because according to what she knows
“migración” (immigration officers or ICE) could even stop local buses or people driving through
checkpoints (she saw it on Facebook).
Socorro resented that a younger Mexican coworker had mistreated her to the point of
making her cry because of her undocumented status. According to Socorro, this younger
coworker “had that DACA permit, and with that she felt bigger than others,” illustrating how
legal status matters in some kitchens and other workplaces. Socorro complained that this
coworker spoke to her in English and said: “if you don’t learn it (English) why do you bother
coming to work?” However, Socorro also remembers that another coworker, an older Mexican
woman who was a U.S. citizen, taught her many kitchen skills. For Socorro, it was clear that in
Long Island, “without documents we are punished, because of the jobs,” and more recently,
when landlords ask for social security numbers from potential tenants. 99

The process to renew the U.S. passports of Socorro’s children was not easy due to multiple factors, including
errors on the birth certificates from California (i.e. the first name and the middle name were in a different order for
the mother, or the name of the father was omitted or also had misspellings), the fact that the children were under 16
years of age residing with their grandmother in a remote town in Puebla and therefore it was expensive and difficult
to get to Mexico City, and because the forms needed signatures and documentation from the two biological parents
who were either in jail or living as unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. and were not easily reachable.
99
Socorro had an erratic and hectic labor trajectory in the local economy of Long Island, working intensively
between five and six months (from June or July up to November or December) doing agricultural work, cleaning
houses, or in kitchens.
98
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Socorro recognized that she lives with fear given a lack of papers, but at the same time
feels that because ‘they’ (she and her partner) do not have a criminal record or a background ‘for
killing people or doing bad things,’ they are ‘good immigrants.’ Despite not having ‘papers’ or a
valid immigration status, she and her partner are not doing anything wrong; they are not
‘criminals’ because they came here to work. “But sometimes there is bad luck,” Socorro reflects
about her lack of papers. To ask for protection and guidance, every weekend or on her days off
between March and September (usually Mondays or Tuesdays), Socorro and Román, her new
partner, buy flowers for their Virgen de Guadalupe-Tonāntzin altar in the apartment they share
with a Salvadoran couple.
The lack of consistent organizational support for Socorro makes her condition as an
undocumented immigrant more vulnerable, especially living in a less immigrant-friendly area
where police agents are known for targeting Latino drivers like Román. In the summer of 2019,
they told me about ‘a new policy’ in the East End targeting landscaping trucks. He had received
multiple tickets driving in Long Island for minor infractions, including parking and not having a
valid license. Nevertheless, he has always paid the tickets on time to avoid ‘a bad record.’ The
lack of consistent interaction with CBOs or FBOs also put Socorro at risk of buying into the ‘10year law’ (see Chapter 4), a process that she did not complete because she was unable to afford
it.
In sum, my story with Socorro began when a Catholic FBO in Long Island put her in
touch with me, as part of CUNY and the MIDA team. By doing this, I became (in effect) her
agent, learning about her complicated personal and familial story in order to assist her. I was able
to coordinate with the FBO and helped her to solve some problems that resulted from her
undocumented status, lack of formal education, and her condition of precarious immobility with
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high immigrant vulnerability in a less immigrant-friendly suburban area in Suffolk. the county in
New York State with the highest number of infractions for driving without a license. 100
Esteban Salcido: CBOs & “prepa” in Queens
Esteban Salcido is an undocumented immigrant with above average education, residing in
an urban community with more than one organization or institution providing support to him and
his child. “Life has not been easy,” he said when I asked him to tell me about how he ended up in
New York. “Our dreams go away,” he added to emphasize some disappointment about his life as
an immigrant experiencing precarious immobility. In 2017, Esteban was considering going back
to Mexico to open a mechanic workshop, fully aware of the rampant insecurity and drug-related
violence there. Esteban is an atypical MIDA participant because of his educational trajectory and
because, while living in Queens, he was able to get support for his son’s DACA application from
a CBO in the Bronx.
Familia Salcido is a case of precarious socioeconomic immobility with low vulnerability
in Queens, because of Esteban’s higher educational attainment and intermittent experiences with
supportive organizations. Esteban Salcido finished high school in Mexico but was unable to go
to college. “My best years were in la prepa (high school) (…) good friends and classmates,” he
said. Biology, physics, history and educación física (equivalent to physical education or gym)
were his favorite classes back then. “I saw that my father was not going to be able to afford the
expenses of the university”; therefore, Esteban considered attending military school in Mexico
City. With four other friends he did tests to pursue a career in the Mexican army, but only one of

100
According to official NYS data, between 2014 and 2017 there were 71,800 traffic ticket violations for unlicensed
operators in Suffolk: 34.5% to people with non-NYS drivers’ licenses, 72.6% to men driving, and with a median age
of 30 years old. During this four-year period, 32.0% of the driver’ licenses were not identified, 14 cases were
international licenses and 7 cases were from Mexico (5 of them corresponded to 2015). About 98% of these 190,000
traffic tickets were associated with four courts: Suffolk District Court (41%), Suffolk County TPVA (30%),
Brookhaven Town Court (14%), and County of Suffolk TPVA (13%).
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them was selected. He finally studied in a private trade school in Mexico for three years and
worked as an auto mechanic.
In the past twelve years, Esteban has only worked in kitchens in New York without any
English abilities. He started as a dishwasher and doing deliveries, earning about $450 per week,
and working the full seven days. Eventually he became and still is a cook, making $600 per week
(five to six days a week). Esteban, like Anastacia, also tells his DACA child to echarle ganas at
school, to avoid hanging out with bad friends, and dreams about his kid being fully bilingual.
Ideally, Esteban hopes that his child will go to college, although at the time of this interview he
was more interested in becoming an airplane pilot. Esteban took English classes at a local public
library near his apartment for a few months. Queens public libraries, particularly one in Corona,
were convenient spaces for Esteban and his kid to hang out and spend time together or by
themselves. For Esteban, libraries were spaces he mentioned frequently when describing his life
as an undocumented labor migrant in New York.
How did a Mexican family in Queens get help from a CBO based in the Bronx? In the
case of Esteban Salcido and his young DACA child, this was made possible when they were in
Manhattan celebrating the Mexican Independence Day in mid-September. The event, organized
by the Mexican Consulate, brought different institutions and service providers to the venue
where Esteban’s child was screened and became part of the MIDA project. Previously, around
2011, Esteban Salcedo had also participated for less than a year with the non-profit Make the
Road New York in Queens. The precarious immobility in this case was mitigated by the sheer
luck of meeting a CBO promoting educational planning (a partner of the MIDA project) at this
event.
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Some educational planning was identified in the interviews and interactions with Esteban
and his child, both seriously thinking about college for the child. Esteban was well informed and
aware of how DACA had helped his son to get financial support and to consider more than one
option to study in the city. Esteban was even considering going back to Mexico, so his son could
go to a university there. His son, however, was uncomfortable with that idea because it was an
unknown country to him. That is why the most realistic option for them in 2017 was a trade
school, which could be paid for over 1 or 2 years. When I asked Esteban how his lacking papers
affected his family’s opportunities, he could not say anything specific right away, but after a few
minutes of silence he said, “it’s possible that [it affects] the university,” alluding to the fact that
he did not have the resources to pay for his child’s tuition.
Two different variables help explain the precarious immobility and lower vulnerability of
Familia Salcido: organizational activity and educational attainment. Similar to the case of
Anastacia Barrios, Esteban mentioned some institutions and organizations they occasionally
relied on for services and support. For example, he mentioned a Catholic parish and the public
library, both close to his home. Furthermore, the fact that the father looked for various
educational and work opportunities at a younger age in Mexico, eventually going to trade school,
opened more opportunities to find different types of jobs in New York. Because he was able to
read, write, and learn basic key words in English at his jobs, he quickly moved from washing
dishes and delivering food to becoming a griller, cook and manager in the kitchen. Esteban
Salcido feels that there are organizations in his community that provide support when facing
problems or if he needs help, as well as institutions where he can look for resources and spend
his free time such as the public library nearby.
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Eduardo Naranjo: No CBO & 9th grade in Queens
For Eduardo Naranjo only one factor, out of seven, was not entirely negative: moderate
or mixed interactions with police or law enforcement agents. Compared to Esteban Salcido,
Eduardo’s formal education is lower, but after several years working at the same grocery-store
he was also able to learn some English to become a cashier. His precarious immobility with high
vulnerability in Queens is similar to the one experienced by Socorro Cortés in Long Island, but
in the latter case the only factor that was not negative had to do with organizational activity with
one FBO. Eduardo does not participate in any organization around him, distrusts public
institutions, and one of his very few sources of support was a network of people he met at Los
Nómadas food truck. Both Eduardo and Socorro experienced high levels of vulnerability because
they are generally unable to verify or regularly obtain reliable information about their rights as
immigrant workers or to avoid abusive employers or landlords, and were unable to assuage their
fears of deportation with organizational support in their immediate local communities.
Before leaving Mexico City, Eduardo Naranjo finished secundaria (9th grade). In New
York, he did not report any organizational experience with CBOs serving immigrants and never
mentioned to me attending a public library or taking English classes. We met consistently for
over four years before I asked him to record an interview. I knew he did not have papers, because
other friends had told me. We met as customers at Los Nómadas food truck. I visited his
apartment in Woodside several times and he visited mine. We talked about politics and about
soccer because we support the same team in Mexico: Los Pumas. We also used to hang out with
other workers and customers of this food truck and went out at night to small Latino bars.
On several occasions, between 2016 and 2017, Eduardo asked me and other paisanos at
Los Nómadas about borrowing money. Eduardo worked for over seven years at a grocery store,
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getting paid first $500 a week and then going up to $850 (12 hours a day, 6 days a week). His
first job in New York was as a dishwasher, getting paid about $300 a week (10 hours a day, five
days a week), but that did not last more than a few weeks. He then went to a factory where he
started getting paid $350 a week and eventually went up to $500, but it was a lot of hours
(between 12 and 14), six days a week. He usually paid me back on time, and the loans were
usually between $40 to $80 dollars for a week or ten days. I noticed he started borrowing money
after trying to open a small spot outside a store in Queens to sell fresh juices and fruit. Other
customers at Los Nómadas complained that Eduardo Naranjo did not pay them on time and were
bothered because he was asking for money too often. His link to the network of customers at the
food truck became weaker because of this.
During our first recorded interview in November 2017, Eduardo told me he had been
trying to get DACA for a few months without success. I was surprised by this because he looked
older to me. I thought he was around 40 years old, and I was not sure how old Eduardo was when
he left Mexico. I did not know then that he arrived in California when he was about 16 years old.
Eduardo said he was extremely frustrated about not getting DACA; he had not been able to get a
valid birth certificate from Mexico in order to get a passport. Out of frustration and desperation,
he destroyed the last copy of his birth certificate sent by his family. Eduardo told me that he
ripped it into pieces, very symbolically, in front of the Mexican Consulate in Manhattan after his
last request was denied. Eduardo had so little support (from organizations, institutions, or
community), he did not know how to get DACA or know how to look for other informed legal
options or trustworthy counsel as an undocumented immigrant in Queens.
After 16 years living in the United States, Eduardo reflected that he has always faced
obstacles as an immigrant and occasionally has been pushed to his limit. I remember one time, a
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few months after we met, Eduardo told me that he was not afraid of his employers and demanded
minimum wage in order not to be exploited. We often hung out and talked with others outside
Los Nómadas food truck, or watched the news, soccer games, movies, or Mexican soap operas.
One night, while hanging out with other friends, Eduardo told us that he had threatened his
employers, two brothers from the Middle East who owned the grocery, with quitting if they did
not hire someone else to lift heavy boxes. Eduardo had a back injury that at some points was so
bad he could not walk. He decided to go see a huesero (sobador or bonesetter) for his injuries. At
some point, he also stopped drinking alcohol and started using Herbalife products. After that,
Eduardo started selling other supplements and nutritional goods. His high vulnerability as an
immigrant is partly the result of lacking formal organizational support from CBOs, as well as his
lack of resources to get proper medical attention or more comprehensive advice about his labor
rights.
Even when Eduardo says he is not living in the shadows and is a hard worker, selfevaluating his general experiences as an immigrant in a positive way (because he has “a job, a
roof, and food on the table”), he is still not close to experiencing upward mobility. Eduardo does
not feel the police can deport him and does not have the daily fear of deportation. This indicates
that he feels safe in a more immigrant-friendly local ecosystem, despite a lack of CBO support.
He thinks that not being able to get DACA or “get papers” is because of being “dejado” (‘for not
doing the things he is supposed to do’). Like Esteban Salcido, Eduardo feels part of New York
but does not have any family or organizational support around him. “My child is my family,”
Eduardo told me. “I always give her the idea of studying: de echarle ganas.” His daughter was
student of the month and Eduardo tells her to continue studying to avoid working a lot like him,
saying: “look at me, keep studying.” Furthermore, Eduardo does not have an educational plan for
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his daughter. This is an additional sign of higher vulnerability; precarious immobility with lower
vulnerability occurs when there is concrete knowledge, plans or aspirations for further education
or a college degree. He did not articulate specific plans or actions when we talked about his
daughter’s future – although she is still quite young. Considering all this, Eduardo faces more
vulnerability than Esteban because the support provided by CBOs and other local institutions,
such as public libraries or other city agencies, are generally more comprehensive and reliable
than the advice provided by Los Nómadas.
A food truck such as this one in Queens can offer certain social and community support,
but shared information is not always reliable, and it is not always useful to someone like
Eduardo. The type of support at Los Nómadas can be two sided, because while information is
provided freely and casually by workers and customers, it can also be partial and sometimes
inaccurate. Unlike the community support usually provided by local CBOs or FBOs working
with immigrants and other urban groups in the city, the main goal of a street vendor like this is
not to provide services, nor to give specific advice or actionable information. However, it is still
a local business offering a welcoming public space in which private exchanges or random
relations can lead to potential solutions and support for various needs, by and for a group of lowincome immigrants. Los Nómadas can still be an important form of community support for
undocumented immigrants like Eduardo in NYC, a space in which he can seek advice, help or
information of multiple kinds (urgently or not) at no cost and at his own risk.
5.3. URBAN RANCHEROS & SUBURBAN BELIEVERS
Place or local ecosystem matter for unauthorized immigrants experiencing precarious
immobility. Local context is a crucial factor that determines different forms of support from the
community, and therefore different levels of vulnerability for immigrants. In this section, I
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elaborate on these two elements by describing and analyzing the forms of support observed
among people linked to Los Nómadas food truck in Queens and volunteers at one FBO
connected to the Catholic Church in Long Island. At Los Nómadas, the young male immigrant
workers displayed limited and moderate activity with local CBOs or FBOs, very positive
interactions with local law enforcement agents, and mixed effects from social networks. All of
these factors combined to create an informal but tangible network of street support. Therefore, I
argue that this group of immigrants had lower vulnerability compared to the suburban residents
in Long Island dealing with more aggressive police officers and other community members,
despite having access to a local FBO.
While both groups, the taqueros in NYC and the volunteers in Long Island, had low or
very low levels of human capital, the religious group in the suburbs had moderate activity in
local organizations, mixed effects (positive and negative) from social networks and intra-family
dynamics, and negative interactions with police in a context or local ecosystem considerably
more hostile to the foreign born. Therefore, the negative interactions with law enforcement
agents in a less-welcoming environment for immigrants, despite similarities and differences
across other variables of the analytical model, I argue, were the most consequential factors in
determining a higher vulnerability for the LTU immigrants in Long Island facing precarious
immobility. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, elements of immigrant vulnerability include
fear of being detained and deported, as well as losing or risking family life, jobs, housing, or
income because of negative encounters with law enforcement.
Food truck support in NYC, low vulnerability
Los Nómadas operates in a pro-immigrant locality and helps to protect workers and
customers from abusive or violent law enforcement agents, a city providing IDs for LTU
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immigrants, among other supportive actions. Unauthorized workers I met in Queens, mainly at
the site of this street vendor, but also through the soccer group where I met family Arias (see
Chapter 3), knew about IDNYC but not all of them applied for it. 101 The matrícula consular or
Mexican consular ID cards were far more common for undocumented immigrants across all my
field sites. Those who owned a car usually went to other states in the region and paid large sums
of money to get valid driver’s licenses. In fact, it was surprising to learn that a few of them used
and applied for licenses from states beyond the East Coast, including states in Southern Mexico.
Even with the options of a valid U.S. driver’s license, a consular ID card, a Mexican passport, or
a driver’s license from a state in Mexico, a smaller number of people associated with the food
truck brought my attention to the “Fraternal Order of Police” cards (see Figure 5.1). I was told
Figure 5.1 Fraternal Order of Police Cards [Edited], Queens, NY. December 2017

that these cards were useful in case of minor traffic infractions, such as running a red light or
stop signs, and I saw police officers giving them to workers at Los Nómadas on Christmas and

IDNYC or the New York’s municipal ID card program, according to the Mayor’s Office for Immigrant Affairs,
hit a milestone in 2017 by issuing its one millionth card. IDNYC was described as, “a Mayoral initiative and a
crucial means of fostering inclusion and access for New York City’s diverse population, including immigrants.”
(MOIA 2018: 23).
101
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New Year’s Eve. These FOP cards were given by officers who were regular customers at this
Mexican food truck. 102
Customers and workers at Los Nómadas often talked about the challenges of not having a
valid ID. An identification was not solely for the function of driving a car, but also to access
local bars or to buy alcoholic beverages at public events such as soccer games or rodeos. The
issue of driver’s licenses was a more prevalent concern among the immigrant families I met in
Long Island compared to those in the city, as the latter group was more used to public
transportation but still required some form of identification document for non-driving matters.
Deportation became a great concern at the food truck when Trump became a presidential
candidate. Months before the outcome of the 2016 election, even before the final nominations in
each party, I was inside Los Nómadas discussing the election. To my surprise, I found some
Trump supporters not only among customers, but also among workers at the food truck. One
customer put a Bernie Sanders sticker next to the big menu outside the truck. Another
undocumented worker told me that even if he had the chance to vote he would not do it because
he did not like any of the candidates. “No nos quieren aquí” (they do not want us here) said one
delivery guy who infrequently worked in the food truck and who was trying to explain to me the
rhetoric and candidacy of Trump. None of the over 20 undocumented immigrants I met at Los
Nómadas between 2013 and 2017 had ever been deported, or had close contact with someone
who was detained by ICE. Most of them, however, knew people who ‘voluntarily’ decided to go
back to Mexico before and after Trump was elected.
Los Nómadas became a pathway to learn more about the experiences of mainly male undocumented Mexican
immigrants and their families in New York City. These individuals were generally very distrustful of any
government, including the Mexican consulate, and neither aware nor involved in any community-based
organizations in the city. Through this street vendor, I was invited to attend Mexican rodeos and ranchero concerts
in the metropolitan area. On one occasion, I was a few hours away from taking a plane to a city in the Midwest with
an undocumented person I met at the food truck who had never before taken a plane; he wanted to follow me going
through the airport as he lacked the sense of security and familiarity to navigate this context.
102
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At Los Nómadas, I also saw how people organized to support each other by explaining
where to go in the case of medical emergency (e.g. hospitals with more Spanish speaking staff,
or private doctors, clinics, and dentists with better reputations), and sharing information about
affordable moving services or landlords who did not ask for SSN. In other cases, information
was relayed about how to acquire loans with low interests, buy a car or get the right insurance, or
send and receive packages to and from their places of origin mostly in Southern Mexico (such as
the states of Puebla, Mexico City, Morelos, Guerrero and Oaxaca). Almost all my close
informants at Los Nómadas could be considered ‘urban rancheros’ because they were from small
rural towns in Mexico, but expressed to me their intention of living in the city with their families
until they could no longer work or pay their bills. Unfortunately, but also unintentionally, not all
the support and information given at this food truck was accurate or trustworthy, and sometimes
was partial or incomplete, such as in cases referring to dodgy lawyers, low paid jobs, or even
abusive employers.
Workers at Los Nómadas knew a lot about their allies and frequent customers, including
their countries of origin, immigration status, occupations, and salaries. Based on that
information, they offered or provided informal forms of support. Several times I witnessed, or
they told me about, situations in which one known customer or an acquaintance asked them for
jobs or housing options or even legal services. At one point a lawyer posted an advertisement
next to the menu on display (like the Sanders sticker) and left several flyers for potential
immigration cases. A busboy worker told me he had hired the lawyer announced in the
advertisement; then he was able to transition from a U visa to a green card. He also explained to
me that he was being paid around $1,000 dollars “in check” from a restaurant. Further, he felt he
was paying too much in taxes, continuing to make the point that “there were good and bad things
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about being legal or ‘illegal’” and not getting all your salary in cash. A delivery worker also
expressed to me how he foresees the political future of his unauthorized status: “There will be no
immigration reform because then who will clean their ass,” he said in a firm tone. 103
In one of the concerts that I attended with Los Nómadas workers and customers, the lead
singer of Calibre 50, a well-known band in Mexico and the United States for their songs about
border crossings and living without papers, told the audience: “And do not lose your passport,
because then you are fucked.” 104 After I spent more time at Los Nómadas, I also learned that
workers and customers helped each other to write letters for hospitals or employers, got special
discounts from nearby stores to buy personal or business-related goods, invited each other to
organized parties or special occasions, and participated in tandas and quinielas (see Figure 5.2)
with people they trusted and met there. 105
The most trusted and tenured undocumented worker at the food truck, Simón Santos
Quiñones, aka El Monei (age 30, 10 years in the U.S.), was making $55,000 annually with no
more than 5 days off per year and no other job. Other undocumented workers, especially those
who only worked sporadically or for less than 20 hours, were paid around $10 per hour and
sometimes got a few extra bucks from tips. Juan Rojas, aka Tiburón (age 32, living in NYC for
11 years), is a regular customer at Los Nómadas and works as a dishwasher and delivery boy in
Midtown Manhattan, making about $31,000 per year for six days a week and about 10 hours per
“No habrá reforma migratoria porque luego quién les va a limpiar el culo.”
“Y que no se les pierda el pasaporte, porque se los lleva la chingada.”
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These informal practices of saving and making money rely on trust by all the participants. In tandas, a group of
about a dozen people or more trust one person, the organizer, by giving a fixed amount of money for a certain
number of weeks or months. This fixed amount turns into a form of savings (with no interests), that the organizer
gives in full to each participant at one specific moment during the convened period. That specific moment or time to
get the money is raffled. For example, a group of 12 people decides to participate with $100 each for over a year.
After a raffle indicating which month each participant will get paid, every month only one participant receives the
$1,200, and each month everyone gives $100 to the organizer. If someone participating in the tanda does not give
the monthly amount (e.g. $100) the organizer vouches for that person that did not pay. In la quiniela, for instance,
each participant pays in advance to an organizer (between $5, $10, or $20) for ‘a line’ of results (for the Mexican
soccer league) during each weekend and getting points for each successful result. The person with more points wins
the money from all the participants (each one gets a copy of the overall selections).
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day. He married a Dominican woman, who he met on Facebook. She was a legal permanent
resident applying for U.S. citizenship before Trump got elected. El Monei was living with
another woman from Mexico, who did not have status and whom he met at a bar. These two men
were fathers who delegated all the household work to their female domestic partners, including
all the decisions about their U.S. born-children (they both had children under 5 years old). 106 The
difference in earnings between Simón Santos Quiñones and Juan Rojas, both of them
undocumented and in typical mixed immigration status families in Queens, is because El Monei
gets more cash from working one more day (e.g. seven days a week and at least 10 more hours
per week), plus he earns more in tips.
Figure 5.2 Mexican soccer quiniela used by Los Nómadas workers and customers, Queens,
December 2016

The support system around Los Nómadas works through frequent interactions and
communication that slowly develop into trust and solidarity. Among the first questions the
workers and frequent customers ask anyone that might show some interest in joining this system

Perhaps the only time I saw Juan Rojas trying to take the lead on the education of his kids was between 2015 and
2016, when he asked me to help with the UPK applications for his two U.S. born children in NYC.
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of street support is: ‘where do you work and how much do they pay for that?’ People then are
supposed to show some proof of their job, or at least offer some information that others might
find useful. For instance, restaurant or delivery workers usually mention job openings, available
apartments, or affordable places to get medical attention, dentists, mechanics, or some sort of
discount as a referral for a service or product. I remember that several times the owner of Los
Nómadas got better prices with owners of nearby stores (i.e. groceries, dollar stores), or workers
and customers exchanged advice about neighborhoods to live in and apartments to rent, cars to
buy or sell, good or bad employers and landlords, and even about how to buy the right car
insurance, get legal advice, or the quality of schools for their children.
Church support in Suffolk, high vulnerability
FBOs in Long Island help temper the effects of anti-immigrant local contexts, such as in
the case of Familia Faz, which is one of 14 families I categorize as suburban believers, because
they are volunteers and church goers strongly associated with Catholic parishes. This family is
headed by an immigrant LTU couple from southern Mexico who have been living in Eastern
Suffolk for over two decades. Together they were making over $30,000 a year (see Table 5.3). I
stayed at their home several times, and one morning I asked about the story behind a book I saw
in the living room (titled “There Was an Old Lady Who Swallowed a Chick”). In their answer
they explained to me how lucky and grateful they were to be a part of the Parent-Child Home
Program (PCHP). Far from being exclusively “good luck,” the Faz family, I later learned, was
close to more than one CBO or FBO around them. One of these organizations helped connect
them with the PCHP and receive free books, despite no universal prekindergarten (or UPK)
available to them in Suffolk. This family in Long Island had multiple ties to non-profit
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organizations and displayed some positive intra-family dynamics that helped them to navigate
life as Latin American immigrants in Long Island.
I met Omar Faz while he was preparing food for a Catholic celebration in Suffolk during
the winter: día de la Virgen de Guadalupe. He was wearing an NFL jersey on that very cold
morning. Because I was introduced by a Dominican nun, and perhaps because of my beard, he
promptly asked me if I was a missionary. I explained to him I worked for CUNY and right away
he expressed interest in learning more about how to send his children to college. Omar and his
wife María Esther, in general terms, fit in the category of suburban believers, or as Mexican
immigrants in the suburbs affiliated to a Catholic parish as active volunteers, because of their
unauthorized status, active or somewhat frequent participation in a local FBO serving Latino/a
immigrants, and low educational attainment of the family household heads (9 years or less).
Omar dreams about owning a house in Long Island, and he was seriously considering becoming
a volunteer fireman in New York.
Over 15 years ago, Omar was the victim of a group of young “blanquitos” (Non-Hispanic
whites) while working part-time in a kitchen in the city. It was a rainy night, after midnight,
when Omar and a co-worker from the restaurant were waiting for the bus to go to the apartment.
Suddenly a vehicle stopped very close to where they were sitting. The driver and passengers in
the car started shouting insults to Omar and his friend and shot paintballs at close range. One of
the shots hit Omar's face and ear, causing him to lose consciousness and temporarily lose
hearing. He called the police and got a lawyer.
It was not until after the election of Trump that Omar finally decided to reopen the case.
He had avoided doing so before because he was scared, had spent a long time getting medical
attention (two surgeries that cost him over $20,000), and did not have the money. His new
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lawyer from the Financial District –costing about $ 2,000 USD – worked diligently so that what
happened in Brooklyn would allow him to qualify for a U visa. 107 By January 2018, Omar had
obtained the old police report, hospital records, and the necessary signatures to begin the legal
process for the U visa, which could take several months or even years. He feels optimistic about
having access to migratory relief. Access to the U visa could help Omar to get a work permit and
eventually be able to become a legal permanent resident. This would allow him privileges like
visiting a family member in Mexico if they became ill – something that he, like other people
interviewed in NYC and Suffolk, lament not being able to do because of undocumented status.
He was motivated to begin the U Visa application after Trump’s election.
Omar and Esther live in an area that generally requires driving, preferably with a valid
driver's license, New York State plates, and with valid car insurance. According to official NYS
data from 2017, out of approximately 190,000 traffic ticket violations in Suffolk County, 21,700
were described as “unlicensed operators.” Police officers in Suffolk are specifically known for
targeting Latino drivers and vehicles with out-of-state plates. The public transportation system in
Long Island is limited. Omar had to invest about $6,000 and at least three months of waiting,
including three or four trips during which he lost workdays, to be able to process a driver license
issued by a state other than New York on the East Coast. This amount included costs associated
with travel by land, accommodation, and advice received. His oldest child accompanied Omar on
some of these trips. This type of non-New York State driver’s license was advertised
occasionally in the free press in Spanish circulating in the city. The issue of licenses for
undocumented persons is especially important for people like Omar and Esther, who live outside
the city. After 2019, one FBO has been organizing workshops about how undocumented people
The U visa is a legal option offered by the U.S. immigration system for victims of certain serious crimes and who
have suffered considerable physical or mental harm.
107
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in New York State can acquire a driver’s license and have also provided support for low-income
drivers in order to pay for the required tests and paperwork.
Even though the FBO that introduced me to Omar Faz and his family did not directly
support him in getting his U visa under Trump, other support they have provided in years past
has been crucial for the family. Around 2011, when Omar was working in the city and was a
direct witness to 9/11, an event that he described as extremely painful, this same FBO paid for
his older child’s education. The FBO paid about $10,000 a year, for six years, so that Esther and
Omar’s child could attend a private Catholic school close to their home. The FBO also offered
monetary help for high school, but Esther and Omar decided not to accept it because it was too
much money and a risk for their finances in the event of job loss (it was a risk because they were
“making ends meet”). The education of the Faz’s older child, a U.S. citizen, has been strongly
supported by this FBO in Suffolk, and, one hopes, will continue to be once their child begins
college to study a health-related career.
ID cards issued by local FBOs
Keenly aware of the inability of unauthorized immigrants to get a driver’s license in New
York State, the FBOs in Long Island that allowed me to meet familia Faz (and other volunteers
or ‘suburban believers’) have worked to produce identification cards, especially after Trump’s
election (see Figure 5.3). These ID cards were publicly and privately negotiated by local
religious leadership with some police agencies, using their moral authority by appealing to
humanitarian reasons, including family unity. In providing these ID cards, the leaders of one
FBO argued that immigrants were recognized as people; they were identified as part of the local
religious community, explicitly linking undocumented immigrants to specific parishes and
churches nearby providing aid and reducing or preventing reporting to ICE. In a period of two
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weeks in early 2017, one of the organizations produced about 400 identification cards that
included first name, last name, recent photo (taken in situ or on site, at the FBO), home address,
date of birth, sex, height, weight, eyes and hair colors, plus any ID markers.
Figure 5.3 Identification Card by the Alliance of Citizens and Immigrants [edited], Suffolk County,
NY (Long Island). February 2017

Leaders in the organization estimated that in a period of about 10 years, they were able to
produce more than 3,000 cards, initially using funds from grants. In 2017, I noticed that the
organization was charging $5.00 dollars per card, but sometimes waived the fee for families in
great need. It usually took between one and two weeks to get a card with a two-year expiration
date. These ID cards for undocumented immigrants in Long Island, produced and promoted by
local religious institutions, were cleared by the Police Chief at the Police Department in Suffolk
–a key local institution within the community– illustrating a positive experience with some law
enforcements agencies in Long Island.
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‘Show me your license’
Between 2015 and 2017, I found that interactions between the unauthorized Mexicans I
spoke to and the local police were less intense and stressful in New York City compared to the
different local law enforcement agencies my informants identified in Long Island, from Town
Police officers to State troopers. What differed among them was a higher level of fear and
distress for LTU drivers dealing with State troopers and police in certain towns throughout Long
Island. Informants in the suburbs told me about avoiding certain roads and driving extra carefully
when passing State troopers, at rush hour, or basically avoiding passing or crossing through
certain towns. 108
As mentioned in Chapter 4, one Colombian Legal Permanent Resident who had been
living in Suffolk County for over 25 years pointed out to me the importance of making a
distinction between the Town Police and the Village Police in Sandshire, because the latter can
stop you for any reason. When he was pulled over on a normal day over a decade ago, he
suspected that the reason was because of his darker skin. He did not get a ticket because he was
an LPR with a valid NYS license. Another Colombian, who was part of a fundraising event
organized by an FBO in collaboration with other small CBOs and pro-immigration advocates,
said in Spanish and English: “this event is for immigrants who are afraid; we work with the
police and we are here to help.” In conversation with Mexicans and other immigrants from
countries like Guatemala, Ecuador, and Honduras, many mentioned that usually the local police
in their towns respect immigrants, but the State Troopers generally do not.
Indeed, informants repeatedly pointed out that there are certain local roads and towns
where Latino/a immigrants face the risk of being stopped by the local police for not having
registered plates from New York State. Marcelino, an undocumented person in a focus group
108

None of my informants in NYC reported something similar while driving in the city: mapping ‘safe’ roads.
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organized by the MIDA project, said that he was stopped two times in a town near Sandshire (see
Chapter 4). While doing fieldwork, I noticed the leadership from FBOs and local law
enforcements agencies, particularly in urban centers with heavier Latino/a presence, were more
likely to sit and dialogue about the positive role of immigration, instead of openly following or
stopping “Latino/a looking” drivers with out of state plates.
Armando Rojo and his wife Marisela (ages 34 and 31), both from Puebla, and both living
in Long Island for over 12 years, also complained about their interactions with the police, in
particular about police checkpoints targeting Latinos. In 2012, Armando paid close to $2,000 in
tickets. Around 2005 he was detained for driving a car that was not under his name and did not
have insurance. He ended up paying around $1,000, which was about the value of the vehicle he
was driving. On that occasion, he was detained in the police station for at least five hours. In
2015, he finally decided to get a driver’s license from another state and get plates from New
York.
For Armando, spending about $5,000 to get the license was an important investment. In
2017 their family household income was estimated to be $28,800 and they had three minor
children, all of them born in New York. Their family rented a one-bedroom apartment for $1,000
a month, right next to an expensive boat and yacht storage. Armando was employed mainly in
landscaping and Marisela was working part-time in the kitchen of a local restaurant. They both
have very low educational attainment, below six years of education in Mexico and weak family
networks. “They do not care about one who does not have papers,” Armando said when
reflecting on his life as an unauthorized immigrant in Suffolk.
Since 2012, Andres and Marisela Rojo have relied on at least three different CBOs,
including the FBO that was a part of MIDA and introduced me to the family. One of these
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organizations was extremely active in sending information about police checkpoints and
educational opportunities and even doing advocacy work with the family. This organization was
about 30 to 45 minutes away from the Rojo family home and relied on a network of volunteers
who were LPRs or U.S. citizens to pick up members at their homes. The Rojo family also relied
on other organizations specialized in domestic violence and empowering women.
Marisela proudly showed me two text messages in her smartphone sent by one of these
organizations, inviting people to “listen to personal stories of immigrant youth-DACA” at a local
venue and another inviting community members to “march to defend DACA,” giving
instructions on where to go and whom to call if they planned to attend (see Figure 5.4). Because
the organizations worry about deportations, they communicate and coordinate with their
members via text messages instead of openly publicizing these events on Facebook or other more
open social networks (especially via WhatsApp).
Figure 5.4 Text messages sent by local CBO inviting to a DACA rally[edited], Suffolk County, NY
(Long Island). February 2017
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Despite moderate or mixed effects from the organizational activity of these and other
suburban believers, their precarious immobility with higher vulnerability compared to the urban
rancheros in Queens is exemplified by one participant who was deported to Mexico in early 2019
(Mario Moreno), another father from Honduras who was denied entry to the United States as part
of a family reunification case, and several first-hand stories of relatives, friends and close
acquaintances who were detained and deported.
Publicly negotiated inclusion
During one of my first visits to the East End in August 2015, more specifically to a public
town hall meeting in Riverhead, I noticed some efforts by a few FBOs and CBOs in the area to
create bridges between the local police departments and the Latin American immigrant
population in the East End of Long Island. 109 I was invited by one FBO to this meeting as part of
the audience of the Anti-Bias Task Force (or ABTF). 110 In that same visit, I also noticed the
presence of taxis raiteros, which could be defined as an informal type of business used by
immigrant workers (like a pre-Uber service for low-income Mexicans, including many
farmworkers or other immigrants who did not have a car or know how to drive) in New York and
other U.S. cities such as Chicago, Los Angeles or San Diego. In a bilingual business card (one
side in Spanish and the other in English), Mr. Carlos offered his services as “Taxi Raitero” by

Names in this section were not anonymized because this was a public meeting with press coverage.
The Anti-Bias Task Force in Riverhead, according to some of the informal conversations I heard at the town hall,
was created between 1991 and 2007. For local media, this task force was “in sleep mode” or “dormant” until 2014.
The ABTF is defined as a “non-partisan group comprised of concerned citizens, government officials,
representatives of law enforcement, education, and clergy all of whom work together to address the issue of
prejudice.” The ABTF was coordinated by a chair, a vice-chair, a secretary/treasurer, a town board liaison, and a
police department liaison, plus the other 12 to 14 members without a specific role or position. According to its
mission statement states: “Intolerance and prejudice against persons because of their race, ethnicity, age, disability,
gender, religion or Sexual orientation tears at the fabric of a democratic and pluralistic society. Acts of violence
based on such Bias further alienate individuals and groups and serve to rob us of the crucial sense of security we all
require in order to live, work, and play or pray in our communities. In consideration of the destructive effects of
prejudice and racism in our communities and in order to address this ongoing problem, the Riverhead Anti-Bias
Task Force has been created.”
109
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phone calls, charging about $5.00 for local rides (see Figure 5.5). The purpose of this subsection,
based on a report of the town hall meeting, is to illustrate how local organizations and
institutions intervene on behalf of immigrants, in this case in a non-immigrant friendly
ecosystem, to negotiate their public inclusion.
Figure 5.5 Business Card of a Raitero Taxi Driver [edited], Suffolk County, NY (Long Island)

At 10am, the session of the ABTF began when Supervisor Walter asked everyone to rise
and recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Then the Supervisor read the “The Parable of the Good
Samaritan” (Luke 10:29-37) from the Bible. In that passage, Jesus explains the meaning of a
“good neighbor” and the Supervisor asked everyone to keep the word “mercy” in their minds
during the session. Ten minutes later, Rabbi Steven Moss, identified by a local online newspaper
as the “longtime chairman of the Suffolk County Human Rights Commission and co-chair of the
county’s Inter-Faith Anti-Bias Task Force,” gave a speech centered on the idea of how “God
used all the colors of earth to create Adam.” The Rabbi closed his talk saying that no human
being is any better than anyone else and with a collective prayer to help everyone in the room
better understand “the sense of community.” After this, the panelists took their seats at the main
table with Riverhead’s supervisor and council members (see Figure 5.6).
Both the Town Supervisor and Maryann Slutsky – executive director of Long Island
Wins, whose first words were that the panel represented an “educational moment” – suggested to
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introduce each of the participants. Once all the panelists were introduced, Mr. Amol Sinha from
the New York Civil Liberties Union expressed his concern about how the word “sanctuary” was
used in a negative way in Riverhead. He also explained the difference between a civil and
criminal offense in regard to lacking legal status, how immigration enforcement is a federal
matter, and how local governments in New York State collaborate with ICE: must be with a
warrant, he said.
Figure 5.6 Anti-Bias Task Force Meeting in Riverhead Town Hall, Suffolk County, NY (Long
Island). August 2015

On the left (with a light sweater) Maryann Slutsky (executive director of Long Island Wins), to her right (in black)
Catholic Bishop Emil Wcela (St. John the Evangelist R.C. Church) and to her left an unidentified woman (never
spoke or was introduced by anyone). Under the U.S. flag (from left to right) councilmembers James Wooten and
John Dunleavy. Supervisor Sean Walter, councilmembers George Gabrielsen and Jodi Giglio. In white Chief Police
David Hegermiller, and to his left Amol Sinha (from NYCLU) and then Daniela Guillen (Honduran DACA recipient
working for the nonprofit Pathstone).

The local Chief of Police and the Bishop spoke next. The Police Chief had the shortest
participation among the panelists, saying that in his department, “we follow the rules” and that
“immigration is up to the feds to take care of.” The third participant was the Bishop, who read a
manuscript about his immigrant heritage –I learned later that his parents were first generation
Poles in the area–. He said that on this matter “people of faith should speak.” The Bishop also
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clarified that the Catholic Church does not favor illegal immigration and is respectful of
sovereign states.
The most powerful speech at the ABTF meeting was given by Ms. Daniela Guillen, who
identified herself as a “Dreamer from Honduras” who works at a nonprofit that collaborates with
agricultural workers. She started her intervention by pointing out that she was speaking on behalf
of the immigrants and Latinos in Long Island. She explained how her family left everything they
had in Honduras: her father was a banker there and now worked in the fields of Long Island; they
brought her when she was a small girl.
Daniela also mentioned how her immigration status and the status of her parents affected
her life in different ways: explaining a feeling of frustration in high school, her struggles
adapting as an immigrant in school, and how more recently she got two jobs and put her dreams
on hold. She mentioned the fear of not seeing her parents one day because they could be
deported, and how simple things, such as work or driving, felt liberating and made her happy
when she obtained DACA.
During Daniela’s presentation she used sentences such as “I’m not a criminal,” “I’m
familiar with living in fear,” and “I’m a law-abiding citizen.” One of the council members asked
her about the location of the organization where she works, and if she graduated from Riverhead
high school, probably trying to make her look as an outsider to Riverhead. Daniela’s answer was:
“I graduated from Port Jefferson.” Councilmember Dunleavy said that he was impressed by her
good English, and then the Supervisor asked what exactly DACA was. That the Town Supervisor
did not know what DACA is, in a place with so many immigrants and especially undocumented
immigrant youth, deserves mention because it signals the distance between these public officials
and the foreign-born community they supposedly represent.
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“Nobody wants a subculture within us” and “we want immigrants to assimilate and have
better communication with the community,” were among the statements given by the supervisor
and the board towards the end of the meeting. Councilwoman Giglio also said that “they don’t
pay taxes” and gave some numbers about how children who don’t speak English represent a
burden to the school district.
The Supervisor finally reiterated what he had mentioned at other moments in the past,
something along the lines of “I don’t see the Latino/Hispanic community coming out, getting
involved.” After the moderator held up some index cards with questions or comments by the
audience, the supervisor replied to one of them that: “The term sanctuary city is a political
football (…) It came here for political means, so it blew up into this (…) the definition of a
sanctuary city is a welcoming city. We are going to raise up everything we do in this city. We
want this to be a sanctuary city.” The board mentioned that Latinos in the community and the
police department had a good relationship from their point of view, although only one police
officer on the force speaks Spanish. This meeting could be seen as a microcosm of a larger
public debate on contemporary immigration in the United States, in which each participant
represented different opinions or narratives (some uninformed and less empathic) within a place
or local ecosystem that was for the most part non-immigrant friendly.

CONCLUSION
Precarious socioeconomic immobility describes a situation in which immigrants are
neither upwardly nor downwardly mobile in terms of family household income and educational
prospects compared to the native-born majority in the receiving society and the initial economic
status of immigrants in the United States. It is a condition that often limits the socioeconomic
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prospects and well-being of younger and future immigrant generations in the United States. In
this chapter, I presented cases with variation in access to organizational support and with
dissimilar interactions with law enforcement agents, to show how local ecosystems matter. Even
in exclusionary or anti-immigrant localities, help from FBOs can be crucial to protect against bad
outcomes, high immigrant vulnerability, and “preventing” precarious immobility from becoming
downward mobility.
Four cases of families headed by LTU immigrants, two mothers and two fathers of U.S.born children, illustrate how different combinations of the seven key variables in the theoretical
model suggested in this dissertation resulted in precarious immobility with a high or low level of
vulnerability. Anastacia Barrios and Esteban Salcido had more educational attainment, strong or
moderate organizational activity, beneficial interactions with other public institutions around
them, and mostly positive encounters with the police in immigrant-friendly New York City.
Therefore, their precarious immobility takes place with less vulnerability, because of better
education and thanks to the community support they received from organizations and institutions
around them.
The higher immigrant vulnerability of Socorro Cortés was related to her moderate
organizational activity while living in immigrant-hostile Suffolk. Eduardo Naranjo, on the other
hand, lives in Queens, has low formal education and no CBO support. Hence, his immigrant
vulnerability is high because he lacks sustained or reliable access to information and networks
providing community support, and even his contact with Los Nómadas was weak. In short, these
four cases illustrate that community support across places matters in determining the
vulnerability of those experiencing precarious immobility, particularly considering interactions
with law enforcement agents (not so negative as in Long Island).
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Los Nómadas is not only a taco truck but a place offering informal support to the
immigrant community. Its workers, several customers and other people around Los Nómadas
catch up on recent news, including exchanging information about job openings in the area,
housing, social events, or commercial opportunities. It is a space of socialization for different
groups, where people are constantly exchanging all sorts of information. This food truck offers a
space of interactions like a CBO or FBO, but with less trustworthy information and without the
express goal of providing specific services to immigrants.
The chapter shows how one FBO in Suffolk and the taco truck in Queens can help
undocumented people in New York. In Long Island, the less immigrant-friendly environment
requires a lot of intervention by the FBO, because the police and surrounding community are
generally anti-immigrant. The organizational community support helps to prevent more problems
associated with undocumented status. The most obvious illustration of this in Suffolk was the ID
cards produced by FBOs in dialogue with some local police agencies. These cards and the FBO
intervention could reduce deportations and loss of vehicles, affecting family budgets. In the case
of the food truck and its social life in Queens, immigrants without substantial interactions with
formal CBOs might be able to sometimes find some good information, but not always. The
information and resources offered by Los Nómadas are not so helpful as the ones provided by
FBOs in Long Island, which is also considered a harder place to live as an undocumented person.
This chapter included evidence to examine the ‘precarious immobility’ of Mexican
immigrants in New York by paying attention to their immigration status, the climate of local
ecosystems towards immigrants, and to formal and informal forms of community support, one
provided by a Catholic FBO in Long Island and the other by a street vendor in Queens. I
identified what I call precarious immobility: a condition that limits the social integration
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prospects of undocumented immigrants as individuals and families, and which can be
experienced with higher or lower levels of vulnerability associated with a context that could be
welcoming or hostile towards the foreign-born.
Almost all the Mexican parents I interviewed placed a high value on education for their
children, however a majority had a hard time navigating a distinct and unfamiliar system, from
early childhood education to college. Even when these parents tell their children to do their best
(echarle ganas), the community support provided by CBOs or FBOs is crucial in continuing to
move forward in their educational prospects. These organizations could help parents like Jaime
Ruelas in the Bronx, who I met at a rally in Washington D.C. supporting DAPA. When I asked
him where he wanted his children to study, he immediately responded: Harvard. I kept asking
and realized that he did not know where that university was, he had only heard about it from a
movie a few days before we talked. The point here is that “echarle ganas” at school or at work is
clearly not enough when LTU immigrants experience organizational isolation, and this “ethic”
becomes more effective when undocumented immigrants and their families are linked to CBOs
or FBOs that can provide real community support, such as information and steps to go from preK to college, or about how to exercise their rights as laborers, tenants, students, parents, and
human beings.
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CHAPTER 6. LIMBOS OF LEARNERS & LABORERS: DEFERRED MOBILITY
The executive action for immigrant youth known as DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals) was announced by President Barack Obama on June 15, 2012. It is a policy allowing
some undocumented immigrants born after 1981, who meet very specific criteria, to receive a
renewable two-year period of deferred action or temporary relief from deportation. The program
does not ‘provide a path’ to citizenship for recipients, but they are eligible for work permits.
DACA helped mainly people born in Mexico, about 80% of more than 800,000 beneficiaries.
The DACA program was suspended for new applicants on September 5, 2017 by the Trump
administration, putting the nearly one million people who had already applied at risk of
deportation. As of early 2020, the future of DACA has been in the hands of the United States
Supreme Court.
DACA recipients experience “deferred mobility” in New York. This is a type of
precarious immobility for family households with DACA relatives, where the sudden granting of
partial status opens educational and work opportunities that they previously lacked. In a sense, it
helps them to get out of a socioeconomic limbo. Deferred mobility happens when DACA
recipients improve their mobility prospects because they can obtain better paid jobs and further
their educational opportunities (i.e. loans, credit, funding, or scholarships). I argue that, in
addition to DACA status, being in an immigrant-friendly vs. anti-immigrant place (New York
City vs. Long Island) reduces vulnerability. More positive interactions with the police and
stronger links with FBOs and CBOs also reduce vulnerability, while immigrants on the opposite
end of these factors experience increased vulnerability.111 Below I analyze the cases of Aranza
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As explained earlier in Chapter 5, vulnerability for undocumented immigrants is defined here by significant
hardships causing harm or suffering directly and individually or indirectly and collectively. The key elements of
interests for this concept in this dissertation are the following: risk of detention and deportation, forced family
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Olalde in the South Bronx and Marco Ramírez in Eastern Suffolk. These cases illustrate how
their DACA status, as well as differing attitudes toward immigrants in the local ecosystem,
organizational support, and interactions with police, cause them to experience higher or lower
vulnerability.
Aranza Olalde and Marco Ramírez were born around the same year and have a few
memories of Mexico. Once they were brought by their parents to the United States, Marco has
lived only in Suffolk and Aranza in the Bronx. In 2019, they were both still living with their
undocumented parents, younger siblings born in the United States and extended family members,
some born in the U.S. and others born in Mexico. Their families reported a similar level of
family household income: between $34,000 and $36,000 per year, which is lower compared to
the “exceptional cases of upward mobility” explained earlier (see Chapter 4).
As a dedicated and very motivated student, Aranza has been receiving support from
CBOs and FBOs in the city for a long time; however, she lives with many relatives in an
overcrowded apartment located in a rough neighborhood. Marco, in contrast, is a mediocre and
discouraged student with very weak ties to only one FBO not far from his home, an ample
basement space in a quiet suburban area. Marco has worked more jobs and more hours than
Aranza, starting without supervision at an early age. Aranza’s parents made her work less when
her grades slipped, while in Marco’s case, the family pushed him to gain extra cash and take on
more responsibilities by looking after a younger half-brother at home.
Once they were granted DACA, Marco was planning on getting a driver’s license and
was seriously considering joining the police or the army, while Aranza was looking for driving
classes, a part-time job close to home, and scholarships for college. He lives in a hostile
separation, loss of job, housing, income or other properties due to violent attitudes or actions by private or law
enforcement agents.
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ecosystem for minorities, while Aranza does not. Marco and his family inhabit a limbo of
laborers with more vulnerability, while Aranza and her family inhabit a limbo of learners who
are less vulnerable. They inhabit a kind of limbo (see Gonzales, 2015), because the mobility they
might have otherwise experienced was denied to them by their lack of legal status. It was then
partly enabled when they received DACA. Yet DACA still cannot insulate Marco from the
effects of the anti-immigrant place where he and his family live. Aranza, on the other hand,
living in an immigrant-friendly place and relying on multiple links to FBOs and CBOs, aspires to
graduate from college and is seeking financial support offered to DACA recipients. The new
status changed her life and future prospects far more than it did for Marco.
This chapter is divided into three sections that contribute to my central argument: more
CBO or FBO support and less negative interactions with police foster mobility for DACA
recipients in the Bronx, while those on Eastern Long Island are closer to immobility due to
intense police scrutiny, even with minimum help from an FBO. In the first section, the two
socioeconomic “limbos” for both learners and laborers are delineated into four groups:
immigrant family households with DACA recipients in the Bronx and Long Island, like Aranza
and Marco, and family households headed by long-term undocumented (LTU) immigrants in
these same locations. I contrast these groups because it illustrates how the outcomes for DACA
recipient families improve compared to LTUs who do not have DACA recipients, thus
illustrating deferred mobility, meaning their upward mobility is put off for a later time (or they
experience limited mobility when DACAmented), but they are not experiencing downward
mobility.
The second and third sections are focused on the first two groups, looking in more depth
at the cases of familias Olalde (for Aranza) and Ramírez (for Marco), plus a few other families,
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in order to show how DACA matters when looking at upward mobility in these two opposite
urban spaces. Immigrant friendly-New York City supports DACA recipients more than Long
Island (more hostile to minorities), particularly when immigrant youth and their immediate
relatives have strong, solid, and constant interactions with CBOs or FBOs, as well as less
negative or infrequent contacts with the police.
6.1 SOCIOECONOMIC LIMBOS
Family household income of long term undocumented (LTUs) and DACA-recipient
immigrants was shown to be critically affected by immigration status and place in this study.
One striking finding was how much income increased for families with a DACA recipient
compared to those without. As shown in Figure 6.1, there is a positive relationship between
family household income and years of formal education for heads of household who got DACA
compared to those who did not.
There is a $9,000 difference in median household income reported by these heads of
Mexican families compared to those who were not DACA recipients. The difference in years of
education between the two groups is close to 2 years (about 1.8). Figure 6.1 only shows data
considering the status of the head of the household (11 DACAmented cases), but if we consider
those family households with at least one DACA recipient (i.e. an adult or minor, head of the
household or not: 18 cases), the difference remains but is lower ($7,900). 112
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I do not compare the incomes of families in the Bronx and Queens versus those on Long Island here to show
outcomes, because the factors might show cross purposes (see various tables and figures in appendix). Those from
the Bronx had lower levels of income but more education, while those in Long Island had higher income but less
formal education compared to participants in the Bronx. Furthermore, two other pieces of information about the
main respondents could explain different trajectories in labor market participation, overall settlement process and
income gaps: age and years living in the United States. Participants in Queens were older (38 years) and had
generally lived longer in the U.S. (16.5 years) compared to those in the Bronx (age 31, 15.8 years) and Long Island
(age 32, 14.7 years). Additionally, most of the participants in Long Island (except one out of 23) reported active
participation in CBOs. Despite less organizational activity or membership organizations, Mexican immigrant
families in Queens seemed more settled, older and with more time living in New York. The lower income in the
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Figure 6.1 Years of formal education and annual family household income by immigration status
for Mexican families in New York (DACA recipients and undocumented immigrants), 2015-2017

I argue that place matters by designating these spaces of denied legal status a ‘limbo of
learners’ in New York City, and a ‘limbo of laborers’ in Suffolk County, because of the
differences in how location led to better outcomes for DACA recipients in the Bronx compared
to Long Island. Two groups of cases are presented in Table 6.1, showcasing deferred mobility
with low vs. high vulnerability. Levels of vulnerability were related to the place or local
ecosystem where each family lived, and how undocumented immigrants and their relatives might
deal with hardships causing harm or suffering resulting from detention, deportation, family
separation and loss of properties in those localities. There are two main outcomes for family
household income (from medium and low to very low), educational planning (more or less) and

Bronx therefore does not hold much weight because people on Long Island might have better paid jobs and higher
expenses (i.e. more expensive rents).
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immigrant vulnerability (high or low). These two outcomes represent two different types of
mobility with lower or higher vulnerability: as learners (in the Bronx) or as laborers (in Suffolk).
Table 6.1 shows that there are two main differences across the seven variables and
connected to the two different outcomes. First, and more importantly, participants in the Bronx
reported positive or mostly positive interactions with police, while in Long Island these were
negative or mostly negative. Second, the organizational support in the city is mostly positive,
while in the suburbs it was mixed.
Table 6.1 Four groups of cases of ‘deferred mobility’ for Mexican families in New York, 2015-2017
Factors →
Groups &
↓ Familias
Bronxican
DACAs:

Familia Olalde,
Familia Loredo
Familia Vélez
Familia Lara*

MXIslander
DACAs:

(i) Papers, or
immigration
status effect?
(parent & child)

(ii)
Org.

(iii)
Police

(iv)
Educ.

+–

++

++

+–

DACA recipients in
household, children,
or adult

+–

Fam. Ramírez
Fam. Morales R.
Fam. Morones R.

DACA recipients in
household, adultheads, or children

Places or
ecosystems

(v)
Skill?

(vi) Social
networks:
strongreliable?

(vii) Intra-family:
Partneringparenting
decisions?

––

––

––

Human
Capital

Outcome
Limbo of
learners:
Deferred
mobility w/low
vulnerability,

low or very low
income; more likely
to have educational
planning

+–

––

+–

Acronyms:
LTU: Long-term undocumented person.
USC: U.S. citizen.
DACA: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival Recipient.
Org.: Organizational activity in CBOs or FBOs.
Police refers to interactions with police or law enforcement agents.
Educ.: Educational attainment.

––

––

––

Limbo of
laborers:
Deferred
mobility if
DACA w/high
vulnerability,

medium or low
income; somewhat
likely to have
educational planning
Note: Symbols in cells should be interpreted as follows:
– – negative or mostly negative
+ – moderate or mixed
+ + positive or mostly positive.
*Rolando Lara was applying for DACA at time of last contact.

The first group of cases includes family households in the Bronx with DACA recipients,
active participation in immigrant serving CBOs, household heads with slightly above average
education (9.7 years), and modest median income (approx. $46,000). Aranza Olalde and her
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family are part of this group. The second group of cases correspond to families living in Long
Island who are headed by or have DACA recipients. Marco Ramírez is part of this group, not as
a head of household but as an adult DACA recipient. The most relevant difference between the
two groups, in fact, has to do with the local ecosystem, because in NYC the CBO or FBO
activity-support and interactions with police-law enforcements agents are, in general terms,
positive or very positive, while the opposite was true in the Long Island suburbs. The key
difference here is: immigrant-friendly vs. immigrant-hostile places.
The DACA recipients and LTU immigrant groups in the Bronx, I argue, experience less
immigrant vulnerability than the groups in Suffolk precisely because of the role of place. Cases
in the Bronx had low or very low income but were more likely to have educational planning. To
a certain extent, this might be the result of active organizational support around education,
promoting greater deferred mobility in the Bronx than in Suffolk. In addition, interactions with
the police in the city were unlikely to be very negative or to result in deportation. For these
immigrants in the Bronx, due to higher education and strong CBO ties, I suggest that these
families inhabited a ‘limbo of learners’ as DACAmented or undocumented immigrants with
more education and virtuous community support provided by public institutions or non-profit
organizations around them. The DACAmented among the ‘suburban believers‘ of Long Island,
generally with good but limited support from a Catholic FBO in a less welcoming ecosystem for
minorities and with lower education, inhabit a ‘limbo of laborers’ with higher vulnerability that
resulted in an increased likelihood for detentions or deportation, plus fewer educational
opportunities for this community of immigrants in the suburbs.
To provide more context, family income, educational planning and organizational
participation were examined across places and keeping in mind immigration status. Only two out
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of the eleven DACA recipients heading family households did not report active participation in
CBOs or FBOs. The estimated median income for these eleven cases was almost $10,000 higher
than the undocumented heads across the board, meaning they are more upwardly mobile. Table
6.2 demonstrates this and other notable differences in income by immigration status, educational
planning, CBO participation and by specific county. In the following sections, the cases of
families in the Bronx and Suffolk are presented, bearing in mind how their immigration status,
location and organizational experiences explain their limbos of immobility or deferred mobility
with the corresponding low or high immigrant vulnerability.
Table 6.2 Median family household income, educational planning, and organizational participation
by immigration status and county, among Mexican family heads in New York, 2015-2017
FHI

DACA
Undocumented

$44,500 (11 cases)
$35,180 (42 cases)

DACA
Undocumented
All
Undocumented only:

$44,500 (9 cases)
$35,360 (29 cases)
$35,430 (38 cases)

FHI
No educ. planning
Some planning
Consistent planning

Yes, org. participation

Bronx

$33,800 (11 cases)
0 (no cases)
$31,250 (10 cases)
$33,800 (1 case)

No educ. planning

4 cases
15 cases

No org. participation

$64,800 (2 cases)
$35,000 (13 cases)
$39,000 (15 cases)
Queens

$35,000 (13 cases)
$33,100 (6 cases)
$35,100 (6 cases)
$87,000 (1 case)

Some planning

5 cases
23 cases

NYC

$58,800 (6 cases)
$34,400 (24 cases)
$35,000 (30 cases)
Suffolk

$37,100 (18 cases)
$32,500 (9 cases)
$38,500 (7 cases)
$52,500 (2 cases)

Consistent planning

2 cases
4 cases

Long Island

$41,600 (5 cases)
$37,100 (18 cases)
$37,400 (23 cases)
All (undocumented only)

$35,180 (42 cases)
$32,500 (15 cases)
$36,800 (23 cases)
$52,900 (4 cases)

6.2 BRONXICAN DACA RECIPIENTS: LIMBO OF LEARNERS
“DACA, it’s an opportunity for young students who want a future,” said Alba, the
undocumented mother of Aranza Olalde, a DACA recipient, while we talked in her kitchen. 113
Familia Olalde was one of half a dozen cases in the Bronx of which at least one member of the
family household was a DACA recipient (see Table 6.3, panel A). All these ‘DACAmented’
families in the Bronx had positive and very active participation in non-profit organizations (CBO
113

I interviewed Alba (LTU mother) and Aranza (DACA daughter) around the same time as the Olalde family
household. Alba barely missed the requirements to apply for DACA (she was slightly older, born before 1981, also
arriving in the U.S. when she was over 16 years of age). Alba was the first in their home to hear about the policy,
basically convincing Aranza and leading the process of application.

195

or FBOs) and got help on educational issues. These families in the Bronx inhabit a less harmful
limbo, a ‘limbo of learners’ so to speak, due to comparatively higher educational attainment and
more community support, especially on educational issues, that they access via multiple CBOs
around them (despite lower incomes).
Table 6.3 Two groups of Mexican families with low vulnerability in the Bronx, 2015 2017
Panel A: Bronxican DACAs (or Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals recipients born in Mexico)
Family
Status heads
CBOs
Ed. Heads
Intra family dynamics
FHI
2.Fairly present, unbalanced
Hernán-Ley
DACA
Yes
12
$20,480
2.Fairly present, unbalanced
Lara*
Undocumented
Yes
9
$21,840
2.Fairly present, unbalanced
Vélez
DACA
Yes
8
$22,000
1.Consistent, active, positive
Olalde
Undocumented
Yes
10
$33,800
2.Fairly present, unbalanced
Loredo
DACA
Yes
11
$57,600
3.Inconsistent, inactive, none
Zamudio
DACA
Yes
9
$60,000
3.Inconsistent, inactive, none
Hernán
Undocumented
Yes
8
$118,000

Ed.Pl.
Some
Some
Some
Yes
Some
No
No

Panel B: Bronxican LTUs (or long-term undocumented immigrants born in Mexico)
Family
Status heads
CBOs
Ed. Heads
Intra family dynamics
FHI
Ed.Pl.
2.Fairly present, unbalanced
Dávalos
Undocumented
Yes
10
$21,000 Some
2.Fairly present, unbalanced
Fernández
Undocumented
Yes
9
$21,000 Some
2.Fairly present, unbalanced
De Jesús
Undocumented
Yes
10
$26,000 Some
2.Fairly present, unbalanced
Guillén
Undocumented
Yes
6
$27,500 Some
2.Fairly present, unbalanced
Barrios
Undocumented
Yes
12
$35,000 Some
3.Inconsistent, inactive, none
Martínez
Undocumented
Yes
12
$35,360 Some
2.Fairly present, unbalanced
Ruelas
Undocumented
Yes
7
$39,000 Some
1.Consistent, active, positive
Garza
Undocumented
Yes
9
$52.000 Some
*Note: Rolando Lara was applying for DACA at time of last contact.

Families headed by LTU immigrants and DACAmented relatives in the Bronx had a
similar level of education but differed on family household income, which was slightly higher
for families with DACA recipients. This indicates that DACA offered upward mobility through
access to better or higher paid jobs that provide more resources for the family household.
Furthermore, families with DACA recipients were usually less afraid of detention and
deportation because they were ‘following the rules’ and taking an ‘opportunity’ that the U.S.
government was offering them. It was interesting that some DACAmented families in NYC told
me they were ‘part of the DREAMers’ or ‘soñadores’ (dreamers in Spanish), rather than ‘DACA
recipients’ or having applied for deferred action. In the limbo of learners, DACA recipients were
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not only earning more and finding more stable jobs, they were buying cars, dreaming about
getting credit for a house, planning on visiting relatives in Mexico, and expanding their
education.
Familia Olalde: Support before college
The Olalde family seemed to be seeking, collectively, a way out of their ‘limbo of
learners’ by advancing the educational opportunities of Aranza, their oldest child, an exemplary
student who received DACA and aspires to go to college; an older sister who helps her smaller
siblings with their homework, and who occasionally works and contributes economically to the
household expenses.
When I asked Aranza’s mother how being undocumented affected her life and her family
she responded: “the doors are closed without papers.” 114 Her voice broke while she told me the
story of how her immigration status prevented her from visiting her mother when she was sick
and eventually died. This was a frequent answer to the same question I asked across sites in New
York City and Long Island. That is why Alba tells Aranza to “take advantage [of DACA] before
Trump kicks me out.” Like other Mexican parents experiencing precarious immobility presented
earlier in this dissertation (see Chapter 5), Alba used the expression ‘echarle ganas,’ and told her
older child to “give it your all (…) I don’t want you to ‘rest on your laurels’” 115. Unlike the cases
of Anastacia Barrios or Esteban Salcido in the previous chapter, in the Olalde family there were

114

Between 2017 and 2018 I conducted three formal interviews (audio recorded) with Aranza and Alba Olalde in
their home. In one of them I was joined by Averi Giudicessi as part of the MIDA project. During 2018 and 2019 we
talked informally several times via phone calls and text messages.
115
“Yo le digo que le eche ganas (…) no quiero que te duermas en tus laureles.” Recent studies and discussion
about social inequality in Mexico have analyzed discourses by elites, and the public in general, on meritocracy and
its relationship with what is colloquially known as “echaleganismo”. That is, there is a prevalent idea among
Mexicans that ‘no matter what, you should echarle ganas’ to overcome obstacles, including poverty, thus ignoring
the role of structural and institutional factors creating, promoting or preserving socioeconomic inequalities.
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clear examples of strong and consistent educational planning supported by CBOs they had
sought out. 116
Alba Olalde is a full-time mother of six, a devoted homemaker with work experience
outside the household as well, and a ‘buena mujer’ who does not qualify for any type of
immigration relief. Her husband and father of all her children, Jesús Javier, is in the same
situation. They only crossed the border once, when Aranza was less than 5 years old. Aranza
does not remember crossing the border and says her first memory in the United States was in a
Head Start program. In 2017, the other Olalde kids, all born in New York, were 13, 11, 7, 5, and
2 years old. They all live in a three-bedroom apartment in the Bronx, sharing one living room
with an uncle who is also an undocumented worker. The uncle is a baker who contributes a third
of their rent ($617 out of $1,850) plus $50 per week for food that Alba buys and prepares for
everyone in the household. Unlike her mother, Aranza is now a DACA recipient who is moving
her educational aspirations forward with the support of her family.
I was able to meet Alba and Jesús Javier through a CBO in the Bronx that helps Aranza
with her homework and other schoolwork in the summer. Jesús Javier did not participate in any
interviews because he was working most of the time. Even for Alba, it was rather difficult to
make some time in the mornings to talk because she was busy with domestic chores. On one
occasion, while I waited outside their building to ‘buzz me in’, I saw Alba and two children
coming from the laundromat and helped them to move four large laundry bags and baskets, along
with their folding shopping cart, through four floors in their pre-war building (or ‘walkup
building’ i.e. no elevator).

116

In Chapter 4, I defined educational planning ‘a process of preparation, application or exercising of verbal plans
and actions to advance the education of adults and children within the immigrant family household beyond high
school and college graduation.’ I was able to detect this by doing interviews, asking questions, and observations.
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“She knows she is not born here,” 117 is how Alba explained to her daughter that she is not
a U.S. citizen and needs to work extra hard to get good grades to help her get into college. I saw
how Alba, in front of Aranza, expressed the importance of education by saying that she needs to
“strive to 200% (...) more for not being born here.” 118 An already exemplary student, Aranza was
getting excellent grades before and during high school. She decided to attend a CUNY college in
2018. After we first met, they continued to ask me about scholarships, available funding and
other organizations or institutions that support DACA students in low-income families. They
were already aware of most of the options I gave them and mentioned others that I had not heard
of. In 2019 Aranza began attending CUNY, a key outcome that might not have happened without
DACA and the CBO support she sought and received in the Bronx and other places in NYC.
Alongside the fact that CBOs in NYC helped Aranza to change her status by getting
DACA, inherently improving her and her family’s prospects, I want to briefly point out the role
of her mother in this case. In the case of Marco Ramírez, a DACA recipient in Suffolk who was
about the same age as Aranza, his mother was not able to do much during the DACA application
process, being considerably more passive and less informed (she was indeed working more hours
outside the household). Unlike Aranza, Marco had very little to no encouragement or assistance
from his parents while applying for DACA, one consequence of this was that he forgot to renew
on time once. This never happened to Aranza because her mother was aware of the calendar and
in constant communication with the CBOs that supported them.
Alba helped her oldest daughter to apply for DACA from beginning to end. They were
told that Aranza might be eligible for that program at a CBO in the Bronx. At first, they were not
interested in applying for DACA because they were not really aware of how that could change
117
118

“Ella sabe que no es nacida aquí.”
“Esforzarte al 200% (…) más por no haber nacido aquí.”
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their lives, but after a while they saw there was value in having a social security number. The
CBO explained the policy in more detail and later helped them to apply. Before becoming a
DACA recipient, Aranza and her family learned about the program because she participated in a
‘science summer camp’ offered by a CBO in the city. In 2018, both mother and daughter told me
they were looking for information on scholarships and DACA renewals, and they already had in
mind asking for support at a local legal service center, a non-profit in Washington, and through
other contacts they have from their church. Without DACA, Aranza would not have been able to
look for or get specific financial support targeting DACA recipients. For this type of DACA
recipient, more CBO support in an immigrant-friendly place promotes deferred mobility, a type
of mobility for undocumented immigrant youth who are focused on education.
Aranza and her mother also expressed desires to travel outside the city and advance their
education as a family. They told me about engaging with other local CBOs in the Bronx,
Manhattan, Brooklyn or Queens, but ideally in their own neighborhood, although both mother
and daughter considered it to be dangerous. 119 In early 2017, Aranza already had plans to go to
college in the city. She attended a middle school in Manhattan that focused on mathematics and
sciences. The educational planning in the case of familia Olalde is noteworthy compared to other
families I interviewed, because Aranza and her parents have been thinking about and actively
searching for help and opportunities to go to college, despite limited financial resources. These
practices that enhanced their educational planning, were key in finding a CBO that made them
aware of DACA, helping them to apply to this policy, and helping to prepare and apply for
college.
119

Alba and Aranza expressed concern about the safety of where they live in the Bronx, saying that there is more
violence in the summer and that this is a neighborhood where people get shot. In recent years, the Mexican consulate
has been collaborating closely with the NYPD in community events to show a ‘friendlier’ image. The NYPD went
from having “20-30 Hispanics in a police force of 20,000” in 1954 (according to the NYPD Hispanic Society) to
about 28% Hispanic officers in 2019 (information available on July 2020 at https://www.nypdhs.com/about).
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Familia Olalde is extremely religious, entrepreneurial, as well as friendly and easy going
with neighbors and relatives. The Olalde family feels a strong sense of community with their
church in the Bronx. Alba often speaks about how much their congregation (Evangelical) has
helped them, but she also mentions that they give a significant amount of their monthly income
to their church. Their pastor, also Mexican, has helped them a lot when they need transportation,
or with filling out paperwork or learning about programs and opportunities in the city.
Like other families I followed headed by LTU immigrants, Aranza, her mom and the rest
of her relatives faced serious challenges accessing social services, such as medical attention, due
to their low family household income and unauthorized immigration status. At times they relied
on other more immediate networks of support, such as neighbors. One-time Alba had a serious
injury (she said a foot fracture) from an awkward step or tripping while carrying heavy bags on
their building stairs. Due to lack of insurance she waited three days to see a doctor. Relatives
living in the same building helped with the children during those days and she used home
remedies. Alba also told me a story about how one of her children became very sick and needed
medication. The medication was $800, and the family could not afford it, so the Mexican
pharmacist in the neighborhood gave them the medication for free.
Alba emphasized to Aranza and her younger siblings the importance of education in
order to avoid badly paid ‘immigrant jobs’ such as the ones she has had. Alba first worked
cleaning houses in Brooklyn, but only for a month and half, getting paid $150 for 3 days per
week from 9am to 7pm. Then she worked at a food truck in the Bronx, 7 days a week and
making somewhere between $200 and $220 per week from 10am to 6pm. She was working there
with her partner, and after getting what she thinks was an unfair ticket, she started to distrust the
NYPD. Her most stable employment was in a bakery. Alba did that for two years, from 2pm to
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8pm on weekdays, and from 6am to 8pm Saturday and Sunday. She was paid $8.75 per hour.
Alba worked for a few days at a fish market, but she quit after a serious allergy from exposure to
seafood sent her to the hospital. Back in Morelos, Mexico, Alba’s dad was a truck driver before
disappearing from the family for more than three years, while her mom was in the food
preparation business. Familia Olalde opened small businesses in Mexico while being in the
United States, including a butchery, but those attempts ultimately failed. 120 These stories were
shared with me by Alba when Aranza was also present, and perhaps functioned as incentives for
all her children to keep studying in order to avoid these types of jobs.
Looking at their cramped kitchen and refrigerator, Alba looked me in the eyes and said:
“If I had a ‘social’ [security number] I would not be living here”. Alba’s aspirations at this time
(in early 2017) were to have a car for the family –to move more freely with Aranza and her other
children– and to own a tortillería in the United States, preferably in the Bronx.
Between 2018 and 2019 they shared with me good and bad news. They were finally able
to get a car for the family, but they were still afraid of Trump administration policies. Jesús
Javier, the father, was getting fewer work hours (in construction) and Alba was looking for more
options to get some money for the family, such as informally selling home-made Mexican food
to relatives, neighbors, and friends. Aranza was still attending college, but seriously considering
a part-time job to help her parents with family expenses. The Olalde family seemed to be
seeking, collectively, a way out of their socioeconomic limbo by advancing the educational
opportunities of Aranza. In sum, familia Olalde is a case of precarious immobility situated in a
‘limbo of learners’ with solid community support from multiple CBOs, some neighbors and their
church. Despite the undocumented status of the parents, their oldest DACA-status child is
They were able to open businesses in Mexico while living in New York because their relatives were in charge
and managed their money.
120
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moving ahead in college. Of course, further educational plans and aspirations depend on her
keeping DACA, a program under attack by the Trump administration.
DACA parents & CBOs
Aranza Olalde’s application for DACA was easier and more straightforward than for
parents in the Loredo, Vélez and Lara families because Aranza was younger, still attending
school, living with her nuclear family in the same apartment for a number of years, and did not
have children or face any extraordinary challenge (i.e. errors in birth certificate or personal
paperwork). 121 Martha Loredo, Alma Vélez and Rolando Lara, unlike Aranza, had children
before applying for DACA, but like her they counted on organizational support from at least one
local CBO or FBO. These families also fit the profile of precarious immobility residing in a
‘limbo of learners’ with community support by multiple local organizations. 122 It is relevant to
explain that their DACA cases were harder because without CBO support, they might have not
been able to apply, might have been discouraged sorting out the requirements, or might have
received incomplete or expensive advice about the application process. Furthermore, these three
families headed by DACA recipients are examples of cases who received help from CBOs in
NYC to change their legal status, improving their socioeconomic prospects in an immigrantfriendly area where they experience less vulnerability.
Families in the Bronx generally received substantial organizational support on
educational issues from one or more CBOs around them. Other low-income and undocumented
immigrants I interviewed, including Mixteco-speakers across sites, were more isolated in Long
Island compared to the city. The support provided to those in Long Island, by only one FBO in
121

Karen Reyes, Maria Xique and Angelo Cabrera participated in interviews and follow up with some of these
cases.
122
Rolando was included and coded as undocumented because at the time of our last contact he was still in the
process of getting his DACA approval, he had an appointment notice for biometrics.
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Eastern Suffolk, was noticeably limited. The effective and constant community support provided
by CBOs in the Bronx allowed people like Martha, Alma and Rolando to apply for DACA
despite initially lacking all or some of the requirements, such as proof of entry or more concrete
educational documentation because they did not attend school in the United States (see de
Graauw et al., 2013 on “suburban free riding”).
These DACA parents needed different and specific forms of aid to understand and
complete their applications. Martha not only faced educational challenges to apply for DACA,
but also in preparing her documents and sorting out all the paperwork. Alma, in contrast, did not
face these issues because she had many receipts and printed evidence dating back to when she
arrived in the United States. In 2017, Alma was 35 years old and had been living in the United
States for 22 years, but she always kept evidence in paper of her life in New York. That was not
the case for Martha. Before getting support from one CBO, she was already fully aware of what
DACA was, and different organizations had tried to help her sort through the paperwork. But
some organizations never called her back, she did not have their contact information and she said
her working hours were an obstacle. CBOs in the Bronx helped DACA applicants having a hard
time trying to gather paper evidence by following up with them throughout the process,
providing orientation, and sorting out the chaotic paperwork that some applicants have. 123
Familia Loredo: More study, paid vacations
Martha Loredo obtained DACA thanks to a CBO in the Bronx that she had relied on for a
number of years. Her partner who was the same age also applied for DACA, and they both
finished 11th grade. Except for her two children born in the Bronx, Martha Loredo and the rest
of her extended family members (adults) were born in Puebla, and most of them were also

123

I intentionally did not want to specify which CBOs in the Bronx were more ‘effective’ than others.
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undocumented. Her partner worked in a restaurant, in the kitchen, and she was in charge of
cleaning a beauty salon. She left school because of her firstborn: “I was going to try, but I did not
want to go to school pregnant”. Despite that, by learning English and getting a GED she would
like to teach her children that by studying you can achieve many things. “One of them likes art
very much and the other is in acting classes; we tell them a little bit about life, about the work
that their dad and I are doing so they don’t have to work so hard,” she said about her children.
Before getting help for her DACA application, Martha was already connected with this CBO in
the city that assisted with her personal and family educational plans. While it might be too late
for her to go to college, according to her story and plans, it certainly is not for her children.
Getting DACA changed the household income for the Loredo family. In 2015, Martha
and her partner were making approximately $40,000, but by January 2017 (by adding the
contribution of her mother in law, living with them) they were making $12,000 more. Their rent
for a three-bedroom apartment was $1,600 monthly. By 2018, with DACA, her job situation
improved, and her salary was raised from $10 to $13 per hour. She was also working less and
getting some benefits that she did not have before, like sick days and paid vacations: “I had that
[those free days, before DACA], but they did not pay me.” Her husband was taking driving
classes in order to get a license. She also finally got health insurance and is still planning to get a
GED with the support of the CBOs in her neighborhood. The same CBO that helped her to get
DACA is following up and supporting them with the renewal process. Even when these older
DACA recipients are not going to college, they are working and aspiring towards educational
goals for their two U.S.-born children with the help of trusted CBOs.
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Familia Vélez: ‘Una buena ciudadana’
Familia Vélez represents the case of a family with a very low family income, many
children, and solid support from CBOs in the city. Alma Vélez is a mother and DACA recipient
that overcame the challenges of the educational requirement (for the application) with the help of
CBOs. She was born in the state of Guerrero in 1984. In 2017, Alma and her partner (three years
older, also from Guerrero and undocumented) had five children, ages 15, 9, 7, 5, and one under a
year old. Before she applied for DACA, the Vélez family was making around $18,200, while in
2017 they reported approximately $22,000. Most of their money went to the rent of their twobedroom apartment, which cost $1,300 per month. Alma’s partner works in a restaurant, off the
books (or “de libre”) while she, before getting pregnant, was working two days per week
cleaning apartments for $160 while their children were at school (from 8am to 4pm). Without the
help provided by trusted CBOs, it was very unlikely that someone like Alma, who seemed
DACA eligible but lacked economic resources or reliable information, would have applied.
Alma was among a group of MIDA participants who “heard about DACA, but did not
believe she was eligible” because she “did not trust” in the program: “When Obama announced
DACA I did not trust that much because I said (to myself) I will give all my information and
they will deport me, I’m a good citizen (soy una buena ciudadana)” she said. Even if a free loan
was available to her at the time, she was not interested in getting it, probably because Alma did
not seem to fully understand what ‘a deferred action’ was all about and if she was eligible in
2015. Alma, who finished “tercero de secundaria” (9th grade, a year more than her partner), has
been an active member of one CBO in the Bronx for over six years, which is the same
organization that helped her to get DACA and sort out the educational requirements for
application. She has taken English classes with that same organization for over a year. CBOs like
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this one, focused on education and immigrant rights, are crucial for people like Alma and her
family to improve their economic and educational prospects as undocumented parents with U.S.born children.
If Alma Vélez could change her status and “get papers” (meaning more than DACA, like
a green card) she would like to become a nurse. In Mexico she wanted to be a teacher because
her father was one. She often tells her children “to study so they can earn good money, so they
won’t suffer in the future (…) I tell them I don’t have papers, and they say ‘don’t worry, as long
as you are with us, taking care of us’ (…) I help with their homework, and they tell me how
school was.” Since she arrived in New York, Alma has only worked cleaning houses, and her
first job could be considered what Sara Angel Guerrero-Rippberger (2017) has called
“internada” or “encerrada”, referring to young immigrant women working full time (usually in
houses of Orthodox Jewish families, 70 or 80 hours per week for approximately $200 –less than
$3 per hour–under exploitable conditions). Alma remembers that in the house she worked “they
only gave me a tuna sandwich during the day and if I took an apple from the fridge they said
‘No, you have to tell us what are you going to eat’ but I am a person and I want to eat something
else.” She said this job “felt like a sacrifice” in order to pay a debt that her parents had in
Mexico. With DACA and the support she gets in NYC from a CBO, far from resigning to work
as an encerrada, Alma aspires to become a health professional, and continually motives her
children to keep studying in order to avoid her work trajectory.
Familia Lara: Soñando mi restaurante
Lower immigrant vulnerability for DACA recipients and LTU immigrants in the Bronx is
the result of less consequential interaction with police agents in terms of detention and
deportation. Rolando Lara, like Alma Vélez and other people interviewed in the Bronx, distrusts
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the police after some personal experiences but, overall, the interactions they had are not negative
or did not end in a serious conflict that could lead to deportation. Alma was assaulted on the
street once; her purse was stolen and she reported it to the police, but they never followed up on
her case. When the Vélez family lived in Manhattan around 2004, they found that someone had
entered their apartment and robbed them. Rolando, on the other hand, was mugged twice. One
time it was by four people. He reported the incident to the police, but they did not investigate.
Despite those experiences, Alma and Rolando still considered Manhattan and the Bronx to be
safe places. In the five boroughs, compared to suburban areas such as Long Island,
undocumented immigrants generally report feeling safer and less fearful when interacting with
law enforcements agents.
Rolando Lara applied for DACA because there were CBOs near his home and work that
provided free information and aid with the process. He was born in 1988 in the state of Guerrero,
and since he crossed the border has always lived in the Bronx. When he applied for DACA in
September 2015, he had two U.S. born children, ages 4 and 2. The family household income
reported by Rolando Lara was among the lowest of my participants, even though Rolando is a
full-time worker. Before applying to DACA, he was making around $19,760 and two years later
while waiting for his DACA status approval, he began making $21,840 as a cook. He remembers
starting as a dishwasher and delivery boy for $5 per hour plus tips, making $220 per week. If he
could change his immigration status, Rolando would like to become a chef and open his own
restaurant, and he believes that getting DACA might be helpful to open a small family business
in the neighborhood.
Rolando was living with his partner who was two years younger, from the state of
Morelos, also undocumented but not applying for DACA. They were living with their two kids
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and one cousin, who was giving them $500 each month to pay the $1,600 for a three-bedroom
apartment that they have been leasing since 2011. Because they lacked documents, Rolando was
asked to put down $5,000 as a deposit. Their oldest child wants to be a doctor, and when I asked
Rolando about their educational expectations as a parent he replied: “they will have a better
future as American citizens”. Rolando, with 28 years old in 2017, lived half of his life in Mexico,
where he finished “segundo de secundaria” (8th grade), and half in the United States, where he
did not formally attended school but has been taking English classes and preparing for the GED
while he waits for his DACA approval. He is taking these courses thanks to the CBOs around
him.
Rolando Lara, like Alma Vélez and Martha Loredo, occupies a limbo of learners in the
Bronx, in which getting DACA turns out to be a crucial element to explain their ‘deferred
mobility’ under lower vulnerability compared to other DACA recipients in less immigrantfriendly spaces. The main point here is not only that all these DACA parents experience deferred
mobility, but that CBOs were crucial in helping them to obtain DACA. Even when these parents
are not going to college, they not only aspire towards getting more years of formal education or
degrees, but also towards the preparation of their children for college, oftentimes with the help of
trusted CBOs.
6.3 MEXICAN DACA RECIPIENTS IN SUFFOLK: LIMBO OF LABORERS
How is the limbo of learners different to the limbo of laborers? In the former, DACA
recipients usually do not have negative or catastrophic interactions with the police in NYC due to
their immigration status. These DACAmented people tend to be more focused on how to use
their new SSN to get better jobs or improve their education, usually with organizational support.
In the latter limbo, I found DACA youth on Long Island were more afraid of racist or aggressive
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police officers, a situation making it harder to become upwardly mobile even after getting
DACA and having some support by CBOs or FBOs. The DACA laborers were less focused on
advancing their educational prospects and preferred to stay off the radar working on low-paid or
seasonal jobs. Why are Long Islanders less likely to take advantage of educational opportunities?
It seems that education is more available in NYC, and one example of this is the CUNY system,
providing low cost education to immigrant youth.
Mexican immigrants interviewed in Long Island generally had interacted with local
police officers while driving, but evidently the consequences in each case were determined not
only by their immigration status but by the type of infraction. Manuel Moreno told me that
lacking immigration papers has affected his life considerably, especially as a worker. Like other
LTU participants in NYC and the suburbs, he believed that his unauthorized status was his fault:
“if I don’t have papers it is for being careless (dejadez), for being irresponsible.” This indicates
that people like Manuel often think there is ‘a way’ to change one’s immigration status, like
there is a way to get better from a cold or a broken bone by going to the doctor or to the hospital.
This might also indicate that these undocumented immigrants do not acknowledge the structural
policies and institutions that over the years have made it more difficult to overcome an
unauthorized border crossing or an overstayed a visa (about constant police surveillance, see
Haldipur, 2018).
In early 2018, I was notified by a Latino/a family in the area that Manuel Moreno was
picked up by ICE agents outside his apartment, very early in the morning on a weekday, when he
was about to drive to work. As a LTU immigrant in Suffolk for over two decades, Manuel was at
greater risk of deportation due to his bad driving record compared to younger DACA recipients
such as Marco Ramírez or the Reina sisters. I was shocked when I heard that Manuel was
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detained outside his home and was facing prison for months and deportation to Mexico after
more than 20 years in New York. In Eastern Long Island, unlike in New York City, there are
close ties between local police and ICE, the federal immigration police, making immigrant
vulnerability higher. These ties and cooperation have made targeting people like Manuel easier,
especially under the Trump administration, as the Obama-era ‘standards’ or priorities of
detention and deportation have been replaced.
Manuel Moreno was detained by ICE and sent to a detention center in New Jersey less
than a week after his arrest, precisely because of charges from his driving record. Manuel
Moreno, a 39-year-old construction worker from Mexico living with three children and their
mother in 2017, had confessed to me that he had a problem: ‘drinking too much.’ At the
beginning of our first recorded conversation Manuel said: “my life has not been easy (…) I had
problems with alcohol.” In fact, he was stopped more than once driving under the influence, and
on one occasion his minor children were in the car, a felony in New York State. This was a
serious offense against Mr. Moreno, which made him a priority for deportation despite the
support provided by friends, neighbors, family members, and despite his participation with a
local FBO. After his detention, this FBO provided some assistance to his partner in finding legal
advice and paying rent (about $1,500 for a two bedroom). The same organization that helped
familia Moreno during the deportation process, also introduced me to Marco Ramírez and two
young DACA mothers with less serious traffic tickets, but who also experienced precarious
immobility as DACA recipient in a limbo of laborers.
Six out of seven cases of Mexican families with DACA recipients in Long Island,
including Marco’s family, reported strong or positive organizational activity, and only two were
headed by non-beneficiaries of that policy. Table 6.4 includes additional information for the
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cases, which in general terms also showed low educational attainment (five cases with less than
10 years of schooling), inconsistent intra-family dynamics (only one had consistent, active or
positive dynamics), and a yearly family household income range between $20,000-$50,000.
Three cases, familias Ramírez, Morales Reina and Morones Reina, reported very low average
educational attainment for the heads of the family household and did not show any educational
planning. These cases are described in more detail in the following subsection.
Table 6.4 Six Mexican families with high vulnerability in Suffolk (Long Island), 2015-2017

Family
Cosme
Lomas
Ramírez
Morales Reina
Vazquez
Morones Reina

Status heads
DACA
DACA
Undocumented
DACA
Undocumented
DACA

FBOs
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Ed. Heads
6
10
3
4
9
9

Intra family dynamics

3.Inconsistent, inactive, none
3.Inconsistent, inactive, none
3.Inconsistent, inactive, none
3.Inconsistent, inactive, none
1.Consistent, active, positive
3.Inconsistent, inactive, none

FHI
$20,800
$35,100
$35,500
$44,500
$46,800
$52,000

Ed.Pl.
No
Some
No
No
Some
No

Familia Ramírez: Limited support before enlisting?
Marco Ramírez decided to apply for DACA because there was one FBO, trusted by his
mother that offered this service for free in his community. I have categorized this place as less
immigrant-friendly because Mexicans and other Latinos are frequently targeted for traffic tickets.
Marco is a DACA recipient born in 1998, living in a mixed immigration status family household
in a suburban town of the East End of Long Island. Familia Ramírez lives in the same town as
familia Íñiguez in Long Island (see Chapter 4), but they are considerably less successful in terms
of socioeconomic mobility. Unlike familia Íñiguez whose close relatives provided help to get
housing in the area and insurance for their cars, familia Ramírez had a hard time achieving this
because landlords asked them for a social security number; Marco and his relatives knew very
few people who were documented or ‘legal’ immigrants “de confianza” (people of trust).
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Marco’s mother and stepfather are both unauthorized immigrants, both only attended
about three years of elementary school in Mexico. His baby sister was born in the United States.
Marco obtained DACA in 2015. The family rents a large basement with one main room and one
bathroom for $900 a month. In 2016, their family household income was estimated at $35,500
annually. Marc, a nickname given by a schoolteacher in the sixth grade, his mother and four
older siblings (two lived in Brooklyn) were born in a rural town in Puebla. Unlike Aranza,
Marco’s parents knew very little about DACA, provided little guidance or companionship, and
the family trusted almost entirely in the FBO to move ahead with his application.
We met for the first time in the office of a Catholic organization collaborating with the
MIDA project. His mother usually gets support (i.e. finding housing, filling out paperwork,
getting some extra food or paid work) from the religious sisters in that organization. Marco
remembers being raised by his grandmother in a rural town in Mexico. His mother and one aunt
left Mexico in 2004 and decided to settle in Long Island. Marco shared with me memories of his
childhood in Mexico, and like all the other DACA recipients I encountered, he only crossed the
border once. Since the time that we first met (2016) to the last time we spoke (2018), he had
decided to enlist in the army, NYPD, or any other law enforcement agency. After he got DACA,
the organization had a very difficult time trying to reach and talk to Marco.
“Before I had DACA, I was like in the shadows, because I did not have a social [security
number]; I could not open a bank account; I could not have a driver’s license.” Marco answered
after I asked him how the policy changed his life. Marco remembers being different from the rest
of his peers at school, because of economic struggles at home and the reality of “living in the
shadows” (his words) before DACA. While attending school, he received support from five
different teachers –including one ESL teacher, the one that gave him his current nickname– and a
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few classmates. He explained to me how his life felt different before and how he learned that he
was undocumented while looking for jobs at a very young age. “Now that I have DACA I feel
freer (más libre), happier (más contento),” he said.
After his first job at a winery, he had summer jobs in local restaurants as a busboy,
making $200 or $250 in tips during a weekend. It seems that Marco equates his immigration
status with his economic situation and noticed that other people around him who were U.S.
citizens did not face the same situation. Life “out of the shadows” for Marco also meant more
economic responsibility, because he stopped his education and followed the path of his older
LTU relatives in the immigrant economy of the suburbs. After finishing high school, Marco
decided to take a break from school and worked in the landscaping business, between Memorial
Day (last Monday in May) and Labor Day (first Monday in September), getting paid $600 in
cash.
One year after he finished high school, Marco started working full-time on landscaping in
Long Island. He was also doing some side jobs, such as helping a DJ at parties. He was still
living with his family and told me he was not worried about Trump or ICE activity near where he
lives. He said that because he had DACA he was not worried and kept looking for more work.
In the summer of 2017, Marco got at least three traffic tickets, which cost him around
$650. He already had a NYS driver’s license. He got one ticket for speeding, one for not keeping
enough distance from another car, and the last one for not having his license with him. He felt
that the judge helped him by not giving him such a hard time. Marco got his first traffic ticket in
2015 for a broken taillight and not having a driver’s license, costing him $400. In 2018, Marco
asked me about “advanced parole” for DACA recipients so he could visit his grandmother in
Mexico and was seriously considering taking a vacation to Cancún or Acapulco even when his
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earnings had not changed substantially since 2016. He got the three tickets with DACA and
considering that these were minor traffic infractions the consequences were also minor. He did
not have any sort of ID card when he was stopped, but he feels the reason why the judge did not
give him a hard time was because he accepted the tickets and paid what he was told. However,
from his story and based on similar cases of Mexicans being pulled over in the area, Marco was
most likely racially profiled while passing by a well-known local road with racist police officers
because of his darker skin color and his old car.
Marco’s DACA application was not difficult, because his school trajectory allowed him
to have proof of presence, and also thanks to the support of the local FBO that introduced us.
This is the only organization that he has ever been affiliated with, mostly because his mother
pushed him to take catechism classes when he was younger. However, there were some other
situations that Marco and his family did sort out with the help of organizations. For example, in
2015 when he was first screened for MIDA, Marc did not have a Mexican passport and his
biological father refused to sign the papers for him to get one as a minor. Despite not seeing each
other for a decade, Marco’s mother knew how to locate the father and eventually, with the help
of the FBO, they got his signature. After getting DACA (and to reiterate) Marco was harder to
find, not only by me but also by the FBO that introduced us, because he was working a lot of
hours. Due to limited support from the FBO, he forgot to renew his DACA on time, illustrating
the low level of organizational activity for a young DACA worker like Marco, living in a nonimmigrant friendly place as a laborer with high vulnerability.
When I met Marco, he told me he is very proud to be the first in his family graduating
from high school, but also dreams about being able to own a business, buy a house and a new
car, and to help his mom stop working. Right before and after getting DACA, he was only able
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to buy food for his family on weekends (usually Chinese or Mexican, he told me). Marc helps his
younger sister with her homework, so she will not live through what he did in school (when no
one at home helped him), and so she can go to college. He explicitly asked me that when sharing
and writing his story to mention that he strongly believes in God, that he prays, that he can’t do
anything without God’s help, and to tell other youth that lack papers “que le echen ganas
también” (to give it your all too). Between late 2016 and early 2017, Marco was considering
taking courses and getting professional licenses (plumbing, carpentry or auto-mechanic), but he
was substantially more interested in the possibility of enlisting in the army or becoming a police
officer in New York City or in Suffolk.
The case of Marco Ramírez is one of deferred mobility with high vulnerability because
getting DACA, with the help of an FBO to do the paperwork and application, allowed him to get
a driver’s license, open a bank account, and feel better in a non-immigrant friendly locality. The
only FBO around him, the one that his mother trusted, was also key in getting a new passport and
paying the application fee. After he got DACA, Marco got a somewhat better job, was getting
paid slightly more and was able to work in activities other than landscaping, such as at parties as
a Deejay. Marc inhabits a limbo of laborers and not of learners, because with DACA he has
focused more on his work trajectory than on his education. With DACA, he has seriously
considered joining the army or the police, but those doors remained closed (because they are
currently only open for U.S. citizens). However, despite not being able to enlist, Marco keeps
searching for work opportunities to bring more money to his family household, including
contributing to rent money and paying for more family dinners.
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Las Reina: Thriving sisters, working mothers
Mónica and Zoraya are sisters and “DACA moms” born in Mexico, living in the same
building in Long Island, but in two separate and different family households. Mónica Morales
Reina shares the economic responsibilities of her home with her partner and her mom, all of
them undocumented. Zoraya Morones Reina lives next door with a sibling (an adult DACA
recipient) and her dad (undocumented). Each sister has one U.S.-born minor child, but only
Mónica lives with the biological father of her child. Both sisters work full-time, dropped out of
school for economic reasons, occasionally get support from a nearby local FBO, and they have
received multiple traffic tickets while driving, just like Marco Ramírez.
The reasons behind their low educational attainment and family household income has
to do with their parents and Mónica’s partner. While Zoraya and her sibling’s last year of
education in the U.S. was 11th and 12th grades respectively, their parents and partner only
attended a couple of years of elementary school in Mexico. Except for Zoraya, the other adults in
each household are employed seasonally in the landscaping industry. The estimated family
household income for Mónica was around $45,000 and for Zoraya, working as a packer at a local
factory, $52,000 annually. Mónica’s and Zoraya’s parents, in their mid and late 50s, are also
undocumented landscaping workers and have worked considerably fewer hours in recent years
because of their age.
Since 2004, in the case of Mónica, and 2011 for Zoraya, the sisters have received
organizational support from the FBO that introduced me to them. This Catholic organization is
the only one they know and trust and is the same one that helped them to apply for DACA and
take GED courses that might allow them to complete one additional year of education. Thanks to
this FBO, they also started going to BOCES of New York State, a program of shared educational
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services for certain school districts. Their children also participate in this FBO, and it was their
mother who found the organization and sought support for the first time, a few years after she
arrived in Long Island. Even when their father emigrated in the early 1990s, before anyone else
in the family left Mexico, he did not know about this FBO in Long Island. Over the years, the
organization has supported the sisters and their families with food and paying rent, finding
lawyers or legal advice, and with educational issues.
Among the traffic tickets they have received over the years, the Reina sisters mentioned
speeding, not having child seats, parking, and driving without a license. It is interesting that both
sisters, in separate interviews, mentioned that police officers in the area take advantage of
immigrants, but they still trust to call them if their life was in danger. They had not experienced
verbal aggression or harassment from any police officer. Zoraya explained that some people in
the area where they live talk about police officers treating everyone fairly, but some others talk
about how police also harass drivers. Mónica got her first ticket in 2010 for speeding, paying
around $450. Then she paid another in 2012, around $500, for not using the baby seat and
lacking a license. They also mentioned paying $75 for parking tickets. Like other Mexicans and
Latino immigrants in the area, they mentioned certain roads and routes, at specific hours, in
which the probability of being stopped by cops was higher. Both sisters agreed on the importance
of getting driver licenses to drive safely and with confidence to work.
When answering questions about how lacking legal status had affected their lives,
Zoraya and Mónica gave different but complementary answers. Mónica said that she would like
to have a better job and travel to Mexico, because after 12 years she wanted to visit. Zoraya said
she wanted to buy a house and have health insurance. Both sisters also mentioned how important
education was for them and for their children. They both had been motivated by DACA to get
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their GED diploma and offer more educational opportunities to their children by “work[ing] to
support them,” said Zoraya. Mónica dreams of “having better stuff” at her home, “having a
business” with her parents, and “finishing studying.” In short, for the Reina sisters DACA was
sort of a reminder to move their educational trajectory forward, and a motivation to boost the
educational prospects of their children.
The Reina sisters had a harder time getting DACA than any other previous DACA
recipient presented in this chapter and even compared to most of the cases I was able to follow.
In fact, the FBO asked the MIDA project for help with the request for evidence from the DHS,
such as documents about continuous presence in the United States, educational programs’
enrollment verification forms, and including affidavits and sworn statements. The MIDA team
provided some help to the FBO and the sisters by getting these documents from schools,
hospitals, banks, libraries, and other institutions that had records. In April 2018, a year before her
first renewal, Mónica told me that her work permit “made [her] job easier,” and she “feels safer
with DACA.” However, she was also worried about the increasing presence of ICE in the
community and felt more fear with Trump as president compared to Obama: “that fear of [the
DACA program] being cancelled, and they go back to how things were before (…) it is not easy
without a social [security number] and without a [driver’s] license at jobs, and without papers.”
This, of course, was not an irrational fear, but a very real possibility during Trump’s presidency.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I argue that families in the Bronx with DACA recipients inhabit a limbo
of learners because of the sustained community support they received from several CBOs,
positive or mostly positive interactions with law enforcement agencies despite unauthorized
status, and by moving their educational prospects forward. Families with DACA recipients in
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Long Island were more likely to inhabit a limbo or laborers due to the more limited support
provided by the few FBOs and CBOs in the area, negative or mostly negative interactions with
police agents (more likely to target immigrants for traffic tickets), and efforts focused on the
labor market or the economic needs of the family instead of education.
Almost all the immigrants I interviewed put great value on education; however, not
everyone had support to access higher education or lived in immigrant-friendly places with
access to services. The two key elements that determined the type of limbo that DACA recipients
interviewed in this project inhabit are the result of positive or negative effects associated with
organizational support and interactions with police. The chapter showed that Aranza Olalde,
Martha Loredo, Alma Vélez, Rolando Lara and their families lived with various reliable CBOs
around them. Further, they resided in a place in which interactions with police were less likely to
lead to deportation or abusive practices based on immigration status. Their deferred mobility
with low vulnerability in the Bronx has led them to pursue college education for themselves or
for their children with DACA and change of status has also improved their working conditions.
They are getting paid sick days and vacations, allowing them to dream of other jobs or
occupations they did not have access to before (like a health professional or restaurant owner).
Meanwhile, Marco Ramírez and the Reina Sisters have more limited FBO support in an
immigrant-hostile place, an area with more policy scrutiny and cooperation between local and
federal authorities to track and deport people. Their deferred mobility with high vulnerability
occurs in Suffolk, where even though educational prospects seemed dim or narrow, with DACA
they are slowly growing by with better salaries and opportunities in the local labor markets.
Getting DACA, for individuals and families, allowed immigrant youth to feel safer in
their communities, to find better paid jobs with benefits, get driver licenses and receive access to
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multiple institutions. These elements are key to improving the family household income and
educational plans or prospects for Mexican immigrant families in New York, particularly in local
ecosystems that are more inclusive to the foreign born and therefore reduce their vulnerability.
DACA has allowed individuals (both heads and members) of family households to aspire for a
better life, and to seek additional work and educational opportunities in order to improve their
socioeconomic well-being. Most of these chances and opportunities, in general terms, are less
available to other unauthorized immigrants without DACA. Legal status, therefore, is very
important for DACA recipients and their families, because, unlike most long-term undocumented
immigrants, these are individuals accessing key “socially valuable stuff” (see Alba & Foner,
2015) earlier in their lives to effectively make a life out of the shadows for themselves and their
relatives, working towards full integration in New York.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION: ‘PAPERS’ FOR IMMIGRANT FAMILIES AND SOCIAL
MOBILITY ACROSS BORDERS
Legal immigration status is not the only factor influencing upward mobility for Mexicans living
in New York. Some individuals and their families are able to achieve notable socioeconomic
successes, even as undocumented migrants, largely because of their higher human capital, social
networks, and intra-family dynamics. Families headed by undocumented immigrants from
Mexico can be upwardly mobile in U.S. urban neighborhoods or suburban towns with oftentimes
contradicting attitudes towards the foreign-born. For younger immigrants in families however,
legal status is one of the most important variables in determining their upward mobility. Further,
the value of receiving DACA (deferring deportation and allowing access to a work permit) often
depends on context as well. The lives of immigrant youth with DACA might change completely
for the positive. DACA recipients can seek more direct and sustained access to “socially valuable
goods” at an earlier moment in their labor or educational trajectories, promoting stronger cultural
affinities to the receiving society compared to other long-term undocumented (LTU) immigrants.
The socioeconomic mobility of contemporary Mexican-New Yorkers in family
households is a complex process in which immigration status (i.e. papers), local ecosystems (or
places), human capital, social networks and intra-family dynamics are essential variables. By
focusing on 53 Mexican family households in New York City and Long Island (including 92
participants: 61 undocumented, 18 DACA recipients and 13 with other status), complemented
with census and survey data, I found that a variation in mobility outcomes and socioeconomic
profiles persisted. Most of the family households headed by long-term undocumented
immigrants from Mexico that I encountered reported low or very modest income and educational
prospects. Only a few families reported a high family household income and displayed what I
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call “strong educational planning.” They represent exceptional cases of upwardly mobile
Mexican immigrant families that have been able to prosper and improve in the city and suburban
towns, despite living in local ecosystems where many residents and officials have negative
attitudes towards the foreign-born. These exceptional cases of “upward mobility while
unauthorized” had three elements in common: moderate to high human capital (defined by
educational attainment and labor skills), strong, reliable social networks (with relatives who have
lawful immigration status), and positive intra-family dynamics (identified by looking at
partnering and parenting decisions at home).
Precarious immobility, a socioeconomic situation in which immigrants are neither
upwardly nor downwardly mobile in terms of income and educational prospects, was the rule
rather than the exception for the Mexican family households studied in this dissertation.
However, even those cases classified under this condition showed variation in access to support
from community or faith-based organizations (i.e., CBOs or FBOs) and in their experiences with
law enforcement agents. Common denominators among people in this group were low or very
low levels of human capital, constrained or limited social networks, and almost no positive intrafamily dynamics. The levels of organizational support and the types of interactions with police
allowed me to identify a higher or lower level of vulnerability for these immigrants, meaning
they were more or less likely to experience detention due to status and face deportation. In other
words, the level of vulnerability, a component of precarious immobility for Mexican immigrants
in New York, was clearly determined by the local ecosystem (including access to organization
support and interactions or treatment by police).
A tri-dimensional theoretical model of immigrant social integration illustrates how key
variables in this dissertation (i.e., immigration status, local ecosystem, and family dynamics) are
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useful to identify situations of exclusion and inclusion for immigrant families under the current
mass deportation regime in the United States. This regime is defined as a collection of negative
ideas and actions by governments towards the legal, sociopolitical, and physical exclusion of
unauthorized or ‘low-status’ immigrants, primarily from countries in the Americas, which
includes the Caribbean, and also the Asia-Pacific region. More specifically, the deportation
regime has negatively affected immigrant and transnational communities in the United States
from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, China, and Honduras, but also from other countries such
as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Philippines,
South Korea, and India. In this dissertation, I argue that one way to link the study of social
mobility and the notion of limited inclusion is by identifying and differentiating levels of
vulnerability for undocumented immigrants across more or less immigrant-welcoming places.
Vulnerability in this dissertation was defined as a concept related to harm or suffering for
undocumented immigrants, particularly because of risk of deportation, family separation, or loss
of goods and properties acquired after longer periods of settlement. Furthermore, in the analysis
of the social mobility of immigrant families, it must be noted that vulnerability should be seen as
one component of the condition of precarious immobility. Families with exceptional cases of
“upward mobility while undocumented” also experience this type of immigration status
vulnerability, but less so because of their individual and community efforts to access more social
and economic resources after several years of settlement, thereby avoiding and reducing risks
and losses.
Theoretical discussions on assimilation, immigrant integration, and social inclusion,
along with literature on settlement patterns for the foreign-born in the United States, show that
new forms of segregation are emerging in the contemporary urban and suburban landscapes.
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Hence, it is understandable that race and ethnic origin, in combination with social class and
socioeconomic variables, are central to the study of immigration and social inequalities across
the globe. This type of research and its findings are also proof of how the post-1965 immigration
waves in the United States, including many Latinos and Asians, have challenged and changed
theoretical frameworks, public perceptions, and perhaps the social practice of race, ethnicity and
immigration status beyond the traditional dichotomy of “black vs. white” or “legal vs. illegal
immigration.” It remains to be seen how first, 1.5, and second-generation individuals are
identified (or not) as part of national or transnational communities in places like New York,
challenging (or not) ethno-racial and socioeconomic hierarchies within or outside their local
ecosystem, especially depending on their socioeconomic mobility in the coming years.
I claim that the roles of immigrant status, place (or local ecosystem), human and social
capital, and family household units (familial context) are crucial to mitigate negative effects and
identify gradations of immigrant vulnerability as previously defined. Mexicans in New York,
U.S.-born and foreign-born, with or without documentation, have been settling across the five
city boroughs and throughout several counties in the state over the past three decades. There is
not one single “Little Mexico” in New York City. However, noticeable concentrations of U.S.born and foreign-born Mexicans are located in three boroughs: Queens, Brooklyn, and the
Bronx. Further work is required to understand how neighborhoods within these areas, such as
Corona and Jackson Heights in Queens; Sunset Park and Bushwick in Brooklyn; or Mott Haven
and Melrose in the Bronx, could explain the urban geographic dispersion and certain disparate
socioeconomic outcomes of Mexicans by age, sex and place of birth. Place matters a great deal
in the quest for better opportunities and for understanding current inequalities. 124 For Mexican
124

For example, recent work by economists (Chetty, Hendren, & Katz, 2016; see also Wolfers, 2015) shows that the
Bronx is extremely bad for income mobility for children in poor families (it is among the worst counties, ranking

225

immigrants, place becomes even more relevant when we look at local ecosystems with more
welcoming policies towards the foreign-born –such as in the case of New York City– compared
to less welcoming and even hostile places for unauthorized migrants like some towns in Eastern
Long Island.
About 376,000 Mexicans in New York City were geographically dispersed throughout
approximately ten neighborhoods in 2015, while in Long Island their presence was also
scattered, although comparatively smaller. In Suffolk County, a very large suburban area of New
York State, fewer than seven thousand Mexicans reported higher naturalization rates, more
household income and high homeownership compared to those in Queens and the Bronx,
according to census estimates. Suburban Mexicans in Eastern Long Island had a median
household income close to $50,000 USD, still somewhat lower than other foreign-born
immigrants from Central and South American countries in the same area, but above the estimate
for Mexicans in the five boroughs ($46,000 USD in 2015).
Exceptional and rare cases of upward mobility by unauthorized Mexicans heading
families were found both in NYC and Eastern Long Island. Out of the 53 family households
included in this dissertation, only half a dozen reported a family household income above
$70,000 USD between 2015 and 2017 or “strong and consistent educational planning.” This last
outcome variable was defined as the process of preparing, applying, or exercising verbal plans
and actions to advance the educational attainment of adults and children within the immigrant
family household beyond high school and college graduation. Marcela and Claudio Arias, in
Queens, as well as Fernanda and Rodrigo Íñiguez, in Eastern Long Island, were identified as
household heads of the few long-term undocumented immigrant families with high educational
120th out of 2,478 counties, better than only about 5 percent of counties) while Queens is pretty bad but not as bad (it
is better than about 27 percent of counties).
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attainment, English proficiency, developed labor skills, strong kinship and local networks, and
positive partnering-parenting decisions, leading to exceptional upward mobility (see Chapter 4).
I call the strategy used by these families in order to take advantage of their human capital,
networks, and family dynamics: “transferability of skills with supportive legal immigrant ties
and positive dynamics within households.”
Most of the family households headed by long-term undocumented Mexicans in New
York were not upwardly mobile. However, many were supported by nonprofits or other local
organizations and institutions in their neighborhoods, including street vendors such as food
trucks. The majority of the cases included in this dissertation were experiencing precarious
immobility, a situation in which families headed by undocumented immigrants are
socioeconomically stuck in low paid occupations, but their children's lives and prospects were
supported by institutions, organizations, and networks providing assistance or protection.
Precarious immobility, in other words, portrays a condition in which undocumented immigrants
are neither upwardly nor downwardly mobile in terms of family household income and
educational prospects compared to other ethno-racial groups. It was the most common situation
for undocumented persons in my study, but I found variation in access to organizational support
and experiences of interaction with law enforcement agents by location. More importantly,
different combinations of the key variables analyzed in this dissertation resulted in precarious
immobility with higher or lower levels of vulnerability. 125
Four cases of Mexican families in New York exemplified how vulnerability is a
component of precarious immobility. Familias Barrios, in the Bronx, and Salcido, in Queens,
reported family household incomes below $36,000 USD. But compared to other cases, they had
more educational attainment, strong or moderate organizational activity, beneficial interactions
125

It is beyond the scope of this dissertation, however, COVID-19 most likely impacted these families differently.
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with other public institutions around them and mostly positive encounters with the police in New
York City. Therefore, their precarious immobility was combined with less vulnerability, because
of better education and the community support they received from organizations and institutions
around them. Socorro Cortés and her family, on the other hand, were still highly vulnerable,
despite having moderate support from organizations, because they lived in immigrant-hostile
Suffolk. Meanwhile, Eduardo Naranjo and his family in Queens displayed low formal education
and no CBO support. Hence, his immigrant vulnerability is high because he lacks sustained or
reliable access to information and networks providing community support, and even his contact
with Los Nómadas, a taco truck offering multiple connections and information to other Mexicans
and immigrants, was weak. Community support across places is important in determining the
vulnerability of those immigrants experiencing precarious immobility, especially while
interacting with law enforcement agents.
Deferred mobility, a type of precarious mobility for family households with DACA
relatives, where the sudden granting of partial status opens up educational and work
opportunities their lack of legal status had previously denied them, was also identified in this
dissertation. For deferred mobility, place mattered by allowing greater access to education in
New York City, while in Suffolk County, DACA recipients were more focused on labor. But the
most important point here, when looking closer at deferred mobility among Mexicans in New
York, is that organizational support and fewer negative interactions with police fostered limited
upward mobility for DACA recipients in the Bronx as a limbo of learners. However, those on
Eastern Long Island were closer to immobility because of intense police scrutiny as a limbo of
laborers, even while receiving minimum support from FBOs. Getting DACA, for individuals and
families, allowed immigrant youth to feel safer, find better paying jobs with benefits, get driver’s
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licenses and receive greater access to multiple institutions. Legal status is crucial for DACA
recipients in families because, unlike long-term undocumented immigrants, they are able to
access “socially valuable goods” earlier in their life trajectories, allowing them to seek fuller
integration within the country.
One central aim of this dissertation was to demonstrate that the Mexican immigrant
community, far from being homogeneous, hidden or utterly powerless, is actually diverse, active,
and increasing their strength in New York, despite structural barriers and their fairly recent
arrival in this part of the country. Although lack of legal immigration status is still a major
obstacle for the social mobility and well-being of first-generation Mexican immigrants in the
United States and their offspring, the fact that a few of them are making it is a sign of hope. This
is not to say that comprehensive immigration reform in the United States is not necessary. On the
contrary, major federal legislation to regularize all immigrants is necessary, extremely urgent,
and would particularly benefit undocumented immigrant youth and mixed-immigration status
families (many of those with young U.S.-born children). What I found in this research was that
very few long-term undocumented immigrants living in family households were able to be
upwardly mobile because of their lack of legal status, even despite high human capital, strong
social networks, and positive family dynamics. This was true in places that were immigrantfriendly, and also places that were more hostile to minorities.
I experienced several limitations while doing this dissertation project. First, beyond the
initial difficulty of finding people from Mexico who were undocumented and willing to share
their stories, I was not able to develop a parallel strategy to include a higher number of
participants who were U.S. citizens or Legal Permanent Residents. Therefore, my findings are
almost exclusively centered on non-citizens, quasi-regular (i.e. DACAs), and irregular
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immigrants. A similar situation occurred with regard to locating DACA recipients, because I had
a difficult time locating participants with this status (across sites) as well as with finding
opportunities to talk with them. Accessing each family required a lot of time and trust;
obviously, I was not able to visit their homes in every case or, as it is said colloquially in
Mexico, “enter all the way to the kitchen” to interview them and learn more about their lives.
After some time conducting interviews, particularly with people not linked to any CBO or FBO,
I realized that I had to clarify and demonstrate that I did not work for any government or
authority in Mexico, the United States or in New York.
Regarding the various components of this empirical research, it is critical to clarify and
highlight not only limitations, but also advantages. My participation in the Mexican Initiative on
Deferred Action, or MIDA project, allowed me to expand my ethnographic sites and access
beyond one street vendor and an amateur soccer team in Queens to multiple immigrant-serving
CBOs and FBOs in other parts of the city and the suburbs. In some cases, I was able to
incorporate participants from MIDA databases, while in other cases that was not possible. Out of
the 92 individual cases that I followed for over three years, I was only able to record interviews
for about two thirds of them, although I have notes for each case and have been in touch with
almost all of the families over the years. Out of the 92 individual cases, 28 of them were
originally part of MIDA and the other 64 were not directly linked to that project. 126 The MIDA
team, led by Rob Smith, allowed me to be part of multiple research discussions and to expand
my fieldwork. However, one important limitation of MIDA was the different schedules and
research aims of that project compared to my dissertation, because at certain points the fieldwork
and coding for my research was behind or ahead of what the team expected. For example, a
126

See appendix for a more detailed breakdown of the 92 individual cases and the 53 family households included in
the dissertation.
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Qualitative Comparative Analysis and other data analysis techniques seemed appropriate both
for the dissertation and for the MIDA project, but ultimately some of these required more time
and resources than I was able to dedicate or allocate.
Along with a call to the U.S. Congress, organized civil society groups or activists, and
to other actors in favor of comprehensive immigration reform, promoting circular migration
favoring migrant families and promoting human rights across borders, based on this dissertation
work I suggest the following policy recommendations: The U.S. federal government should
promote and facilitate specific temporary visas (i.e. a new type of “non-immigrant family visas”
promoting circularity and flexibility to entrepreneurships) for Mexicans with relatives (in first
and second degree) living in the United States. The Mexican government, at the federal, state,
and municipal levels, should facilitate, complement, and reduce costs for Mexican passports or
other documentation for travel, and assist applicants in gathering the required documentation to
apply for any type of visa offered by any other country. This does not mean that Mexico should
promote widespread emigration, but instead should provide reliable information on the formal
and legal or regular ways to travel abroad, mostly paying attention to the needs of potential labor
migrants, migrant families, students, professionals, artists, entrepreneurs or others sociodemographic profiles in need of crossing an international border. To law enforcement officials in
both countries, racial profiling as a practice must be eradicated and not tolerated. To local and
subnational authorities in both countries, more efforts are imperative to promote access to
education (including validations and certifications) for immigrants of all ages and for adults to
acquire professional licenses or permits. Mexico and the United States, at all levels of
government, must foster and offer incentives to civil organizations providing community support
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for immigrants and other minorities, including the simplification and availability of public
permits to street vendors and allocating additional funds promoting education at all levels.
The social mobility and integration of international migrants, including their children
and families, is inextricably linked to regularization policies, from granting legal status to
enabling access to valuable social “goods or stuff” in U.S. society. In the past ten to twenty
years, Mexico has transitioned from being a country of massive emigration, to one of increasing
immigration and settlement by returned Mexicans, Central Americans in transit, and other
migrants crossing the country from more distant societies, including asylum seekers or refugees
from South America, Asia, and Africa, often originally intending to arrive in the United States or
Canada. The inhumane immigration discourses and policies designed, launched, and executed by
the Trump administration, along with the acquiescence of President Andrés Manuel López
Obrador, have turned Mexico into an unexpected but forced destination for multiple types of
migrants. Violations of human rights against international migrants in Mexico are pervasive and
have existed for a long time, even before the first San Fernando massacre or the assassination of
Anastacio Hernández Rojas in 2010 by U.S. immigration agents. Nativist and xenophobic
attitudes are emerging and sprawling in Mexican northern cities like Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez or
Matamoros, but also among Mexicans in other towns are cities in the interior and all the way to
southern states such as Veracruz, Oaxaca, Chiapas, and Tabasco. The latest episode of these
increasingly visible anti-immigrant sentiments occurred around the Central American migrant
caravans in 2018. It is paramount that future research work on social mobility and integration in
North and Central America transcend simplistic, homogenizing, and criminalizing approaches
towards international migrants and focus on new local destinations and societies with
considerably less historical immigration experience, such as the case of Mexico.
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International migration over the past three to five decades has changed the nature of
race relations in the United States and in other parts of North America in different ways,
including how immigration enforcement has conceived of border zones, as well as transforming
the interior of each country: in places of origin, transit, destination and return. History reminds us
that changes in racial-ethnic relations are the rule. We should pay attention to the mutable nature
of race relations at diverse moments of migrant trajectories. After looking at the Mexican
geographic dispersion in New York City and State, in relation to local and transnational public
policies targeting this community over the past decades, new questions about social, economic,
and political exclusion in a transnational context will emerge.
Beyond these transformations, a central element in contemporary analyses of
international migration is the notion of change (see de Haas et al., 2020), not only at the global
level or for social dimensions, but also around local, regional, political, cultural, and economic
issues. All these transformations also imply that societies in countries of origin, transit, return,
destination, and re-emigration could be affected by international migrants and their families in
several ways, including socioeconomic marginalization in ethnic enclaves or rampant violation
of human rights. We should pay attention to the interventions of diverse actors in the migratory
process and across migratory systems (such as the nation-state and its agencies, subnational or
regional governments, transnational corporations, unions, community- or faith-based
organizations, home-town associations, and multilateral institutions), affecting the conditions and
social mobility of millions of individuals seeking inclusion in lands different from the ones
where they were born.
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APPENDIX
For this dissertation, 92 individual ethnographic cases were developed and collected between the
fall of 2014 and the summer of 2017 in two counties in New York City –the Bronx and Queens–
and over three towns in the East End of Suffolk County in Long Island (about 80 miles East of
Midtown Manhattan). Almost all of these cases were incorporated into the Mexican Initiative for
Deferred Action project, initiated in the summer of 2015, which includes other areas, regions,
and counties in New York State and the metro area (see Smith & Yrizar Barbosa, 2018). 127 The
92 cases I developed are mainly short biographies, fieldwork notes, labor and migratory
trajectories of foreign-born Mexicans, most of them unauthorized immigrants, who have been
living in New York for an average of 16 years and an estimated median family household
income of $43,000.
Basic socio-demographic information for 92 cases developed for over two years are
presented in Table 8.1 to provide a clearer picture of the group of people I worked with. Except
for eleven participants, eighty-one cases included in this research project were born in Mexico
and lived in the United States for a decade or more. 128 Along with the idea of purposefully
including a balanced number of participants by sex (51% women), my intention was also to
acquire half of the cases from the two local ecosystems based on my four points of entry,
resulting in 45% cases residing in New York City and the rest in Long Island.
The median age of the cases examined was 35 years old, about three quarters of them (or
74%) were between 26 and 45 years of age. Almost two thirds of the cases (or 61 people) in this
There are cases that have not been included into the MIDA databases because no formal intake or interview was
originally used, some other cases were part of focus groups only, and finally a few cases have missing information
that still is being updated or verified and notes were gathered with their authorization and approval to participate in
the research. The Mexican Initiative for Deferred Action (MIDA) was a research and intervention project to promote
DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) applications lead by. Robert C. Smith in Baruch College (+1,700
surveys/intakes conducted since 2015).
128
These eleven participants were either non-born in Mexico, documented immigrants, or U.S. citizens by birth.
127
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project openly declared to me that they were unauthorized immigrants; 18 more were DACA
recipients, and the rest had another regular immigration status or situation such as being U.S.
citizens, Legal Permanent Residents, Temporary Protected Status, or valid visa holders. About
70% of the participants were identified through CBOs that were MIDA partners in New York
State. It also shows that a majority of the participants had children and were not attending school.
The average educational attainment for those who said that they were undocumented as well as
the and the DACA recipients was between 9 and 11 years.
Forty two percent of participants were born in the State of Puebla, followed by Tlaxcala
(13%) and Guerrero (11%). Except for San Luis Potosí, the rest of participants were from states
in Southern Mexico, such as Mexico City, Morelos, Estado de Mexico, Veracruz, Hidalgo, and
Oaxaca. An important gap in family household income was identified by immigration status: a
median of about $35,000 for heads who were undocumented (37 cases), $43,000 for families
with at least one DACA recipient (18 cases), and $78,000 for heads who had lawful status (nine
cases). 129 Most of the cases included in this study are LTUs or “long term undocumented
immigrants” because of their long period of stay in the United States, usually over 10 years.
The focus of the dissertation fieldwork was on 53 households headed by at least one
undocumented immigrant from Mexico. 130 The median income for these family households was
$35,500, but six cases had more than $70,000 in income. This section examines how those
higher income families became upwardly mobile. Table 8.2 includes variables relevant to the
framework proposed here to trace the socioeconomic mobility of unauthorized immigrants living
in family households. Furthermore, this approach is useful to developing set-theoretic
129
Two out of the nine families with authorized heads were also counted as part of the 36 unauthorized cases:
familias Hermosillo (father with tourist visa, mother undocumented) and Mora (father with TPS, mother
undocumented).
130
Out of the 92 individuals mentioned earlier, 67 are included as part of the 53 households of interest. Each
household is defined either by one or two individual participants included in the study.
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connections as is suggested by Charles Ragin (2008). These seven variables and two outcomes
are key to identifying variation and commonalities in the study of the 53 cases, allowing me to
focus on those displaying higher family household income and educational planning.
Three quarters of the family households I selected were headed by undocumented
immigrants only. The other families were headed by DACA recipients (11 cases) and only two
families had couples who were a Temporary Protection Status or TPS recipient and a tourist visa
holder sharing responsibilities with unauthorized partners. Nine out of ten families had an
immediate relative (adult or minor) who was born in the United States, was a U.S. legal
permanent resident, or a DACA recipient. Only five cases (households) reported not having
multiple statuses, a situation identified in couples without children present, because they did not
have children or their children were in some other place, or are single migrants living with
partners, friends, or roommates. Fifteen families did not report any active participation in CBOs
or FBOs; a higher number of families involved in these organization were living in Long Island
(22 cases) compared to NYC (16 cases, more in the Bronx than in Queens).
Negative interactions with police or law enforcement agencies varied by place. Seventeen
family households in Long Island mentioned frequent negative interactions with police agents by
them or people they know, while the 21 families in New York City mentioned very few or none.
Twenty-three families in Long Island reported moderate to serious negative interactions with
police and law enforcement agencies, while only 9 reported “some or not major” encounters in
New York City. However, the cases of family households with negative police interactions in
which the heads had nine or more years of education declined across counties, and more so in the
case of Suffolk (only seven cases out of 23). Furthermore, fewer families reported harmful law
enforcement interactions if any DACA, U.S. citizen or LPR adult was part of the household or
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was a close relative of the family. Notably the median family household income for cases in
Long Island in which positive intra-family dynamics were identified as ‘fairly present’ or
‘consistent and active’ was higher ($39,500, n=8) compare to those lacking positive intra-family
dynamics ($36,800, n= 15).
The average number of years of formal education reported by the heads of the family
households was the same compared to Table 8.1 for the 92 cases. 131 Three additional variables
within each family household were initially simplified with dichotomous answers or categories
(e.g. yes or no, corresponding to characteristics present or absent for each case). These variables
were recoded into three categories to parse it more finely and to describe variation in the data
(see Figure 8.1). The first of these variables is about the identification of “developed labor skills”
and the second one about the “social networks” type. Even when the affirmative responses for
these two questions was the same under the dichotomous coding (12 cases), the families differ in
each case. Only seven families had both characteristics, developed labor skills and strong
networks (see Table C in Figure 8.1) The last variable included in this framework corresponds to
“intra-family dynamics” to deal with the presence or absence of “positive partnering-parenting
decisions” in the family household. Notice that, as a dichotomous variable, in seven families
these ‘decisions’ were identified, three of them were in Long Island (Suffolk) and four in New
York City (Bronx and Queens; see Table F in Figure 8.1).
Two outcomes linked to upward mobility included in Table 4.2 are the total family
household income reported in a year, with a median of $35,000 (average of almost $42,000) for
families of approximately four relatives: two adult earners born in Mexico in charge of two
minors born in the United States, and the identification of strong and consistent educational
planning, more visible and verbalized for children and minors in the second generation.
131

Even when the focus is on the 53 households, the 92 cases are included to show the ‘larger’ group of participants.
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A detailed analysis of these mobility outcomes by place and for each family is presented
in Figure 8.2 and Table 8.3. The former figure shows the relationship between years of education
for the heads of the household and the annual family household income reported by place. In the
Bronx, the relationship was negative, while in Long Island, Queens and in aggregate terms was
positive. The latter table shows the 53 cases sorted by family household income and place,
including the six cases where a consistent educational planning was identified. Going or talking
in detail about going to college or graduate school, saving and using money to that end, and
getting help in applying to different schools and scholarships, are crucial elements for a strong
educational planning.
The higher income and its positive relationship with education in Queens and Long
Island but not in the Bronx could be explained by looking at factors and variables included in
Table 8.4. Families in Queens reported more educational attainment (11 years on average) and
higher number of people with developed skills or more reliable and stronger networks. In the
Bronx, families were larger (5.5 relatives) and had more U.S.-born minor children (2.8 kids).
Long Island had the lowest level of education (6 years on average) but it had a higher number of
adult relatives with lawful status, including DACA recipients, allowing access to better paid or
more stable jobs, among other goods, such as housing and health care, despite being in a hostile
environment. Another possible explanation for the positive relationship in Queens and Long
Island, but not in the Bronx, could be related to the number and type of jobs in each place. When
looking at the first and last occupation reported by informants in each place (see tables 8.8, 8.9,
8.10 in appendix), its noticeable that families outside the Bronx reported more than one job at the
same time despite limited occupational mobility for the undocumented.
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After paying close attention to the 53 cases and the seven relevant variables previously
suggested, a set-theoretic connection can be established combining the two outcomes of interest
and location of immigrants were living in New York. Table 8.5 shows there is connection
between place of residence (e.g. city vs. suburban towns) and no upward mobility for the people
included in the study, because almost all the cases of families headed by unauthorized migrants
from Mexico living in the Bronx, Queens or Suffolk did not report a family household income
above $60,000 USD and did not display educational planning to improve their education
(UPMOB). Only six cases, four in the city and two in suburban towns, might be experiencing
upward mobility because of their high family income plus encouraging plans towards
education. 132
An alternative and detailed way to see how the 53 cases fared across the seven variables
and the two outcomes of interest is shown in Table 8.7. For each family household, the presence
or absence was determined across six of the seven variables. If a condition was detected, a value
of 1 was assigned otherwise it was a 0. Therefore, if both heads of the household were
undocumented, not DACA recipients or other valid immigration status, a zero was assigned in
the first variable (UNDOC). A value of one was coded for those cases who were actively
involved in CBOs or FBOs (PLACBO) and did not have frequent negative interactions with law
enforcement agencies or police (PLAPOL). Formal education (EDUC) for the heads of the
households remained as a continuous variable. If cases lacked “developed labor abilities”
(SKILLS), strong and reliable social networks (NETW), or positive intra-family dynamics
(INTFAM) they were coded as zeros. The two dependent variables are also listed for yearly

According to Alba, “where people live tends to reflect their income, and hence cannot be readily used to explain
income difference” (personal communication). However, the idea here is that equifinality, a concept I used referring
to different paths leading to the same outcome, would help explain why some people in Bronx with more education
were reporting less income compare to those in Queens and Long island
132
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family household income (FHI, continuous) and for educational planning (EDPLAN,
categorical). For this variable, the operationalization corresponded to clearly identifying several,
some, or very few elements related to going to college, or saving money and getting help to that
end. Cases of upward mobility in Table 8.6 included under the UPMOB require further
interpretation particularly for two of these six families in which the heads were either DACA or
long-term unauthorized ‘Mexiyorkers.’
But before looking at the cases an important question is: how do these independent and
dependent variables vary together or not? Regression models (Figure 8.11 in appendix) show that
social network and intra-family dynamics had positive and statistically significant effects when
family household income is the dependent variable. The effect of status, CBO, and not having
police interaction were also positive (not significant), while education and skills were negative
(also not significant). A logistic regression for educational planning exposed other key results.
The linear regression model indicates that having a valid status, participating in local
CBOs, lack of negative interactions with the police, strong and reliable social networks, as well
as encouraging intra-family dynamics have positive effects on the family household of Mexican
immigrant families in New York with unauthorized status. Interestingly, the model also shows
that more years of education among the heads of the family households and more developed
skills had a negative effect for higher income. However, the logistic regression model, which
excluded intrafamily dynamics as a covariate (see appendix), specifies a negative effect of
immigration status (not significant) and the positive and very important effect of CBO
participation and the educational attainment of the heads (both significant) on having some or
solid educational planning (dichotomous).
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The “successful” and extraordinary upward socioeconomic mobility of the family
households headed by (i) Anel García, (ii) Marcela and Claudio Arias, (iii) Rodrigo and
Fernanda Íñiguez, as well as (iv) Javier and Hilda Arias Hernández leave room to highlight the
concept of equifinality (see George & Bennett, 2005; Ragin, 2008). Two of these four cases were
head by DACA recipients (García and Arias Hernández) and the other two by long-term
undocumented parents (Arias and Íñiguez). Only one of these cases was in Long Island, two
were from Queens, and the other one from the Bronx. Anel García’s partner was a young U.S.
citizen, about the same age (early 30s), and they did not have any children. The other three
couples had two children each. Only in the case of the Íñiguez family were the children born in
Mexico; in fact, they are DACA recipients, and the oldest was living on his/her own. These four
families had heads of households with 11 years of formal education or more, plus strong and
reliable networks around them, constituted by people with multiple immigration statuses,
providing support. Except for Javier and Hilda, in the other families the presence of developed
skills and positive intra-family dynamics was identified. These four cases clearly illustrate that
the outcome of upward social mobility is the result of different combinations of conditions.
Only two families headed by undocumented immigrants consistently showed positive
high scores considering the seven variables, the two outcomes, and after ranking the values for
all the cases. Familias Arias and Íñiguez lived in different places, Queens, and Long Island,
having opposite interactions with law enforcements agencies, and only the latter actively
participated in a local FBO. However, in both families the parents had very high educational
attainment, developed labor skills, had strong and reliable networks constituted by close relatives
or neighbors with legal immigration statuses, and displayed positive intra-family dynamics
allowing them to preserve more than two jobs while sharing housework with their children.
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These two families also had very high family household income compared to the other fifty
cases, an amount very similar to the one reported by other families in which no one was
undocumented. 133 The cases familias Arias and Íñiguez will be developed in more detail in the
following section.
Emilio and Pamela Hernán (21 and 27 years old respectively) are siblings: born in a rural
town bordering the states of Puebla and Tlaxcala but residing in two separate households in the
same neighborhood in the Bronx. Their parents went to the United States when she was 11 years
old, and he was 4. Pamela filled out a MIDA questionnaire, and thanks to her closeness to a
community-based organization (CBO) in the Bronx, she was able to receive support and
assistance to apply for and receive DACA. At the time of our first interview in 2017, Pamela was
five months pregnant and lived with her partner, who was also born in Mexico but did not
qualify for any type of immigration relief. He supported Pamela’s preparing all the paperwork
for her application. Emilio believed he did qualify for DACA, but he felt unsure about applying;
it was Pamela who insisted, successful convincing him. Pamela allowed me to know more about
Emilio’s story, and how he lived in another household with her parents, two married siblings and
their children.

One of these cases is familia Jaramillo in Long Island, in which the two heads were legal permanent residents and
their two children were U.S. citizens. The family household income reported by the Jaramillo family was $75,000.
During this research I collected data for a total of seven families in which both heads had lawful status.
133
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Table 8.1
Cases of immigrants from Mexico & Latin American countries living in
New York (Queens, Bronx, and Suffolk), 2015-2017

Sex
Cases
Female
51%
47
Male
48%
45
Years of age (median)
35
16-25
16%
15
26-45
73%
67
46 +
11%
9
Immigration status at time of interview
Unauthorized or Undocumented
66%
61
DACA recipient
20%
18
Other situation (including U.S. citizens, LPR, TPS, and valid visas)
14%
13
Place of residence in New York State
New York City (Five boroughs, almost exclusively Queens and the Bronx)
45%
41
Long Island (East End of Suffolk County)
55%
51
Identified through CBO/FBO-MIDA partner in New York State?
Yes
70%
64
No
30%
28
Have children?
Yes
85%
78
No
15%
14
Attending school?
Yes
15%
78
No
85%
14
Years of education (average, all)
9.3
92
Unauthorized / Undocumented people
8.6
61
DACA recipients
11.3
18
Years in the United States (average)
Unauthorized / Undocumented people
16
61
DACA recipients
14
18
State/region of birth
Puebla
42%
39
Tlaxcala
13%
12
Guerrero
11%
10
Ciudad de México, Morelos, and Estado de México
11%
10
San Luis Potosí, Veracruz, Hidalgo, and Oaxaca
11%
10
Others (including places outside of Mexico, USA, in Latin America)
12%
11
Median family household income
Headed by one or more undocumented immigrants
$35,000
37
With at least one DACA recipient (not necessarily the head)
$43,050
18
Headed by at least one head with lawful immigration status
$78,000
9
Occupation (main one; only DACA & Unauthorized people included: 79 cases)
Cooks and food preparation workers; waiters, waitresses and dishwashers
16
Family-housework (unpaid, all female)
15
Landscaping, grounds keeping, agricultural workers, janitors & cleaners
11
Construction (paid, all male)
8
Domestic workers & housekeeping cleaners (paid, all female)
7
Self-employed (different activities & sectors)
7
Students (full time)
6
Others (various occupations, activities, and sectors)
9
Source: Author and MIDA estimates based on fieldwork in New York City and the East End of Long Island. N=92.
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Table 8.2
Variables relevant to the immigrant socioeconomic mobility of Mexican families in
New York (Queens, Bronx, and Suffolk), 2015-2017
1. Immigration status
% or other
Cases
Head(s) of family household*
Unauthorized or Undocumented
75%
40
DACA recipient
21%
11
Other**
4%
2
Any USC, LPR, DACA (immediate relative, adult or minor)
Yes, one or more USC minors (only)
66%
35
Other combination of USC or DACA minors or adults
25%
13
No combination or other (include people living with friends, roommates)
9%
5
Any USC or LPR adult in the household or close relative
Yes
25%
13
No
75%
40
Any DACA present in the family household
Yes
28%
15
No
72%
38
2. Active participation in CBOs or FBOs
Yes, in NYC
30%
16
Yes, in Long Island
42%
22
No (only one case in Suffolk)
28%
15
3. Negative police interactions reported
None or minimal (all in NYC)
40%
21
Some and minor
28%
15
Numerous or serious (all in Long Island)
32%
17
4. Education, head(s) of family household***
Median (mean)
9.0 yrs. (8.7 yrs.)
5. Developed labor skills
High value, specialized, English required
9%
5
Somewhat specialized, some English might be required
28%
15
Low value, almost no English required, not very specialized
63%
33
6. Social network type
Strong, reliable, lawful status
15%
8
Moderate, partly reliable
49%
26
Weak, unreliable, no status
36%
19
7. Intra-family dynamics: positive partnering-parenting decisions
Continuous, active, balanced
15%
8
Fairly present, sporadic
40%
21
Uneven, inactive, none
45%
24
Family-household income (annual)
Median (average)
$35,500 ($41,690)
Mean size
4.3 people
Median number of earners and minors in household who are U.S. citizens
2 earners, 2 minors
Strong-consistent educational planning
Yes
11%
6
Some
53%
28
No
36%
19

*The head of the household was self-identified by respondents or identified based on their role or responsibilities in the
family by its members; it was usually either one adult person or a couple.
**Other refers here to couples in which one person was undocumented and the other one had a valid status, such as a
tourist visa holder from Mexico or a Central American with a temporary protection status.
***If more than one family-head identified in the household, then the average was estimated and reported.

Source: Author and MIDA estimates based on fieldwork in New York City and the East End of Long Island. N=53.
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Table 8.3
Cases of family households headed by Mexican undocumented immigrants or DACA recipients in New York
(Queens, Bronx, and Suffolk) by place and main outcomes, 2015-2017

Family name (first names)
Hernán Ley (Pamela)
Dávalos (Montserrat/Angel)
Fernandez (Silvia)
Lara Lozano (Rolando)
Vélez Valdéz (Alma)
De Jesús López (Gabriela)
Guillén (Teresa)
Olalde (Alba/Aranza)
Barrios (Anastacia)
Martínez (Hilario)
Ruelas (Jaime)
Garza (Romeo)
Loredo (Martha)
Zamudio (Amanda)
Hernán (Emilio)
González (Andreina)
Muñiz (Alberto)
Hermosillo (Antonio/Paty)
Rojas (Juan)
Eduardo (Naranjo)
Salcido (Esteban/Alan)
Casillas (Yadhira)
Peláez (Arturo)
Lopez (Ezequiel)
Marín (Carlos Jano)
Solis (Alma)
Quiñones (Santos)
Arias (Claudio/Marcela)
Arias Hernández (Javier/Hilda)
García (Anel)
Cortés (Socorro)
Arenas (Romelia)
Cosme (Maribel)
Huesca Tello (Adan)
Rojo (Francisco)
Ramos (Ramon)
Ríos (Fernando/Malena)
Faz (Omar/Esther)
Lomas (Lorena)
Ramirez (Marco)
Islas (Roque)
Huesca (Gonzalo)
Manzo (Rigoberto)
Íñiguez Nowak (Sofia)
Ortíz (Franco/Angelina)
Valles (Elena/Josefina)
Morales Reina (Monica)
Salinas (Josefa)
Vazquez (Graciela/Mario)
Moreno (Yvonne/Manuel)
Morones Reina (Zoraya)
Íñiguez (Rodrigo/Fernanda)
Mora (Mercedes/Mauricio)

Status of head(s)
DACA
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
DACA
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
DACA
DACA
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
Visa/Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
DACA
DACA
Undocumented
Undocumented
DACA
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
DACA
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
DACA
Undocumented
Undocumented
DACA
Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
DACA
Undocumented
TPS/Undocumented

Other status for immediate relatives
Yes: USC (minors), DACA (adult)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC & DACA (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (one minor)
Yes: DACA (adult) USC (minors)
Yes: USC (adults & minors)
No
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors), LPR (adult)
Yes: USC (one minor)
Yes: DACA (minor)
Yes: USC (adults & minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
No*
No
Yes: USC (adult)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (adults & minors)
No*
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC & DACA (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC & DACA (minors)
No
Yes: USC (one minor)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (one minor)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: DACA (minors)
Yes: USC (minors)
Yes: USC (one minor)
Yes: DACA (minor)
Yes: USC (minors)

Place
Bronx
Bronx+
Bronx
Bronx
Bronx
Bronx+
Bronx
Bronx
Bronx
Bronx
Bronx
Bronx
Bronx
Bronx+
Bronx
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens+
Queens
Queens+
Queens+
Queens
Queens
Queens+
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens
Queens+
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island+
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island+
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island

FHI (USD)
$20,480
$21,000
$21,000
$21,840
$22,000
$26,000
$27,500
$33,800
$35,000
$35,360
$39,000
$52,000
$57,600
$60,000
$118,000
$19,760
$20,000**
$23,400
$31,000
$31,200
$31,200
$35,000
$39,000
$41,600**
$45,000
$45,000
$55,000
$87,000
$88,000
$117,000
$19,500
$20,000
$20,800
$24,000
$28,800
$29,080
$32,500
$33,000
$35,100
$35,500
$36,800
$37,400
$38,500
$41,600**
$43,000
$44,000
$44,500
$45,000
$46,800
$52,000
$52,000
$72,000
$78,000

Educ. Plan.
Some
Some
Some
Some
Some
Some
Some
Yes
Some
Some
Some
Some
Some
No
No
Some
No
Some
No
No
Some
No
No
Some
No
Some
No
Yes
Some
Yes
No
No
No
Some
No
No
No
Yes
Some
No
Some
Some
Some
Yes
No
No
No
No
Some
No
No
Yes
Some

**Annual income for respondent as a single person in a nonfamily household.
* Parents with U.S.-born children, adult or minor, living in Mexico,
+ These cases lived or were identified as residents of two or more boroughs or counties in New York State or the metropolitan area.
Note: All family names and first names are pseudonyms.
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Figure 8.1
Bivariate tables and summary statistics for key independent and dependent variables among family
households headed by Mexican undocumented immigrants or DACA recipients in New York, 2015-2017

A. CBO participation and police interactions:

D. Skills and networks (three categories):

C. Labor skills and social networks (dichotomous):

F. Family dynamics (2 c.) and place (or county):
E. Educational planning and family dynamics (2 c.):

H. Educational attainment (heads), family household
income, family household size, number of earners:
G. Educational planning and family dynamics (3 c.):

B. Police interactions and place (or county)
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Figure 8.2
Years of formal education and annual family household income for Mexican families in
New York (Queens, Bronx, and Suffolk), 2015-2017
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Table 8.4
Independent, dependent and other key variables of interest among Mexican families in
New York (Queens, Bronx, and Suffolk), 2015-2017
5. Dev.
6. Soc.
7.Intra
1. Status in
2. CBO
3. Police
4. Educ. att.
IV:
skills
Networks
Fam. D.
Fam. Hld.
activity
neg. inter.
heads (avg.)
Bronx

DACA: 4
LTU: 11

Yes: 15

Yes: 0

9 yrs.

Yes: 2

Yes: 0

Yes: 2

Queens

DACA: 3*
LTU:12*

Yes: 1

Yes: 0

11 yrs.

Yes: 7

Yes: 8

Yes: 2

Suffolk

DACA: 6*
LTU: 17

Yes: 22

Yes: 23

6 yrs.

Yes: 3

Yes: 4

Yes: 3

DV: FHI
(Median)

DV: Educ.
Planning

Fam. Hld.
Size (avg.)

Fam. Hld.
Earners

USC minors
(avg.)

USC | LPR
adults

DACAs in
Fam. Hld.

Bronx

$33,800

Yes: 1
Some: 13

5.5

1.9

2.8

Yes: 1

Yes: 5

Queens

$39,000

Yes: 2
Some: 7

3.1

1.5

1.1

Yes: 8

Yes: 3

Suffolk

$37,400

Yes: 3
Some: 8

4.4

1.6

2.3

Yes: 4

Yes: 7
N= 53

247

Table 8.5
Place of residence and socioeconomic mobility for Mexican families in
New York (Queens, Bronx, and Suffolk), 2015-2017
Bronx

Queens

Suffolk, Long Island

Upward mobility*
1
3
2
No upward mobility
14
12
21
*UPMOB (=1) was a variable defined by the absence or presence of two elements: an annual family household
income higher than $60,000 USD and consistent educational planning.

Table 8.6 shows the estimated family household income for 18 DACA recipients I
followed up with and interviewed since 2015 with the support of the MIDA project,
including Pamela and Emilio Hernán. When I met them, they were living in separate family
households not far from each other in the Bronx. Pamela lived with her partner and their
first child. Emilio was living with his two parents and three brothers: two older who are
married, and one younger. Except for Emilio and his young brother, no one else has papers.
Therefore, there are six undocumented adults, one DACA, and one minor U.S.-born child
living under the same roof. That is, eight people with different immigration statuses, mostly
unauthorized, pulling together about $120,000 USD annually. Like some other long-term
undocumented immigrants over 40 years old whom I interviewed, Emilio told me that his
dad had a problem with his birth certificate that made him unable to get a passport, a
consular ID, and therefore any other identity document such as the New York City ID.
Pamela and her partner were making about $20,500 USD a year with one child and one on
the way. These two estimates for the Hernán siblings, living in two separate households,
put them at the low and high end of the family income reported by the DACA recipients I
encountered in New York City and Long Island up to 2017.
Once he finished high school and similarly to other DACAs I encountered, Emilio
did not continue studying right away because he decided to work and help his family
financially. Like other younger DACAs interviewed in MIDA, Emilio does not only have
248

tasks, responsibilities, and obligations working outside the household but also inside
helping relatives. His parents and older brothers have full-time jobs in construction, while
the mother cleans houses. His sister in law take care of the children most of the time, but
when she sporadically works, Emilio is the one in charge of the children. Emilio began to
assume responsibilities as an adult at age 16, and eventually explained me that he is the one
in charge of his five-year-old brother who, unlike the rest of the people in that home, was
born in the United States. When Pamela got married, she moved with her partner to another
place, but Emilio's older brother decided to stay with the parents.

Sex
Female
Female
Female
Male
Female
Female
Male
Male
Other*
Female
Male
Female
Female
Female
Other*
Male
Female
Male
Average

AGE
27
27
33
16
17
25
19
16
24
24
18
28
36
26
17
35
29
21
24.3

Table 8.6
Mexican DACA recipients in New York, 2015-2017

Pseudonym
Pamela Hernán
Maribel Cosme
Alma Vélez
Alan Salcido
Aranza Olalde
Lorena Lomas
Marco Ramirez
Rigoberto Manzo
Íñiguez, older child*
Monica Morales Reina
Mario Vazquez Jr.
Zoraya Morones Reina
Martha Loredo
Amanda Zamudio
Íñiguez, younger child*
Javier Arias Hernández
Anel García
Emilio Hernán
Average

EDU
11
9
9
11
11
9
12
10
14
11
12
11
11
11
12
11
17
12
11.3

State of birth
Tlaxcala/Puebla
Puebla
Guerrero
Tlaxcala
Morelos
Puebla
Puebla
Puebla
Puebla
Puebla
Puebla
Puebla
Puebla
Guerrero
Puebla
Tlaxcala
CDMX
Tlaxcala/Puebla
Average:

YRSUS
15
13
16
13
15
11
11
13
13
11
11
12
22
13
13
12
25
17
14.2

PLA
Bronx
Long Island
Bronx
Queens
Bronx
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Long Island
Bronx
Manhattan
Long Island
Queens
Brooklyn
Bronx
Median:

FHI
$20,480
$20,800
$22,000
$31,200
$33,800
$35,100
$35,500
$38,500
$41,600
$44,500
$46,800
$52,000
$57,600
$60,000
$72,000
$88,000
$117,000
$118,000
$43,050

Emilio, as a DACA recipient, said that every day he fears that something will
happen to his parents and relatives because of not having papers. Earlier, in a separate
interview, Pamela also expressed the fear of deportation as a major worry. Emilio’s request
for DACA took four months to process. The first interview we had happened after Trump
took office. Emilio said he was very anxious because of the deportations. He feared that he
or his parents would be sent to Mexico, and then said that it is something he thinks about
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every day when he wakes up. According to Emilio, the fact of receiving DACA did not
diminish his fear of being deported.
When describing his educational experience in the Bronx, Emilio remembers that in
the schools he attended there were many gangs (“gangas, pandillas”). He decided to
distance himself from his schoolmates who were in gangs by dressing in a different way, in
a very formal way, business type. Emilio remembers that his friends told him that he was
dressing as if he was going to a school in Manhattan, because he did not wear baggy jeans,
and long shirts. The main reason why Emilio left school after high school was financial
because he saw how his parents had difficulties in paying rent and keeping up with the
household expenses. At first his parents did not know that he had left school, and he lied to
them about it while looking for a paid job.
Once school was out of his immediate plans, Emilio began looking for temporary
and informal jobs, while helping with the cleaning of his parents' house and taking care of
his little brother. But once he received DACA, and thanks to the fact that he had a social
security number for the first time, Emilio was able to find a formal job, with benefits, and
he was hired as a waiter in a restaurant in Midtown Manhattan. He liked this job more than
the domestic chores in his home, and his co-workers were also very supportive and treated
him with respect and camaraderie.
Thanks to DACA, Emilio has been able to get a more stable and better paid job, but
the ghosts of an undocumented life are not gone. As a waiter in a restaurant, he considers
that he earns enough to support his family financially. He gets paid more than minimum
wage and has some sick days and vacations. Although the change to DACA has been
positive from an economic perspective, Emilio said he had the same level of stress and
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anxiety about deportations. He fears that he, his parents, or siblings could be trapped by the
Trump administration and sent to Mexico.
Emilio considers that his neighborhood in the Bronx is safe during the day, but not
so during the night. Her sister Patricia shared this same perception when I talked to her.
Both brothers recognize the great help that nonprofits or CBOs in the Bronx have given
them, especially to get ahead in school and more recently to obtain DACA. Emilio believes
that New York in general is a good place for immigrants and described it as a sanctuary city
for immigrants like him. He said that if he had a different immigration status, as a resident
or U.S. citizen, he would like to be a mechanic or courier-messenger, because that way he
could earn more money. Emilio agrees with the postulate that “America is the land of
opportunities,” despite the fact that he had to leave school because of economic and family
pressures; despite the fact that his parents have been discriminated against for not speaking
English; and despite that every two years he has to pay approximately $ 500 to the U.S.
government to be able to renew DACA, his work permit and the key to his limited social
inclusion in New York.
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Table 8.7
Cases, relevant variables, and mobility outcomes (ranked) for family households headed by Mexican
undocumented immigrants or DACA recipients in New York, 2015-2017

FAM-ID
Hernán
García
Arias Hdz.
Arias
Mora
Iñiguez
Zamudio
Loredo
Quiñones
Moreno
Morones R.
Garza
Vázquez
Marín
Solís
Salinas
Morales R.
Valles
Ortiz
Iñiguez N.
López
Peláez
Ruelas
Manzo
Huesca
Islas
Ramírez
Martínez
Lomas
Casillas
Barrios
Olalde
Faz
Ríos
Eduardo
Salcido
Rojas
Ramos
Rojo
Guillén
De Jesús
Huesca T.
Hermosillo
Vélez V.
Lara Lozano
Dávalos
Fernández
Cosme
Hernán L.
Muñiz
Arenas
González
Cortés

UNDOCH
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0

PLACBO
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1

PLAPOL
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0

EDUCH
8
17
11
14
6
14
9
11
7
7
9
9
9
12
12
9
4
5
9
14
7
12
7
3
6
5
3
12
11
6
12
11
9
6
9
12
8
5
5
6
10
9
9
9
9
11
9
7
12
9
1
16
6

SKILLS
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

NETW
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

INTFA
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

FHI
$118,000
$117,000
$88,000
$87,000
$78,000
$72,000
$60,000
$57,600
$55,000
$52,000
$52,000
$52,000
$46,800
$45,000
$45,000
$45,000
$44,500
$44,000
$43,000
$41,600
$41,600
$39,000
$39,000
$38,500
$37,400
$36,800
$35,500
$35,360
$35,100
$35,000
$35,000
$33,800
$33,000
$32,500
$31,200
$31,200
$31,000
$29,080
$28,800
$27,500
$26,000
$24,000
$23,400
$22,000
$21,840
$21,000
$21,000
$20,800
$20,480
$20,000
$20,000
$19,760
$19,500

EDPLA
Some
Yes
Some
Yes
Some
Yes
No
Some
No
Some
No
Some
Some
No
Some
No
No
No
No
Yes
Some
Some
Some
Some
Some
Some
No
Some
Some
No
Some
Yes
Yes
No
No
Some
No
No
No
Some
Some
Some
Some
Some
Some
Some
Some
No
Some
No
No
Some
No

Source: Author and MIDA estimates based on fieldwork in New York City and the East End of Long Island.
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UPMOB
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0

.25

.5
Fraction of the data

.75

1

0

.25

.5
Fraction of the data

.75

1

0
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Quantiles of fhi
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Figure 8.3
Distribution of income and educational attainment (for heads of family household) in quantiles for
Mexican immigrant families (N=53) in New York City, 2015-2017
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Table 8.8
First and current occupation of the Mexican interviewees and cases in the Bronx, by sex, year of birth
(YOB), years living in the United States (YUS), 2015-2018

Sex

First U.S.
occupation

2015-2017
NY occupation

2018
Status

YOB

YUS

Male

1996

17

Student

Waiter

DACA

Female

1991

13

Student

Food runner

DACA

Female

1981

22

Student

Cleaning

DACA

Male

1984

16

Factory worker

Entertainment (music)

Undocumented

Male

1982

19

Grocery, employee

Dry cleaner, employee

Undocumented

Male

1995

10

Student

Food worker, cook

Undocumented

Female

1978

22

Childcare

Childcare, cleaning

Undocumented

Female,
child

1982
2000

15
15

Cleaning, street vendor
(mother); student
(child)

Homemaker (mother);
student (child).

Undocumented;
DACA (child)

Female

1974

19

Cleaning

Cleaning and
homemaker

Undocumented

Female

1989

11

Student

Cleaning

Undocumented

Female

1984

16

Cleaning

Cleaning, homemaker

DACA

Male

1988

14

Food delivery

Food worker, cook

Undocumented

Male,
Female

1981
1980

17
16

Factory worker (M);
homemaker (F)

Undocumented
(both)

Female

1981

12

Homemaker

Construction (M);
childcare, cleaning (F)
Homemaker, sales
self-employed

Female

1990

15

Student

Homemaker

DACA
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Undocumented

Table 8.9
First and current occupation of the Mexican interviewees and cases in Queens, by sex, year of birth
(YOB), years living in the United States (YUS), 2015-2018

First U.S. occupation

2015-2017
NY occupation

2018
Status

Sex

YOB

YUS

Female

1988

25

Student

Male,
Female

1982
1984

12
11

Food delivery, dishwasher
(M); childcare (F)

Male,
Female

1974
1974

21
20

Food delivery, dishwasher,
factory worker (M)

Male

1986

10

Dishwasher

Street vendor, employee

Undocumented

Male

1977

12

Mechanic, assistant

Mechanic, worker and
owner

Undocumented

Female

1976

21

Beauty parlor, worker

Beauty parlor, owner

Undocumented

Male

1976

13

Dishwasher

Food worker, cook

Undocumented

Male,
Female

1975
1985

19
13

Food delivery, factory
worker (M); factory
worker, food worker (F)

Driver, taxi (M);
homemaker (F)

Undocumented

Female

1966

28

Factory worker

Cleaning

Undocumented

Male

1986

11

Landscaping

Grocery store, employee

Undocumented

Male

1980

13

Food delivery, dishwasher

Food worker, cook

Undocumented

Male

1983

11

Dishwasher

Food delivery

Undocumented

Male,
Female

1971
1973

20
18

Driver, moving (M);
homemaker (F)

Visa holder (M)
Undocumented (F)

Male

1989

7

Day laborer, food
delivery

Undocumented

Female

1965

25

Cleaning

Undocumented

Day laborer, sales selfemployed (M); cleaning,
food worker (F)
Dishwasher; construction,
mason
Factory worker
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Administrative
employee, public sector
Waiter (M);
homemaker (F)
Carpentry, waiter (M);
cleaning, administrative
assistant (F)

DACA
DACA (M)
Undocumented (F)
Undocumented
(both)

Table 8.10
First and current occupation of the Mexican interviewees and in Long Island (Suffolk), by sex, year of
birth (YOB), years living in the United States (YUS), 2015-2018

First U.S. occupation

2015-2017
NY occupation

2018
Status

Sex

YOB

YUS

Female

1974

12

Homemaker

Male
Female

1969
1974

19
13

Landscaping (M);
homemaker (F)

Male

1978

19

Dishwasher

Female

1988

12

Student

Male,
Female

1976
1970

15
10

Landscaping (M);
homemaker (F)

Female

1985

9

Student

Female

1993

11

Student

Female 1,
Female 2

1982
1961

16
30

Cleaning, dishwasher,
homemaker (both)

Male
Female

1986
1988

15
16

Landscaping (M);
homemaker (F)

Construction, employee
and contractor (M); food
preparation, salads (F)
Landscaping, cleaning,
delivery, homemaker
Landscaping,
homemaker
Food worker, deli (F1);
cleaning, childcare and
personal care (F2)
Landscaping (M);
cleaning (F)

Female

1993

13

Student

Waitress

DACA

Male

2000

13

Student

Student

DACA

Male,
Female

1979
1984

16
17

Construction, mason (M); Food worker, cook (M);
food worker, employee (F) homemaker (F)

Undocumented
(both)

Male

1979

17

Construction, mason

Construction, foreman

Undocumented

Male

1998

11

Student

Landscaping

DACA

Female

1991

11

Student

Childcare, homemaker

DACA

Male,
Female

1980
1978

18
20

Dishwasher (M);
Cleaning (F)

Construction (plumber),
dishwasher (M); housekeeping, cleaning (F)

Undocumented
(both)

Male

1985

15

Dishwasher

Food preparation, salads

Undocumented

Male,
Female

1985

17

Agriculture, employees
(both)

Agriculture, employee
(both)

Undocumented
(both)

Childcare, homemaker
Construction, interior
carpenter (M); paid
housekeeper (F)
Construction,
dishwasher
Factory worker
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Undocumented
Undocumented
Undocumented
DACA
Undocumented
Undocumented
DACA
Undocumented
(both)
Undocumented
(both)

[Continuation of Table 8.10, Long Island (Suffolk)]

First U.S. occupation

2015-2017
NY occupation

2018
Status

Sex

YOB

YUS

Male,
Female

1982
1985

19
12

Landscaping (M);
homemaker (F)

Landscaping (M);
dishwasher; food
preparation, salads (F)

Undocumented
(both)

Male

1981

17

Food worker, cook

Food worker, cook

Undocumented

Female

1990

13

Student

Homemaker

DACA

Female

1978

15

Agriculture, landscaping

Female

1979

15

Homemaker

Landscaping; Sales,
self-employed
Dishwasher, food
preparation, salads

Undocumented
Undocumented

Figure 8.4
The binational, transnational and immigrant family of Claudio and Marcela Arias*

*Shapes in blue (smaller rectangles) indicate DACA recipients and one U.S. legal permanent resident.
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Figure 8.11
Regression models for key variables: Papers, places, and Mexican families in New York
A. Multiple linear regression:
#1 DV: FHI (continuous), IV: 7 (6 dichotomous and 1 continuous).

Logistic regression:
#DV: EDUCPLA (dichotomous), IV: 6* (5 dichotomous and 1 continuous).

*Intra-family dynamics was not included because in a previous model with the seven key IV it was dropped
(e.g. “intrafam != 0 predicts success perfectly”).
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Table A.1
Mexican Population by Nativity and Four Largest Latino Nationalities in New York City, 2000 – 2015
2000

Population

Mexican
U .S . B o rn (domestic, native)
B o rn in Me xic o (foreign)

Puerto Rican
Dominican
Ecuadorian
Colombian
Total NYC Population

195,356
63,094
132,262
827,490
530,720
151,792
106,709
8,004,759

2005

% of total

2.4%
0.8%
1.7%
10.3%
6.6%
1.9%
1.3%

2010

% of total

Population

245,344
95,236
150,108
826,557
560,788
181,526
110,499

100.0% 7,962,148

Population

3.1%
1.2%
1.9%
10.4%
7.0%
2.3%
1.4%

342,699
145,331
197,368
738,978
605,840
210,532
101,784

100.0% 8,185,314

2015

% of total

4.2%
1.8%
2.4%
19.0%
7.4%
2.6%
1.2%

Population

376,548
187,511
189,037
700,546
723,077
222,793
101,848

100.0% 8,551,938

% of total

4.4%
2.2%
2.2%
8.2%
8.5%
2.6%
1.2%
100.0%

Table A.2
Mexican Population in New York City’s Boroughs by Nativity, 2000 – 2015
2000
Domestic-born
Foreign-born
Total
12,718 34.1% 24,571 65.9% 37,289
19,842 31.7% 42,809 68.3% 62,651
11,984 36.8% 20,546 63.2% 32,530
15,854 28.7% 39,308 71.3% 55,162
2,696 34.9%
5,028 65.1%
7,724
63,094 32.3% 132,262 67.7% 195,356

2005
Domestic-born
Foreign-born
Total
20,672 34.5% 39,282 65.5% 59,954
31,131 42.6% 42,020 57.4% 73,151
18,014 49.7% 18,252 50.3% 36,266
22,560 34.0% 43,890 66.0% 66,450
2,859 30.0%
6,664 70.0%
9,523
95,236 38.8% 150,108 61.2% 245,344

2010
Domestic-born
Foreign-born
Total
Bronx
34,883 39.5% 53,362 60.5% 88,245
Brooklyn
45,648 45.0% 55,885 55.0% 101,533
Manhattan
21,009 48.0% 22,757 52.0% 43,766
Queens
35,482 38.1% 57,619 61.9% 93,101
Staten Island
8,309 51.8%
7,745 48.2% 16,054
Total
145,331 42.4% 197,368 57.6% 342,699

2015
Domestic-born
Foreign-born
Total
43,862 52.3% 40,007 47.7% 83,869
57,843 50.7% 56,184 49.3% 114,027
26,762 58.3% 19,151 41.7% 45,913
47,567 41.2% 67,837 58.8% 115,404
11,477 66.2%
5,858 33.8% 17,335
187,511 49.8% 189,037 50.2% 376,548

Bronx
Brooklyn
Manhattan
Queens
Staten Island
Total

Table A.3
Mexican Origin Population in New York City by Marital Status, 2000 – 2015
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Table A.4
Household Type of Mexicans in New York City, 2000 – 2015

Figure A.1
Naturalized Citizens of Mexican Origin in New York City, 2000 – 2015
30,872

19,805
13,223

13,848

2000

2005

2010

2015

Figure A.2
Citizenship Status among Mexicans in New York City, 2000 – 2015 (Percentage for all Mexicans)
60%

59%
40%

45%

49%
34%

40%

43%

50%

55%

51%
41%

7% 6% 6% 8%
Total Citizens

Citizen by Birth
2000

Naturalized Citizen

2005
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2010

2015

Not a Citizen

Figure A.3
Electorate of Mexican Origin in New York City, 2000 – 2015

95,340

62,224

35,212

30,392

2000
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Table A.5
Mexican Population in New York City’s Boroughs, 2000 – 2015

Table A.6
Percentage of Four Largest Latino Nationalities in New York City’s Boroughs, 2000 – 2015
Puerto Rican
Dominican
2000
2005
2010
2015
2000
2005
2010
2015
40.0%
38.4%
33.2%
37.0%
40.8%
46.4%
Bronx
40.5%
40.8%
Brooklyn
26.4%
26.5%
24.6%
23.1%
15.1%
16.4%
15.9%
14.5%
24.4%
Manhattan
16.0%
14.7%
14.6%
15.8%
34.5%
29.6%
26.9%
13.7%
15.6%
16.7%
16.8%
16.4%
15.9%
Queens
13.4%
14.6%
Staten Island
3.7%
3.5%
5.1%
6.1%
0.3%
0.5%
0.5%
1.1%
Total
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Bronx
Brooklyn
Manhattan
Queens
Staten Island
Total

2000
14.3%
18.4%
11.5%
54.7%
1.1%
100.0%

Ecuadorian
2005
2010
15.1%
18.3%
14.5%
19.1%
10.7%
10.5%
57.1%
49.8%
2.6%
2.2%
100.0% 100.0%

2015
19.1%
13.8%
9.6%
55.1%
2.3%
100.0%
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Colombian
2015
2000
2005
2010
4.17%
5.97%
5.70%
4.92%
10.39%
9.08% 11.20% 10.46%
7.01%
8.57% 10.48% 10.90%
76.78% 74.24% 70.11% 70.18%
1.65%
2.14%
2.51%
3.54%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%

Map A.1
Mexican Foreign-Born Population Concentrations in New York City, 2006 – 2010
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Map A.2
Dominican Foreign-Born Population Concentrations in New York City, 2006 – 2010
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Puebla
Oaxaca
Guerrero
Ciudad de
México
Estado de
México
Morelos
Tlaxcala
Veracruz

Table A.7
Mexican Consular ID cards issued in New York State for selected years (top 8)
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
47.3%
47.9%
48.1%
46.4%
46.5%
43.1%
(6,254)
(19,292)
(10,973)
(11,603)
(15,297)
(17,738)
6.2%
7.3%
11.3%
7.2%
7.7%
11.9%
(820)
(2,955)
(2,566)
(1,790)
(2,530)
(4,887)
9.3%
10.2%
8.4%
11.9%
11.9%
11.8%
(1,237)
(4,114)
(1,923)
(2,969)
(3,911)
(4,877)
10.8%
8.3%
7.3%
8.7%
7.7%
7.0%
(1,434)
(3,340)
(1,666)
(2,163)
(2,534)
(2,863)
6.1%
6.9%
5.9%
6.5%
5.8%
5.3%
(801)
(2,761)
(1,351)
(1,617)
(1,922)
(2,180)
5.1%
4.6%
4.4%
4.7%
4.5%
4.0%
(669)
(1,873)
(1,007)
(1,175)
(1,473)
(1,659)
4.1%
3.8%
3.5%
3.5%
3.8%
4.3%
(544)
(1,538)
(807)
(878)
(1,252)
(1,756)
3.1%
3.4%
3.7%
3.5%
3.9%
4.4%
(415)
(1,389)
(845)
(962)
(1,272)
(1,809)

All states

13,220 (est.)

40,244

22,790

25,002

32,868

41,158

Source: Based on Mexican Institute for Mexican Abroad official records on consular ID cards
Figure A.4
Mexican Consular ID cards issued, 2000-2011 and 2016
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Source: Based on Mexican Institute for Mexican Abroad official records on consular ID cards
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Figure A.5
Mexican Consular ID cards issued to Migrants born in Puebla, 2006-2016
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55,466
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57,048

2012

56,259
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Source: Based on Mexican Institute for Mexican Abroad official records on consular ID cards
Figure A.6
Non-High School and College Graduation Rates among Three Latino Nationalities in New York City,
2015 (in percent of population 25 years of age and older)
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Figure A.7
Educational Attainment Levels among Mexicans in New York City 2000 – 2015
(In percent of population 25 years of age and older)
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Figure A.8
Non-High School and College Graduation Rates among Mexicans in New York City by Nativity, 2015
(In percent of population 25 years of age and older)
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Figure A.9
Non-High School and College Graduation Rates among Mexicans, Dominicans and Ecuadorians in
New York City, 2015 (In percent of population 25 years of age and older)
I. Did not graduate from High School
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Figure A.10
Mexicans College Graduates 25 Years of Age and Older by Nativity in
New York City, 2015 (population 25 years of age and older)
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Figure A.11
Educational Attainment of Mexicans by Borough in New York City, 2015
(Population 25 years of age and older)
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Figure A.12
Median Household Income by Latino Nationality in New York City, 2000 – 2015
(In inflation adjusted 2015 dollars)
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Figure A.13
Median Household Income of the Mexican Population in New York City by
Nativity, 2000 – 2015 (In inflation adjusted 2015 dollars)
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Figure A.14
Median Household Income for Domestic-Born Mexicans in New York City by Borough, 2000 – 2015 (In
inflation adjusted 2015 dollars)
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Figure A.15
Median Household Income for Foreign-Born Mexicans in New York City by Borough,
2000 – 2015 (In inflation adjusted 2015 dollars)
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Figure A.16
Percentage of Household Earnings More than $100,000 Annually by Nativity in
New York City, 2000 – 2015 (In inflation adjusted 2015 dollars)
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Figure A.17
Percentage of People Living in Poverty by Five Largest Latino Nationalities in
New York City, 2000 – 2015
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Figure A.18
Percentage of Mexicans Living in Poverty New York City by Sex and Nativity, 2000 – 2015
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Figure A.19
Percentage of Mexicans Living in Poverty New York City by Age, Sex and Nativity, 2015
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Figure A.20
Employment Rates by Five Largest Latino Nationalities in New York City, 2000 – 2015
(Population ages 16-60)
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Figure A.21
Out of Work Rates by Five Largest Latino Nationalities in New York City, 2000 – 2015
(Population ages 16-60)
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Figure A.22
Unemployment Rates by Five Largest Latino Nationalities in New York City, 2000 – 2015
(Population ages 16-60)
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Figure A.23
Employment Rate for Mexicans by Sex and Nativity in New York City, 2000 – 2015
(Population ages 16-60)
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Figure A.24
Out of the Work Force Rates of Domestic-Born Latinos in New York City, 2000 – 2015
(Population ages 16-60)
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Figure A.25
Out of the Work Force Rates of Foreign-Born Latinos in New York City, 2000 - 2015
(Population ages 16-60)
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Figure A.26
Out of the Work Force Rate for Mexicans by Sex and Nativity in New York City,
2000 – 2015 (population ages 16-60)
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Figure A.27
Language Ability among Mexicans in New York City, 2000 – 2015 (Population 5 years of age and older)
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Figure A.28
Language Spoken at Home of Mexicans in NYC, 2000 – 2015 (Population 5 years of age and older)
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Figure A.29
Language Spoken at Home for Mexicans by Nativity in New York City, 2000 - 2015, (Population 5
years of age and older)
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Figure A.30
Health Insurance Coverage of Mexican Origin by Borough in New York City, 2010
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Figure A.31
Health Insurance Coverage of Mexican Origin by Borough in New York City, 2015
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Figure A.32
Health Insurance Coverage of U.S. Born Mexicans by Borough in New York City, 2010
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Figure A.33
Health Insurance Coverage of U.S. Born Mexicans by Borough in New York City, 2015
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Figure A.34
Health Insurance Coverage of Foreign-Born Mexicans by Borough in New York City, 2010
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Figure A.35
Health Insurance Coverage of Foreign-Born Mexicans by Borough in New York City, 2015
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